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4 PREFACE 
by Emilio Colombo 
President of the European Parliament 
By solemnly signing in Brussels on 20  September 1976 the Act on  the election in May-June 
1978 of  the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, the Nine responded to one of 
the most enduring and popular European aspirations. 
The most enduring because, since it was  first put forward at The Hague Conference in 1948, 
the  idea  of  a  European  Parliament elected  by  direct  universal  suffrage  has  never  lost  its 
attraction. Although it has frequently been disparaged and held up to derision, it could never 
be completely stifled. 
The most popular, because the present organization of Europe - although a necessary stage 
in its development - has none the less failed to elicit the wholehearted support of its peoples 
who  saw  it  as  something remote  from  their everyday  life.  The  election  of  the  European 
Parliament by direct universal  suffrage  provides  an  opportunity of  bringing the debate  on 
Europe into the public forum and of enlisting the active support of the man in the street for 
the construction of Europe. 
Is  the direct election of the European Parliament an end in itself? Obviously not; no more 
than the election of a  national assembly, but certainly no less. The eternal question of  the 
purpose of  Parliament is  no more relevant  to  the  European  Parliament than to  a  national 
assembly. 
Like a national Parliament, a European Parliament elected by universal suffrage will, above all, 
be  the  custodian  of  fundamental  liberties.  It will  also  exercise  control,  not only over  the 
Community budget, now financed by resources directly levied from  the European taxpayer, 
but also  over the Community executive,  thereby preventing the  Community from  drifting 
into technocracy. 
That  is  what  democracy  means.  For  the  vast  majority  of  men  and  women  in  Europe, 
parliamentary democracy remains, in the last analysis, the best possible system. 
Thanks to  the patient and stubborn efforts  of  a  handful of pioneers, the  plan  to  elect the 
European Parliament by direct universal suffrage has surmounted the innumerable political, 
legal and technical obstacles in its path. 
It is now for the governments, parliaments, political parties and the people of Europe to do all 
in their power to ensure that the Act is ratified and that the electoral laws are enacted on time. 
The pages which follow contain the most important documents on the direct election of the 
European Parliament and are published as part of its contribution to the achievement of these 
goals. 
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6 INTRODUCTION 
by Schelto Patijn 
Member of the European Parliament 
Member of the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 
Rapporteur on direct elections to the European Parliament 
The political significance of direct European elections lies  in the fact  that they are  to  take 
place.  It  lies  in  the  creation  of  a  direct  link  between  the  citizens  and  'their'  European 
Community. It is  the citizens  - not the governments  - who  must influence the further 
development and the policies of the European Community through the democratic processes 
which are vital to  all Member States. This will be possible with the help of a directly elected 
European  Parliament  - even  with  the  powers  it  at  present possesses.  For  too  long now, 
opponents of direct elections have claimed that the European Parliament must be given wider 
powers  before  such  an  election  can  take  place,  while  ironically  denying Parliament these 
powers on the grounds that it has not been directly elected. 
The European Parliament has broken out of this vicious circle and made it clear that the one 
does not depend on the other. Naturally, we  must continue to fight for greater powers for the 
European  Parliament  and,  in  particular,  for  legislative  powers  within  the  European 
Community. That, however, is  not germane to the issue of whether we will shortly be able to 
meet as  the peoples' representatives with a mandate given us by the European peoples instead 
of one conferred on us by our national parliaments. Once we  derive legitimate authority from 
a direct link with the European electors, our claims for such powers will be correspondingly 
more legitimate. 
To gain  these  rights  we  are  contending  not with  the  national  parliaments,  but with  the 
Council, which meets behind closed doors to take its decisions. The national parliaments are 
our allies  in  the endeavour  to  bring uncontrolled  power  under the  democratic  control  of 
democratically-elected representatives in the European Community. 
There is  also a purely practical aspect. As  long as we  are subject to the pressure exerted upon 
us  by our dual mandate  - on the national and the European levels  - we  remain amateurs 
here in the European Parliament. We fulfil our legislative and supervisory tasks in Europe in 
so far as  our duties in the national parliaments or in our constituencies allow us to do so. 
A large part of our responsibility still lies within our countries and we can only carry out our 
tasks here by dint of superhuman efforts. 
This  must  stop.  The  development  of  the  European  Community  requires  a  professional 
parliament to  oversee and participate in it.  European elections are a means to this end and 
nothing more. 
The  publication  of  the  texts  of  the  decisions  and  negotiations  on  preparations  for  direct 
elections should give  the public a clearer picture. The national legislative bodies are  called 
upon  to  ratify  the  Decision  and Act of  20  September  1976  and  introduce  the  legislation 
necessary for their implementation - especially the electoral law  - so that the elections may 
duly take  place  in  1978. This interplay of national and Community parliaments illustrates 
7 our claim that it is  not a question of reducing the democractic rights of any parliament. The 
democratic process at Community level will be strengthened by these elections. This is in the 
interests of the people and, therefore, in the interests of all the democratic institutions of the 
Member States and of the Community. 
The  connection  between  direct  elections  and  close  cooperation  by  the  elected  European 
Parliament with the Parliaments of the Member States is  a constantly recurring theme in the 
debates of the European Parliament. Last but not least there is  the broad political consensus 
among the various political groups in the European Parliament in favour of such elections. 
It is to be hoped that this consensus of opinion will also hold good in the Member States and 
help to arouse the interest of the electors. 
8 COUNCIL 
DECISION 
(76/787  /ECSC, EEC, Euratom) 1 
The Council, 
composed of the representatives of the Member States and acting unanimously, 
Having  regard  to  Article  21  (3)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  Article  138  (3)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  Article  108  (3)  of  the  Treaty  establishing the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Assembly, 
Intending to  give  effect to  the conclusions of  the  European  Council in  Rome on  1 and 2 
December 1975, that the election of the Assembly should be held on a single date within the 
period May/  June 1978, 
Has laid down the provisions annexed to this Decision which it recommends to the Member 
States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
This Decision and the provisions annexed hereto shall be published in the Official journal 
of  the European Communities. 
The  Member  States  shall  notify  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Council  of  the  European 
Communities without delay of the completion of the procedures necessary in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements for the adoption of the provisions annexed to this 
Decision. 
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official journal of  the 
European Communities. 
t OJ L 278 of 8.  10. 1976. 
9 Udfrerdiget i Bruxelles, den tyvende september nitten hundrede og seksoghalvfjerds. 
Geschehen zu Briissel am zwanzigsten September neunzehnhundertsechsundsiebzig. 
Done at Brussels on the twentieth day of September in the year one thousand nine hundred 
and seventy-six. 
Fait a Bruxelles, le vingt septembre mil neuf cent soixante-seize. 
Arna dheanamh sa  Bhruiseil, an fichiu Ia  de mhi Mhean F6mhair, mile naoi gcead seacht6 a 
se. 
Fatto a Bruxelles, addl venti settembre millenovecentosettantasei. 
Gedaan te Brussel, de twintigste september negentienhonderd zesenzeventig. 
For Radet for  De europreiske Frellesskaber 
Fiir den Rat der Europaischen Gemeinschaften 
For the Council of the European Communities 
Pour le  Conseil des Communautes europeennes 
Thar ceann Chomhairle na gComhphobal Eorpach 
Per il Consiglio delle Comunita europee 
Voor de Raad van de Europese Gemeenschappen 
(\ 
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Formand 
Der Prasident 
The President 
Le president 
An t-Uachtaran 
Il Presidente 
De Voorzitter Le  ministre des affaires etrangeres du royaume de Belgique 
De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van het Koninkrijk Belgie 
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Kongeriget Danmarks udenrigs0konomiminister 
Der Bundesminister des Auswartigen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Le  ministre des affaires etrangeres de Ia Republique franc;aise 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland 
Aire Gn6thai Eachtracha na hEireann 
11 II  ministro degli Affari esteri della Repubblica italiana 
Membre du gouvernement du grand-duche de Luxembourg 
·-- ~-.,_,-·~ 
De Staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the Commonwealth of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland 
!J. 
12 ACT 
concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal 
suffrage 
Article 1 
The representatives  in the Assembly of the  peoples  of the States  brought together in  the 
Community shall be elected by direct universal suffrage. 
Article 2 
The number of representatives elected in each Member State shall be as follows: 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Article 3 
1.  Representatives shall be elected for a term of five years. 
24 
16 
81 
81 
15 
81 
6 
25 
81 
2.  This  five-year  period  shall  begin  at  the  opening of  the  first  session  following  each 
election. 
It may be extended or curtailed pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 10 (2). 
3.  The term of office of each representative shall begin and end at the same time as  the 
period referred to in paragraph 2. 
Article 4 
1.  Representatives shall vote on an individual and personal basis. They shall not be bound 
by any instructions and shall not receive a binding mandate. 
2.  Representatives shall enjoy the privileges and immunities applicable to members of the 
Assembly  by  virtue  of  the  Protocol  on  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  European 
Communities annexed to the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of 
the European Communities. 
13 Article 5 
The office  of representative  in  the Assembly shall  be  compatible with  membership of the 
Parliament of a Member State. 
Article 6 
1.  The office of representative in the Assembly shall be incompatible with that of: 
member of the Government of a Member State, 
member of the Commission of the European Communities, 
Judge,  Advocate-General  or  Registrar  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities, 
member of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, 
member of the Consultative Committee of the European Coal and Steel  Community or 
member of the Economic and Social Committee of the European Economic Community 
and of the European Atomic Energy Community, 
member of committees or other bodies set up pursuant to  the Treaties establishing the 
European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the 
European Atomic  Energy  Community for  the  purpose  of  managing the Communities' 
funds or carrying out a permanent direct administrative task, 
member of  the  Board  of  Directors,  Management  Committee or staff  of  the  European 
Investment Bank, 
active  official  or  servant  of  the  institutions  of  the  European  Communities  or  of  the 
specialized bodies attached to them. 
2.  In addition, each Member State may, in the circumstances provided for in Article 7 (2), 
lay down rules at national level relating to incompatibility. 
3.  Representatives in the Assembly to whom paragraphs 1 and 2 become applicable in the 
course of the five-year  period  referred  to  in Article  3 shall be replaced in  accordance with 
Article 12. 
Article 7 
1.  Pursuant  to  Article  21  (3)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community, Article  138  (3)  of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
and  108  (3)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  the 
Assembly shall draw up a proposal for a uniform electoral procedure. 
14 2.  Pending the entry into force of a uniform electoral procedure and subject to the other 
provisions of this Act, the electoral procedure shall be governed in each Member State by its 
national provisions. 
Article 8 
No one may vote more than once in any election of representatives to the Assembly. 
Article 9 
1.  Elections to the Assembly shall be held on the date fixed by each Member State; for all 
Member States this date shall fall within the same period starting on a Thursday morning and 
ending on the following Sunday. 
2.  The counting of votes may not begin until after the close of polling in the Member State 
whose electors are the last to vote within the period referred to in paragraph 1. 
3.  If a Member State adopts a double ballot system for elections to the Assembly, the first 
ballot must take place during the period referred to in paragraph 1. 
Article 10 
1.  The Council, acting unanimously after  consulting the Assembly,  shall  determine  the 
period referred to in Article 9 (1) for the first elections. 
2.  Subsequent elections shall take place in the corresponding period in the last year of the 
five-year period referred to in Article 3. 
Should it prove impossible to hold the elections in the Community during that period, the 
Council acting unanimously shall, after consulting the Assembly, determine another period 
which shall be not more than one month before or one month after the period fixed pursuant 
to the preceding subparagraph. 
3.  Without prejudice to Article 22 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, Article 139 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and 
Article  109  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  the 
Assembly shall meet, without requiring to be convened, on the first Tuesday after expiry of an 
interval of one month from the end of the period referred to in Article 9 (1). 
4.  The powers of the outgoing Assembly shall cease upon the opening of the first sitting of 
the new Assembly. 
15 Article 11 
Pending the entry into force of the uniform electoral procedure referred to in Article 7 (1), the 
Assembly shall verify the credentials of representatives. For this purpose it shall take note of 
the results declared officially by the Member States and shall rule on any disputes which may 
arise out of the provisions of this Act other than those arising out of the national provisions to 
which the Act refers. 
Article 12 
1.  Pending the entry into force of the uniform electoral procedure referred to in Article 7 
(1)  and  subject  to  the  other  provisions  of  this  Act,  each  Member  State  shall  lay  down 
appropriate  procedures  for  filling  any seat which  falls  vacant during the  five-year  term of 
office referred to in Article 3 for the remainder of that period. 
2.  Where a seat falls vacant pursuant to national provisions in force in a Member State, the 
latter shall inform the Assembly, which shall take note of that fact. 
In all other cases, the Assembly shall establish that there is a vacancy and inform the Member 
State thereof. 
Article 13 
Should it appear necessary  to  adopt measures  to  implement this  Act,  the  Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Assembly after consulting the Commission, shall adopt 
such measures after endeavouring to  reach  agreement with  the Assembly in a conciliation 
committee consisting of the Council and representatives of the Assembly. 
Article 14 
Article  21  (1)  and (2)  of  the Treaty establishing the European  Coal  and Steel  Community, 
Article  138  (1)  and (2)  of the Treaty establishing the  European Economic Community and 
Article  108  (1)  and (2)  of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
shall  lapse  on  the  date  of  the sitting held  in accordance  with  Article  10  (3)  by  the  first 
Assembly elected pursuant to this Act. 
Article 15 
This Act  is  drawn  up  in  the  Danish,  Dutch,  English,  French,  German,  Irish  and  Italian 
languages, all the texts being equally authentic. 
Annexes I to III shall form an integral part of this Act. 
A declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is  attached hereto. 
16 Article 16 
The provisions of this Act shall enter into force on the first day of the month following that 
during which the last of the notifications referred to in the Decision is  received. 
Udfrerdiget i Bruxelles, den tyvende september nitten hundrede og seksoghalvfjerds. 
Geschehen zu Briissel am zwanzigsten September neunzehnhundertsechsundsiebzig. 
Done at Brussels on the twentieth day of September in the year one thousand nine hundred 
and seventy-six. 
Fait a  Bruxelles, le vingt septembre mil neuf cent soixante-seize. 
Arna dheanamh sa  Bhruiseil, an fichiu Ia  de mhi Mhean F6mhair, mile naoi gcead seacht6 a 
se. 
Fatto a Bruxelles, addi venti settembre millenovecentosettantasei. 
Gedaan te Brussel, de twintigste september negentienhonderd-zesenzeventig. 
Pour le royaume de Belgique, son representant 
Voor bet Koninkrijk Belgie, zijn Vertegenwoordiger 
le ministre des affaires etrangeres du royaume de Belgique 
De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van het Koninkrijk Belgie 
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For kongeriget Danmark, dets reprresentant 
kongeriget Danmarks udenrigs0konomiminister 
17 Fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ihr Vertreter 
Der Bundesminister des Auswartigen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Pour Ia  Republique fran<;aise, son representant 
le ministre des affaires etrangeres de Ia  Republique fran<;aise 
For Ireland, its Representative 
Thar ceann na hEireann, a hlonadai 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland 
Aire Gn6thai Eachtracha na hEireann 
Per la Repubblica italiana, il suo rappresentante 
il  ministro degli Affari esteri della Repubblica italiana 
18 Pour le grand-duche de Luxembourg, son representant, 
membre du gouvernement du grand-duche de Luxembourg 
Voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, zijn Vertegenwoordiger 
De Staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, their representative 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the Commonwealth of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland 
19 ANNEX! 
The Danish authorities may decide on the dates on which the election of members to  the 
Assembly shall take place in Greenland. 
ANNEX/I 
The United Kingdom will  apply the  provisions  of  this Act only in  respect  of  the  United 
Kingdom. 
ANNEX/II 
Declaration on Article 13 
As  regards the procedure to be followed by the Conciliation Committee, it is  agreed to have 
recourse to the provisions of paragraphs 5,  6 and 7 of the procedure laid down in the joint 
declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 4 March 1975.1 
t  OJ c 89 of 22. 4.  1975. 
20 Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany declares that the Act concerning the 
election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage shall equally 
apply to Land Berlin. 
In consideration of the rights and responsibilities of France, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, the Berlin House of Deputies 
will elect representatives to  those seats within the quota of the Federal Republic of Germany 
that fall  to Land Berlin. 
21 A  - Resolution of the European Parliament 1 
on  the  adoption  of  a  draft  convention  introducing  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage 
I 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the report of its Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 368/74), 
reaffirms its conviction that the process of European unification cannot succeed without 
the direct participation of the peoples affected, 
therefore  considers  a  European  Parliament  elected  by  direct  universal  suffrage  as  an 
indispensable element in achieving further progress towards integration and establishing a 
better equilibrium between the Community institutions on a democratic basis, 
in  pursuance  of  the  task  assigned  to  it  by  the  Treaties  establishing  the  European 
Communities, 
having  regard  to  the  need  to  adapt  the  draft  convention  of  1960  to  the  changed 
circumstances as  they now exist, 
replaces the draft convention it adopted on 17 May 1960 2 by the following 
DRAFT CONVENTION 
ON  THE  ELECTION  OF  MEMBERS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  BY  DIRECT  UNIVERSAL 
SUFFRAGE 
The Council of  the European Communities, 
resolved  to  take  the freely  expressed  will  of  the  peoples  of  the  Member States  of  the 
European  Communities  as  the  justification  for  the  mission  entrusted  to  the  European 
Parliament; 
I  Adopted on 14.  I. 1975. 
2  OJ No 37, 2. 6. 1960, p. 834/60. 
23 anxious  to  emphasize  the  representative  character  of  the  European  Parliament by the 
election of its members by direct universal suffrage; 
having regard to Articles 21  (3)  and 96 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community; 
having  regard  to  Articles  138  (3)  and  236  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic Community; 
having regard to Articles 108  (3)  and 204 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community; 
having regard to the draft prepared by the European Parliament and adopted by it on 14 
January 1975. 
has drawn up the following provisions which it recommends the Member States to adopt: 
CHAPTER I 
General Provisions 
Article 1 
The representatives  of  the  peoples  tn  the  European  Parliament shall  be  elected  by  direct 
universal suffrage. 
Article 2 
1.  The number of representatives elected in each Member State shall be as  follows: 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
23 
17 
71 
65 
13 
66 
6 
27 
67 
355 
2.  The Parliament, the Commission or the Government of any Member State may propose 
to the Council changes in the number of members provided for in paragraph 1. 
Amendments to  this  convention shall  be  made  pursuant to  the  procedure  provided  for  in 
Article 14 of this Convention. 
24 Article 3 
1.  Representatives shall be elected for a term of five years. 
2.  The five-year legislative period shall begin at the opening of the first session following 
each election. 
Article 4 
1.  Representatives shall vote on an individual and personal basis. They shall accept neither 
instructions nor any binding mandate. 
2.  National legislation shall ensure that the representatives receive the same guarantees as 
to independence, indemnity and immunity as  their counterparts in the national Parliaments. 
Article 5 
Membership  of  the  European  Parliament  shall  be  compatible  with  membership  of  a 
Parliament of a Member State. 
Article 6 
1.  The office of representative in the European Parliament shall be incompatible with that 
of: 
member of the Government of a Member State; 
member of the Commission of the European Communities; 
Judge,  Advocate-General  or  Registrar  at  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities; 
member of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities; 
member of the Consultative Committee of the European Coal and Steel Community or 
member of the Economic and Social Committee of the European Economic Community 
and of the European Atomic Energy Community; 
member of committees or other bodies set up in pursuance of the Treaties establishing the 
European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the 
European Atomic  Energy  Community for  the  purpose of managing the Communities' 
funds or carrying out a permanent and direct administrative task; 
member of  the  Board  of  Directors,  Management Committee  or staff  of  the  European 
Investment Bank; 
25 active  official  or  servant  of  the  institutions  of  the  European  Communities  or  of  the 
specialized bodies attached to them. 
2.  Subject  to  the  entry  into  force  of  special  rules  pursuant  to  Article  7  (1)  of  this 
Convention, the provisions of each Member State relating to incompatibility with a national 
parliamentary mandate shall be applied. 
3.  Representatives  of  the  European  Parliament appointed, in  the  course  of  a  legislative 
period, to any of the offices mentioned above shall be replaced under the terms of Article 12. 
CHAPTER II 
Electoral system 
Article 7 
1.  The European Parliament shall draw up a  proposal for  a  uniform electoral system by 
1980 at the latest. The Council shall unanimously lay down the appropriate provisions, which 
it shall recommend to the Member States for adoption in accordance with their constitutional 
requirements. 
2.  Pending the entry into force  of this uniform electoral system and subject to the other 
provisions of this Convention, the electoral system shall fall  within the competence of each 
Member State. 
Article 8 
The provisions governing the admission of political parties to elections in each Member State 
shall apply to elections to the European Parliament. 
Article 9 
1.  Elections  to  the  European  Parliament shall  be  held on the same  day  m  all  Member 
States. 
2.  Any Member State may, however, decide to hold the elections one day earlier or later 
than the fixed date or to spread them over two consecutive days including that day. 
3.  The Council shall make arrangements in accordance with the procedure laid down in 
Article 14, to ensure that the election results are declared at one and the same time. 
26 Article 10 
1.  Elections to the European Parliament shall be held not later than one month before the 
end of each legislative period. 
2.  The  European  Parliament  shall  sit  automatically  on  the  first  Tuesday  following  an 
interval of one month from the last day of the elections. 
3.  The outgoing European Parliament shall  remain  in office  until the first  sitting of the 
new Parliament. 
Article 11 
Pending the entry into force of the uniform electoral system to be adopted in accordance with 
Article 7 (1),  the European Parliament shall verify the credentials of representatives and rule 
on any disputes that may arise in this connection. 
Article 12 
Pending the entry into force of the uniform electoral system to be adopted in accordance with 
Article 7 (1)  and subject to the other provisions of this Convention, the Member States shall 
lay  down appropriate procedures  for  filling  any seat which falls  vacant during a  legislative 
period. 
CHAPTER III 
Transitional and final provisions 
Article 13 
1.  Subject to the provisions of Article 9, the first elections to the European Parliament shall 
be held not later than the first Sunday of May 1978. 
2.  The date of subsequent elections shall be fixed, taking account of Articles 3, 9 and 10, in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 14. 
Article 14 
Should reference be made to the procedure laid down in this Article or should it appear that 
further measures are  required to  implement direct elections to  the European Parliament in 
accordance with this Convention and if the necessary powers are  not provided, the Council 
27 shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the European Parliament and with its approval, 
make the appropriate provisions. The Council shall consult the Commission before making 
its decision. 
Article 15 
1.  The following provisions stand repealed by the present Convention: Article 21  (3) of the 
Treaty establishing the  European  Coal and Steel  Community, Article  138  (3)  of the Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Economic  Community,  and  Article  108  (3)  of  the  Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. 
2.  Article 21  (1  and 2)  of the ECSC Treaty, Article  138  (1  and 2)  of the EEC Treaty, and 
Article 108  (1  and 2) ot the EAEC Treaty shall be repealed on the date fixed in Article 10 (2). 
Article 16 
This  Convention  is  drawn  up  in  the  Danish,  Dutch,  English,  French,  German,  Irish  and 
Italian languages, all seven texts being equally authentic. 
Article 17 
1.  This  Convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Member  States  m  accordance  with  their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
2.  The instruments of ratification  shall be deposited with the Government of the  Italian 
Republic,  which  shall  inform  the  signatory  States  and  the  institutions  of  the  European 
Communities when this has been done. 
3.  This  Convention  shall  enter into  force  on  the  day  the  instrument  of  ratification  ts 
deposited by the last signatory State to carry out this formality. 
II 
The European Parliament, 
28 
instructs its Political Affairs Committee to establish appropriate contacts with the Council 
and the Member States with a view to securing the early adoption of the draft convention; 
urges  the  Council  to  establish  the  appropriate  contacts  with  the  European  Parliament 
immediately if, in its opinion, changes should be made to the draft convention; instructs  its  Political Affairs  Committee to  bring forward  a  supplementary report when 
modifications of the draft Convention appear to be necessary; 
instructs  its  Political  Affairs  Committee  immediately  to  carry  out  the  necessary 
preliminary work for the introduction of a European electoral system; 
instructs its President to  forward  this resolution, together with the draft convention and 
the  report  of  its  committee,  to  the  Council  and  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities and to the Parliaments and Governments of the Member States. 
29 B  - Explanatory statement by the Political Affairs Committee 1 
Rapporteur: Mr Schelto Patijn 
I  - Introduction 
1.  Direct elections to the European Parliament are essential to enable the peoples to play 
an immediate part in the unification of Europe. They would thus lend to the exercise of power 
by the Communities a legitimacy which has  hitherto been lacking. The Treaties establishing 
the European Communities specifically provide for this direct link between the peoples and 
the  European  Parliament,  but it  has  not yet  proved  possible  to  convince  the  responsible 
politicians of the need to take this step which is  so fundamental to integration. 
2.  On 17  May  1960  the European Parliament, acting on the mandate given  to  it by the 
Treaties, submitted a  draft  Convention on the direct election of the  European  Parliament. 
This  draft  was  prepared  by  a  working  party  under  the  chairmanship  of  Mr  Dehousse,  a 
Member of Parliament. Despite intensive efforts by Parliament the Council did not adopt this 
draft Convention or forward it to the Member States. In the meantime, with the expiry of the 
transitional period leading to the establishment of the Communities, the accession of three 
further States and the general political development in Europe, a new and changed situation 
has been created which has diminished the relevance of the 1960 proposal. 
However, the goal of European integration in the form  of political union planned for  1980 
will  require,  speedy  measures  to  extend  the  peoples'  participation  in  the  construction  of 
Europe. 
3.  The increasing problems created by the exercise of a dual  mandate merely emphasize 
the  urgency  of  direct  elections.  The  continuously  increasing  workload  borne  by 
representatives has long since made it impossible for them properly to carry out both national 
and  European  duties.  This  situation  adversely  affects  the  national  parliaments  and  the 
European  Parliament  - not to  mention the dependents of the representatives  themselves. 
Only the introduction of direct elections will make a fundamental improvement possible. 
4.  The submission of a new draft Convention thus serves three purposes: 
By  taking into account the changes which have occurred since 1960 it should provide a 
new opportunity for all the Member States to give their approval to this Convention, first 
in the Council and later by ratification in the national parliaments. 
In  addition, it should strengthen the legitimacy of  the European  Community and thus 
smooth the road to  European Union. 
Finally, it should provide a solution to the problems associated with the exercise of a dual 
mandate. 
1  The following text is an amended version of the report (Doc. 368/74) submitted to the Assembly by the Political Affairs Committee. The amendments were 
adopted by the Political Affairs Committee at its meeting of 23 and 24 January 1975 in accordance with the wordmg of the Draft Convention adopted by 
the Assembly on 14 January 1975. 
30 5.  The  rapporteur  was  guided  by  these  considerations  during  his  work  and,  through 
numerous conversations with politicians and competent experts from  all  the Member States 
and through an analysis of the obstacles which have until now prevented the Council from 
adopting the 1960 draft Convention, has made every effort to submit a realistic proposal. 
It  became  apparent  during  the  preparatory  work  that,  despite  differences  in  opinion  on 
specific questions, there exists a broad measure of agreement on the need for elections to the 
European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. 
The rapporteur wishes in this connection to emphasize that he encountered a great readiness 
to make a serious beginning on the implementation of direct elections and to support him in 
his work. 
The  European  Parliament's  rapporteur  is  deeply  grateful  to  the  national  politicians  and 
experts who so readily cooperated with him. 
6.  The report contains the following sections: 
a draft Convention on the introduction of direct elections in the form of a motion for a 
resolution to be adopted by the European Parliament; 
and, in the explanatory statement 
comments on the individual articles of the Convention together with a comparison of the 
old and new Convention texts; 
a summary of the Dehousse report submitted to the European Parliament in 1960; 
a description of the work done on the question of direct elections since 1960; 
an analysis of the major problems of the draft Convention. 
II - Notes on the individual Articles of the draft Convention 
Article 1 
The  representatives  of the  peoples  m  the  European  Parliament shall  be  elected  by direct 
universal suffrage. 
Explanation 
The text of this Article is  identical with that of the 1960 proposal. 
This Article gives effect to  the principle of elections to the European Parliament by direct, 
universal suffrage laid down in Article 21  (3)  of the ECSC Treaty, Article 13 8 (3)  of the EEC 
Treaty and Article 108  (3) of the Euratom Treaty. 
31 The terms  'universal'  and 'direct'  mean  that  the  elections  shall  take  place  throughout the 
territory of the Community and that the electorate shall directly determine the composition 
of  the  Parliament.  Indirect  elections,  e.g.,  through  electoral  colleges  or by  means  of  the 
present system  of delegation (delegation of  members by their national  parliaments) is  thus 
excluded. 
Article 2 
New text  1960 text 
1.  The number of representatives elected 
in each Member State shall be as  follows: 
The  number  of  representatives  elected  m 
each Member State shall be as  follows: 
Belgium  23 
Denmark  17 
Germany  71 
France  65 
Ireland  13 
Italy  66 
Luxembourg  6 
Netherlands  27 
United Kingdom  67 
--
355 
2.  The  Parliament,  the  Commission  or 
the Government of any Member State may 
propose  to  the  Council  changes  in  the 
number  of  members  provided  for  m 
paragraph 1. 
Amendments  to  this  Convention  shall  be 
made  pursuant  to  the  procedure  provided 
for in Article 14 of this Convention. 
Explanation 
Belgium  42 
France  108 
Germany  108 
Italy  108 
Luxembourg  18 
Netherlands  42 
426 
1.  The  1960  proposal  provided for  a trebling of the  previous number of  members. This 
procedure would today result in a total number of 594 representatives. 
The changes to the 1960 proposal are based on the following considerations: 
In arriving at the total  number of representatives and the distribution of mandates between 
the individual Member States, an attempt was  made to achieve the best possible compromise 
~etween the Parliament's functional efficiency and maximum representation, without taking 
the existing situation as  a general point of departure. 
32 The total number of representatives was decided upon in the belief that the present number of 
198 members is too small to effectively carry out the mission of the European Parliament. It is 
also  too  small  for  the  European  Parliament  to  appear  sufficiently  representative  of  the 
approximately 2SO  million inhabitants of the Community. 
On  the  other  hand,  parliamentary  experience  in  the  democratic  countries  indicates  a 
maximum number beyond which effective parliamentary work is  no longer possible. This is 
probably somewhere between  600  and 700  members.  However,  the  European Parliament's 
workload, as far as it can be anticipated at present, does not yet call for a parliament as large as 
those in the Member States with the biggest populations. For the time being, then, a figure 
below 600 representatives would appear sufficient. The 1960 report provided for 426 seats to 
be distributed amongst the six  Member States. The 3SS  representatives provided for  in the 
new proposal would appear to be enough for the present. This figure allows for any necessary 
adjustments  to  be  made  in  the  event  of  an  increase  in  the  powers  of  Parliament or the 
accession of new States. This figure would also  permit - given the retention of the present 
number of committee seats  - each  representative  to  participate  as  a  full  member of  one 
committee.t 
2.  The distribution of seats amongst the individual Member States is based on the following 
criteria: 
the  highest  degree  of  proportionality  should  be  achieved  between  the  number  of 
inhabitants of a State and the number of its representatives in the European Parliament; 
all  the  important  political  forces  of  a  State  should  be  represented  in  the  European 
Parliament; 
the new distribution of seats should not lead to a reduction in the present number of any 
State's representatives. 
These criteria can be applied fairly accurately by adopting the following system: 
(a)  Up to a population of  1 million each State receives 6 seats. 
(b)  States with a population between 1 million and 2.S  million are given 6 further seats. 
(c)  Up to  a  population of  S  million, each  State  receives  1 further seat for  each additional 
SOO 000 inhabitants. 
(d)  For a population between S million and 10  million each State receives  1 further seat for 
each additional 7SO 000 inhabitants. 
(e)  For a population between 10  million and SO  million each State receives 1 further seat for 
each additional 1 million inhabitants or part thereof. 
(f)  For  a  population  exceeding  SO  million,  each  State  receives  1  further  seat  for  each 
additional 1·S  million inhabitants or part thereof. 
The seat distribution provided for in Article 2 results from  the application of this system to 
Member States' populations in 1973. 
1  The Political Affairs Committee proposed that Parliament should decide on a total number of 550 seats. This proposal was not, however, adopted. 
For the system of calculation and the distribution of the seats between Member States suggested by the Political Affairs Committee, see  below Part V, 
paragraph 50. 
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 3.  Should  it  prove  necessary  to  alter  the  number  of  representatives,  this  can  be  done 
according to  a  procedure similar in principle to that laid  down in Article 235  of the EEC 
Treaty for supplementing the Treaties  - account being taken of the special  provisions of 
Article 14 of this Convention. Under this procedure the Council shall decide unanimously on 
adoption or rejection of the proposal after obtaining Parliament's approval and consulting the 
Commission.  By  contrast with  Article  14  of  this  Convention,  the Member States  and the 
Commission may also themselves submit appropriate proposals to the Council. Details of the 
procedure for adopting this proposal should be laid down by the European Parliament in its 
Rules of Procedure. 
Article 3 
New text 
1.  Representatives  shall  be elected for  a 
term of five  years. 
2.  The  five-year  legislative  period  shall 
begin  at  the  opening  of  the  first  session 
following each election. 
Explanation 
1960 text (Article 5) 
1.  Representatives  shall  be elected for  a 
term of five years. 
The mandate of the representatives elected 
by the Parliament shall, however, end with 
the  loss  of  the  national  parliamentary 
mandate  or  at  the  end  of  the  period  for 
which  they  have  been  elected  by  their 
national  Parliaments.  Any  representative 
whose  mandate  ends  in  this  way  shall 
remain  in  office  until  the  mandate of  his 
successor  has  been  confirmed  in  the 
European Parliament. 
2.  The  five-year  legislative  period  shall 
begin  at  the  opening  of  the  first  session 
following each election. 
The proposed text is basically the same as that contained in the 1960 proposal. However, since 
no  transitional  period  is  provided  for  in  the  new  proposal,  the  second  subparagraph  of 
Paragraph 1 of the 1960 proposal can be deleted. 
The legislative periods in the parliaments of the Member States differ. However, the proposed 
five-year  period  represents  for  the  European  Parliament  the  best  possible  compromise 
between the necessary continuity of work and the most exact reflection in Parliament of the 
will of the electrorate. 
35 Article 4 
New text 
1.  Representatives  shall  vote  on  an 
individual  and  personal  basis.  They  shall 
accept neither instructions nor any binding 
mandate. 
2.  National  legislation  shall  ensure  that 
the  representatives  receive  the  same 
guarantees  as  to  independence,  indemnity 
and immunity as  their counterparts in  the 
national Parliaments. 
Explanation 
1960 text (Article 6) 
Representatives shall vote on an individual 
and  personal  basis.  They  shall  accept 
neither  instructions  nor  any  binding 
mandate 
The first paragraph of this text corresponds to Article 6 of the 1960 proposal. 
It  clearly  indicates  that  the  position  and  function  of  representatives  in  the  European 
Parliament corresponds to those of their counterparts in the parliamentary democracies. 
The purpose of the newly added provision of paragraph (2)  is  to ensure that Members of the 
European  Parliament  obtain  the  same  legal  rights  (for  instance,  protection  against 
prosecution) as  Members of national Parliaments. Otherwise there would be no guarantee of 
directly elected Members without a dual mandate having the same status as  Members who are 
simultaneously Members of a national Parliament. 
Article 5 
New text 
Membership  of  the  European  Parliament 
shall be compatible with membership of a 
Parliament of a Member State. 
36 
1  960 text (Article 7) 
1.  During  the  transitional  period, 
membership  of  the  European  Parliament 
shall  b~ compatible with membership of a 
Parliament. 
2.  The European Parliament shall decide 
whether  these  mandates  are  to  remain 
compatible after the end of the transitional 
period. 
1960 text (Article 3) 
During a  transitional  period,  one  third  of 
these representatives shall be elected by the 
Parliaments  from  among  their  own 
members,  in  accordance  with  a  procedure 
that  ensures  that  the  political  parties  are 
fairly represented. Explanation 
The  1960  draft  Convention  stipulated  that  during  a  transitional  period  one  third  of  the 
representatives in the European Parliament were to be elected by the national Parliaments. 
This rule was not retained in the new Convention for two reasons: 
(a)  As  more  than  15  years  have  elapsed  since  the  establishment  of  the  European 
Communities,  it  does  not  appear  necessary  to  make  the  transition  from  the  present 
situation to a directly elected Parliament in stages. 
Moreover, since this was not provided for by the Treaties, legal objections were also raised 
to the introduction of a transitional period. 
(b)  Furthermore,  the  advantage of  a  close  link between  the  national  Parliaments and  the 
European  Parliament, which  would  be  created  by  the  obligation  for  one  third  of  the 
representatives to retain a  dual mandate, must be set against the disadvantage that the 
European  Parliament would thereby create a  special  status  for  a  particular group of its 
members. After  all,  the  purpose  of direct elections  is  to  grant the  European  mandate 
independent  status  alongside  a  national  mandate  and  to  enable  all  representatives  to 
devote themselves completely to their duties in the European Parliament. The convention 
provides that the loss of a national mandate will no longer lead to the loss of a European 
mandate. 
The new Convention leaves  it to the individual members to decide whether, in addition to 
this European mandate, they also wish to belong to their respective national Parliaments. The 
individual national Parliaments can themselves lay down the conditions and rules governing 
simultaneous  membership  of  both  Parliaments. This  could,  for  example,  take  one  of the 
following forms: 
members of the European Parliament are also members of the national Parliaments with 
or without voting rights; 
members of the European Parliament are released from active participation in the national 
Parliaments; 
members of the European Parliament may delegate their voting rights in their national 
Parliament to another member. 
Article 6 
New text 
1.  The  office  of  representative  in  the 
European Parliament shall be incompatible 
with that of: 
member  of  the  Government  of  a 
Member State; 
1960 text (Article 8) 
1.  During the transitional period: 
(a)  The  office  of  representative  in  the 
European Parliament shall be incompatible 
with that of: 
member  of  the  Government  of  a 
Member State; 
37 38 
member  of  the  Commission  of  the 
European Communities; 
Judge, Advocate-General or Registrar at 
the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities; 
member of the Court of Auditors of the 
European Communities; 
member of the Consultative Committee 
of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community  or  member  of  the 
Economic and Social Committee of the 
European  Economic  Community  and 
of  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community; 
member of committees or other bodies 
set  up  in  pursuance  of  the  Treaties 
establishing  the  European  Coal  and 
Steel  Community,  the  European 
Economic  Community  and  the 
European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
for  the  purpose  of  managing  the 
Communities  funds  or  carrying  out  a 
permanent  and  direct  administrative 
task; 
member  of  the  Board  of  Directors, 
Management Committee of staff of the 
European Investment Bank; 
active  official  or  servant  of  the 
institutions  of  the  European  Com-
munities  or  of  the  specialized  bodies 
attached to them. 
member of  the  High  Authority of  the 
European  Coal  and  Steel  Community, 
of  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Economic  Community  or  of  the 
Commission  of  the  European  Atomic 
Energy Community; 
Judge,  Advocate-General,  or  Registrar 
at the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities; 
member of the Consultative Committee 
of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community  or  member  of  the 
Economic and Social Committee of the 
European  Economic  Community  and 
of  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community; 
auditor, as  provided for  in Article 78  of 
the Treaty setting up the European Coal 
and  Steel  Community,  or  member  of 
the Supervisory Committee of Auditors 
provided for in Article 206 of the Treaty 
setting  up  the  European  Economic 
Community  and  Article  180  of  the 
Treaty setting up the European Atomic 
Energy Community; 
member of committees or other bodies 
set  up  in  pursuance  of  the  Treaties 
establishing  the  European  Coal  and 
Steel  Community,  the  European 
Economic  Community  and  the 
European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
for  the  purpose  of  managing  the 
Communities'  funds  or carrying  out  a 
permanent  and  direct  administrative 
task; 
member  of  the  Board  of  Directors, 
Management Committee or staff of the 
European Investment Bank; 
active  official  or  servant  of  the 
institutions  of  the  European  Com-
munities  or  of  the  specialized  bodies 
attached to them. 2.  Subject  to  the  entry  into  force  of 
special rules pursuant to Article 7 (1) of this 
Convention the provisions of each Member 
State  relating  to  incompatibility  with  a 
national  parliamentary  mandate  shall  be 
applied. 
3.  Representatives  of  the  European 
Parliament  appointed,  in  the  course  of  a 
legislative  period,  to  any  of  the  offices 
mentioned  above  shall  be  replaced  under 
the terms of Article 12. 
Explanation 
Representatives of the European Parliament 
appointed,  in  the  course  of  a  legislative 
period,  to  any  of  the  offices  mentioned 
above shall be replaced under the terms of 
Article 17. 
(b)  Each  Member  State  shall  determine 
whether,  and  to  what  extent,  the 
incompatibilities laid down by its laws with 
regard  to  the  exercise  of  a  national 
parliamentary  mandate  shall  apply  to  the 
exercise  of  a  mandate  in  the  European 
Parliament. 
2.  The European Parliament shall decide 
on  the  system  of  incompatibility  to  be 
adopted  after  the  end  of  the  transitional 
period. 
The incompatibility provisions in the new draft Convention are practically identical to those 
of the 1960 draft. The only new feature is  the reference to members of the Court of Auditors. 
This institution, to be set up shortly, will replace the existing Board of Auditors and the ECSC 
auditor. 
The provision in Article 8 (1)  (b)  of the 1960  proposal, to the effect that the Member States 
may  determine  further  incompatibilities  at  national  level,  has  been  modified  in  order  to 
maintain for the time being the incompatibility rules in force within the individual Member 
States. 
Article  7 
New text 
1.  The  European  Parliament  shall  draw 
up  a  proposal  for  a  uniform  electoral 
system by  1980  at the latest. The Council 
shall  unanimously  lay  down  the 
1960 text (Article 9) 
The  European  Parliament  shall  lay  down 
the  provisions  governing  the  election  of 
representatives  after  the  end  of  the 
transitional period provided for in Article 4, 
39 appropriate  provisions,  which  it  shall 
recommend  to  the  Member  States  for 
adoption  in  accordance  with  their 
constitutional requirements. 
2.  Pending  the  entry  into  force  of  this 
uniform electoral system and subject to the 
other  provisions  of  this  Convention,  the 
electoral  system  shall  fall  within  the 
competence of each Member State. 
Explanation 
in accordance with as  uniform a procedure 
as  possible. 
Until these provisions come into force,  the 
electoral  system shall, subject to  the terms 
of the  present Convention, fall  within  the 
competence of each Member State. 
This provision differs from that in the 1960 proposal to the extent that the latter provided for 
the introduction of a uniform electoral system after the end of the transitional period. 
Article 21  (3) of the ECSC Treaty, Article 108 (3) of the Euratom Treaty and Article 138 (3) of 
the EEC Treaty require the European Parliament to draw up proposals for direct elections in 
accordance with a uniform procedure. 
The Treaties  do  not specify  how  uniform  the  procedure  must  be  in  order to  satisfy  this 
requirement. At the  present stage  of the approximation of  the  procedures  for  shaping the 
political will in the Member States, a uniform procedure could already be said to exist when 
elections  in all  the Member States  are  carried  out according to  the same basic  principles. 
These include in particular, apart from the provisions contained in this draft Convention, the 
fundamental principles of democratic elections, i.e.,  elections must be equal, free,  universal, 
direct and secret. 
In 1960 Parliament, after extensive study, came to the conclusion that it would not at present 
be  possible  to  introduce  a  uniform  electoral  system  in  all  the  Member States.  Parliament 
therefore believed at the time that a 'uniform procedure' was not synonymous with a 'uniform 
electoral system'. 
Even  though  its  ultimate  aim  was  a  uniform  electoral  system,  Parliament  nevertheless 
proposed that direct elections be held initially on the basis of national electoral systems. 
Particularly in the light of the enlargement of the Community, the position then adopted by 
the European Parliament remains appropriate. 
Within the limits of the principles mentioned above, each Member State is  therefore free  to 
draft a law which corresponds to its political traditions and structures. It was  already pointed 
out in  the explanatory statement to  the  1960  proposal  that any  problems  arising  from  a 
conflict  between  national  electoral  law  and  Community electoral  law  could  eventually  be 
resolved by recourse to the European Court of Justice. 
However, as  the political structures of the Member States become more similar, the level  of 
uniformity  must  necessarily  increase.  The  European  Parliament  should  work  out  for  the 
elections to be held after 1980 an electoral system to take account of political developments in 
40 the Member States and to settle further details uniformly. 1980 is a target for the carrying out 
of this obligation on the European Parliament. If Parliament sets energetically about working 
out this project, it will be possible to hold the first elections after the introduction of direct 
elections (presumably therefore in 1983) in accordance with this uniform procedure. 
Article 8 
New text 
The provisions governing the admission of 
political  parties  to  elections  in  each 
Member State shall apply to elections to the 
European Parliament. 
Explanation 
1960 text (Article 13) 
The constitutional provisions governing the 
admission of political parties to elections in 
each Member State shall apply to  elections 
to the European Parliament. 
This text corresponds in essence to Article 13  of the 1960 proposal. 
The  European  Parliament consists  at  present  of  representatives  belonging to  53  different 
parties. As  long as  the electoral procedure is  not fully uniform, it does not seem necessary to 
include in the Convention provisions governing the role of the parties in direct elections. 
A  reference  to  individual  national  regulations  also  appears  appropriate  because  of  the 
considerable differences between individual  national  provisions governing the function  and 
eligibility of parties. 
However,  the  European  Parliament emphasizes the great  importance of  the  parties  in  the 
preparation  for  European  elections.  Not until  the  parties  succeed, within  the  Community 
framework, in establishing close links between themselves, developing joint programmes and 
creating  supranational  party  structures  can  direct  elections  to  the  European  Parliament 
become a key factor in the process of political integration. 
Article 9 
New text 
1.  Elections to the European Parliament 
shall  be  held  on  the  same  day  in  all 
Member States. 
2.  Any  Member  State  may,  however, 
decide to hold the elections one day earlier 
or  later  than  the  fixed  date  or  to  spread 
them  over  two  consecutive  days  including 
that day. 
1960 text (Article 14) 
Elections to the European Parliament shall 
be held on the same day in all  six Member 
States;  the  dates  shall  be  fixed  so  that 
national  elections  do  not  coincide  with 
those for the European Parliament. 
Any  Member  State  may,  however,  on 
grounds  of  tradition  or  geographical 
conditions, decide to hold the elections one 
41 3.  The Council shall make arrangements 
in accordance with the procedure laid down 
in  Article  14,  to  ensure  that  the  election 
results  are  declared  at  one  and  the  same 
time. 
Explanation 
day earlier or later than the fixed date or to 
spread them over both these days. 
Paragraphs  1 and 2 are essentially the same as  the corresponding text of the 1960  proposal. 
They lay down the important principle that European elections shall be held on the same day. 
Respect for national customs, however, ought not to be precluded, and for this reason a minor 
deviation from this election date is  permitted. If elections are held on different days, however, 
care  must be  taken  that the results  from  those countries which have  already voted  do not 
influence  the  behaviour  of  the  electorate  in  the  States  where  voting  takes  place  later.  A 
Council directive could be used to resolve this technical detail. 
It does not appear practical, however, to retain the provision contained in the 1960 proposal 
prohibiting the  holding of  national and  European  elections  on  the same day.  Although  a 
cumulation  of  several  elections  on  a  single  day  would  detract  from  the  psychological 
significance of European elections, it is  not inconceivable that a specific political situation in 
individual  States  (e.g.  early  dissolution  of  Parliament)  might  necessitate  the  holding  of 
national elections at the same time. 
Other factors  in favour  of holding European and national elections (at  regional or national 
level) at the same time include financial consideration and the advantage that - at least in the 
beginning - a higher turnout in the European elections could thus be achieved. 
Article 10 
New text 
1.  Elections to  the European Parliament 
shall  be  held  not  later  than  one  month 
before the end of each legislative period. 
2.  The  European  Parliament  shall  sit 
automatically  on  the  first  Tuesday 
following  an  interval  of  one  month  from 
the last day of the elections. 
3.  The  outgoing  European  Parliament 
shall  remain in office  until the first sitting 
of the new Parliament. 
42 
1960 text (Article 15) 
1.  Elections to  the European Parliament 
shall  be  held  not  later  than  one  month 
before the end of each legislative period. 
2.  The  European  Parliament  shall  sit 
automatically  on  the  first  Tuesday 
following  an  interval  of  one  month  from 
the date of the elections. 
3.  The  outgoing  European  Parliament 
shall remain in office  until the first  sitting 
of the new Parliament. Explanation 
This provision  is  virtually identical  to  that of  the  1960  draft.  It ensures  continuity in  the 
transition  from  one  European  Parliament  to  the  next.  The  precise  election  date  for  all 
elections taking place after 1978 will be fixed according to the procedure under Article 14. 
Article 11 
New text 
Pending the entry into force of the uniform 
electoral  system  to  be  adopted  in 
accordance with Article  7(1),  the European 
Parliament  shall  verify  the  credentials  of 
representatives  and  rule  on  any  disputes 
that may arise in this connection. 
Explanation 
1960 text (Article 16) 
The  European  Parliament  shall  verify  the 
credentials  of  representatives  and  rule  on 
any  disputes  that  may  arise  m  this 
connection. 
With the exception of the reservation  in regard to Article 7( 1  ),  Article  16  of the  1960  draft 
Convention  contains  a  similar  provision.  The  European  Parliament  already  verifies  the 
credentials of  representatives, but this verification will  have greater practical significance in 
the case of a directly elected Parliament. Procedural details should be fixed  in the Rules of 
Procedure. 
As  long as  the direct elections are organized under laws enacted at national level, supervision 
of  the election  procedure  is  incumbent on the  national  bodies.  But as  soon  as  a  uniform 
European  electoral  system  is  introduced,  consideration  should  be  given  to  handing  over 
verification of the lawfulness of the election to a Community institution - e.g. the European 
Court of Justice. 
Article 12 
New text 
Pending the entry into force of the uniform 
electoral  system  to  be  adopted  in 
accordance with Article 7(1)  and subject to 
the other provisions of this Convention, the 
Member States  shall  lay  down  appropriate 
procedures  for  filling  any  seat  which  falls 
vacant during a legislative period. 
1960 text (Article 17) 
Should  a  seat  filled  in  elections  by direct 
universal  suffrage  fall  vacant,  no  by-
election shall be held. 
Subject  to  this  provision  an  electoral 
procedure for filling such a vacancy during 
the transitional period shall be determined 
by national law. 
43 Explanation 
Should a seat filled  in pursuance of Article 
3 fall  vacant, the successor shall be elected 
or  nominated  by  the  Parliament  of  the 
Member State. 
The  new  text  differs  in  two  important respects  from  the  1960  proposal.  Firstly,  the  third 
paragraph of the former Article 17  has been deleted, since the nomination of representatives 
by  the  national  Parliaments  is  no  longer  provided  for.  Furthermore,  for  the  sake  of 
consistency, a national electoral law should remain responsible for establishing a replacement 
procedure  for  seats  which  have  fallen  vacant.  This  includes  the  possibility  of  holding 
by-elections. 
Article 13 
New text 
1.  Subject to the provisions of Article 9, 
the  first  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament shall be  held not later than the 
first Sunday of May 1978. 
2.  The date of subsequent elections shall 
be fixed, taking account of Articles 3, 9 and 
10,  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  laid 
down irr Article 14. 
Explanation 
1960 text (Article 21) 
Subject to  the provisions of Article  14,  the 
first  elections  to  the  European  Parliament 
shall be held on the first Sunday following 
an interval of six months from  the day this 
Convention comes into force. 
Unlike the  1960  proposal, the new text lays  down a latest date for  the first  elections. This 
change  was  made  for  the  following  reasons:  by  fixing  a  date  prior  to  which  the  draft 
Convention will  have  to  be ratified the Council is  given notice of the maximum period in 
which Parliament expects the proposal to be dealt with and adopted. 
The Conference  of  Heads  of  State  or Government on  the 9  and  10  December  197 4  also 
recommended that direct elections to the European Parliament should take place in or after 
1978.  Further, the Conference wished  the  Council to  act  in  197 6  on  the  proposals  of the 
Parliament. 
If the Council starts to work immediately on the Parliament's proposals, it should be possible 
to  take even earlier a decision to  recommend the text of a convention to Member States. By 
1978  it should  be  possible  to  accomplish  ratification  Member States,  the  introduction  of 
44 national electoral provisions and the actual preparations for the elections. In this context, it is 
essential to emphasize the importance, in the achievement of a European Union by 1980, of a 
directly-elected European Parliament. 
A  European Parliament elected by direct suffrage is  an essential part of a political union in 
Europe. Moreover it is  to be hoped that the first elections will be held before the creation of 
the  Union, so· that the  direct  cooperation  of the  European  peoples  in  this  Union will  be 
assured to the full. 
If the  elections  take  place  in  the  first  week  of  May,  the  political  mobilization  of  public 
opinion for European integration which traditionally takes place during this period may have 
a positive effect on the European elections. 
After  1978  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  pursuant to  Article  3,  will  take  place  at 
five-yearly  intervals. Article  10  lays  down that the elections shall be held not later than one 
month before the end of each legislative  period. It would appear appropriate not to fix  the 
exact  election  dates  now but to  leave  the  decision  in  each case  to  Parliament and  to  the 
representatives  of the Member States  in  Council acting under the  procedure laid  down  in 
Article 14. 
Article 14 
(new) 
'  Should reference be made to the procedure laid down in this Article or should it appear that 
further measures are  required to implement direct elections to  the European Parliament in 
accordance with this Convention and if the necessary powers are  not provided, the Council 
shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the European Parliament and with its approval, 
make the appropriate provisions. The Council shall consult the Commission before making 
its decision. 
Explanation 
The draft Convention  - like  the  1960  proposals  - intentionally contains only the most 
essential provisions. A complete solution to every problem is  not at present necessary. At the 
present stage of the development of the European Communities such a solution would also 
cause unnecessary technical and political difficulties. 
It  would  be  impractical,  however,  if  every  addition  to  this  Convention  necessitated  the 
complicated procedure of concluding and ratifying an Agreement between the Member States 
(pursuant to Article 236 of the EEC Treaty). Article 14  therefore provides a flexible procedure 
which  permits  the  Community  to  make  any  essential  additions  itself.  This  procedure 
corresponds almost exactly to that laid down in Article 235 of the EEC Treaty and Article 203 
of the Euratom Treaty, so that, for the purpose of interpretation, reference can be made to the 
commentaries on these Articles. 
The deviation from Article 235 of the EEC Treaty and from Article 203 of the Euratom Treaty 
is  of an institutional character. The Council is  to take the necessary measures not only on a 
45 proposal from the European Parliament but also with its approval. If reference is here made to 
the long-standing demand by the European Parliament for  the right to  approve legislation, 
this represents an attempt to reach a compromise between two extremes. 
Under Article 235 the European Parliament must be consulted by the Council; the latter, 
however, is  not bound by Parliament's opinion. 
On the other hand, since the direct election of the European Parliament is at issue here, it 
could be argued that the Council should have absolutely nothing to do with the electoral 
arrangements  but  that  the  power  to  make  them  should  be  vested  exclusively  in  the 
European Parliament. The proposed right of approval changes the present legal situation 
to  the  extent that  the  Council  can  no  longer  disregard  the  opinion  of  the  European 
Parliament but may nevertheless participate in equal measure in laying down legislation. 
In  this  procedure  the  Commission  has  the  right  to  be  consulted  corresponding  to  the 
consultation of the European Parliament under Article 235  EEC and 203  EAEC. This role is 
already assigned to the Commission elsewhere in the Treaties (e.g. Article 126 EEC). 
Article 15 
(new) 
1.  The following provisions stand repealed by the present Convention: Article 21 (3) of the 
Treaty establishing the  European  Coal  and Steel  Community, Article  138(3)  of the Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Economic  Community  and  Article  108(3)  of  the  Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. 
2.  Article 21  (1  and 2)  of the ECSC Treaty, Article  138  (1  and 2)  of the EEC Treaty, and 
Article 108  (1  and 2)  of the EAEC Treaty shall be repealed on the date fixed in Article 10(2). 
Explanation 
The new text corresponds to  the concept put forward  by the Political Affairs  Committee in 
1960. This Article was deleted in plenary sitting because it was  felt that it would be no more 
than a superfluous declaration. It nevertheless seems expedient to include in the Convention a 
provision  which  clearly  defines  the  relationship  between  the  Convention  and  previously 
applicable provisions. 
The repeal of all the Articles which have until now governed the election and composition of 
the European Parliament is  based on the following considerations: 
Paragraph 1 of Article 21  of the ECSC Treaty. Article 138  of the EEC Treaty and Article 108 
of the Euratom Treaty governs the designation of delegates by the national Parliaments. This 
will no longer be possible after the introduction of direct elections. 
Paragraph 2 of these Articles governs the distribution of seats between the individual Member 
States  and  lays  down  the  total  number of  representatives. This  provision  is  superseded by 
Article 2 of the new Convention. 
46 These two  provisions cannot, however, cease  to  be valid until the newly elected Parliament 
assembles. So that a competent and lawfully constituted Parliament can continue to function 
until that date, the provisions governing the composition of the European Parliament until 
now have to be retained until then.  · 
Paragraph 3 of the same Articles calls  for  the introduction of direct elections, provides  the 
necessary  powers  and  describes  the  procedure  for  adoption  of  the  provisions.  Where  the 
powers provided under Article 21(3) of the ECSC Treaty, Article 138(3) of the EEC Treaty and 
Article  1  08(3)  of the Euratom Treaty have  not already been exhausted they are  included in 
similar  terms  in  Article  7(1)  of  the  new  proposal.  These  Articles  therefore  lose  their 
significance on adoption of this Convention. 
Since the complete repeal of these provisions represents a Treaty amendment, a reference has 
been made in the preamble to the amendment clauses containt::d in the Treaties (Article 96 of 
the ECSC Treaty, Article 236 of the EEC Treaty and Article 204 of the Euratom Treaty). 
Article 16 
New text 
This  Convention  is  drawn  up  in  the 
Danish,  Dutch,  English,  French,  German, 
Irish  and  Italian  languages,  all  seven  texts 
being equally authentic. 
Explanation 
19t&O  text (Article 22) 
This Convention is  drawn up in the Dutch, 
French, German  and  Italian  languages,  all 
four texts being equally authentic. 
This  text  has  been  amended  because  of  the  increase  m  tht::  number of  the  Community 
languages following enlargement. 
The wording  used,  moreover,  corresponds  to  the  form  used  tn  the  Community Treaties 
concluded between the Member States. 
Article 17 
New text 
1.  This  Convention  shall  be  ratified  by 
the Member States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
2.  The  instruments  of  ratification  shall 
be  deposited  with  the  Government of  the 
Italian  Republic,  which  shall  inform  the 
signatory States  and the institutions of the 
European Communities when this has been 
done. 
1960 text (Article 23) 
This  Convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the 
Member  Stat•~s  in  accordance  with  their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
The  Governments  of  the  Member  States 
agree  to  take  the  steps  necessary  for  this 
purpose  as  soon  as  possible,  presenting to 
the Parliaments any document that may be 
needed before approval can be given. 
47 3.  This Convention shall enter into force 
on the day the instrument of ratification is 
deposited by the last signatory State to carry 
out this formality. 
Explanation 
The  instruments  of  ratification  shall  be 
deposited  with  the  Government  of  the 
Italian  Republic  which  shall  inform  the 
signatory States  and the  institutions of the 
European Communities when this has been 
done. 
This Convention shall  come into force  on 
the  day  the  instrument  of  ratification  is 
deposited by last signatory State to carry out 
this formality. 
The new text corresponds to  the form  habitually used  in agreements between the Member 
States on Community matters (see Article 2 of the Treaty of Accession). 
III - Summary of the report adopted by the European Parliament on 17 May 1960 
7.  Directly after the constitution of the European Parliament in March  1958  the Political 
Affairs  Committee began work on a report on direct elections. A special working party was 
first set up under the chairmanship of the Socialist Member, Mr Dehousse, to make a detailed 
study of all problems associated with such elections. After consultations in the Member States, 
the Political Affairs Committee adopted a draft Convention in March 1960 and submitted this 
proposal to  Parliament for  its  approval. This proposal was  accompanied by a report in four 
parts:  the general  report was  drafted  by Mr  Dehousse,  the  report on  the  composition  of 
Parliament by Mr Maurice  Faure,  that on questions relating to  the electoral system  by Mr 
Schuijt,  and  the  report  on  the  representation  of  the  overseas  countries and territories  was 
drafted by Mr Metzger. 
Details  of the background  to  and the  parliamentary consideration of  this  proposal will  be 
found in the selected documents published by the European Parliament in  1969  under the 
title 'The case for elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage'. 
8.  The rapporteur would refer those interested to this publication. He will confine himself 
here  to  a  summary of  the  main  problems  considered  by  the  European  Parliament  in  its 
examination of the draft Convention in 1960. The main points included: 
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the electoral procedure; 
the transitional period; 
the number of representatives; 
links with national Parliaments; 
date of the election, and 
general political problems associated with the introduction of direct elections. 9.  As  regards  the  electoral procedure  the  impossibility  of  setting up  in  the  foreseeable 
future  a  completely  uniform  system  within  the  European  Communities  was  already 
recognized in 1960. The draft Convention therefore proposed that the details of the electoral 
procedure should initially be settled at national level until such time as  a uniform electoral 
system was prepared and introduced by the European Parliament. 
10.  The 1960 draft Convention also proposed that direct elections should be introduced by 
stages and that during a transitional period - to run parallel with the transitional period for 
establishing the European Communities  - only two-thirds of the representatives would be 
directly elected  while  certain  questions  of  electoral  procedure would  not be  finally  settled 
until the end of this transitional period. 
11.  The 1960 proposal recommended setting the number of  representatives in the directly 
elected Parliament by tripling the then existing number of  members. The Convention thus 
proposed a total of 426 representatives. 
12.  Links  with  the  national  Parliaments  were  still  of  particular  importance  to  the 
European Parliament in 1960. The proposal would thus have provided for the retention of the 
dual mandate for one-third of the representatives for the duration of the transitional period. 
However,  the  European  Parliament  did  not  take  any  binding  decisions  as  to  when  the 
permanent arrangement for a directly-elected parliament was to  come into force. 
13.  According to  the 1960 Convention the elections were to  take place on the same date. 
The first elections would be held six  months after ratification of the Convention by all  the 
Member States. 
14.  It was  the view of  the draftsmen of the 1960  proposal that the question of  increased 
powers for the European Parliament and the matter of direct elections should be dealt with 
separately. Increased powers were in any case not a prerequisite for direct elections. 
15.  The details of the 1960 proposal together with the new draft Convention are set out in 
comparative form in Part II of this report. 
IV - Summary of events between 1960 and 197  3 
16.  On 17 May 1960 the European Parliament adopted the following resolutions: 
(a)  resolution on the adoption of a draft convention introducing elections to  the European 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage; 
(b)  resolution on the procedure to be adopted in respect of the draft convention; 
(c)  resolution on the electoral procedure during the transitional period; 
(d)  resolution on the strengthening of Parliament's powers; 
49 (e)  declaration  of  intent on  parttctpation  by  parliamentary  representatives  of  the  overseas 
countries and territories in the work of the European Parliament; 
(f)  resolution on the preparation of public opinion for European elections by direct universal 
suffrage. 
17.  In the next twelve  years,  the  European  Parliament made many attempts to  obtain a 
Council  decision  on  the  draft  convention.  At  the  same  time  bills  were  tabled  in  certain 
national parliaments with a view to  arranging the direct election of the national delegations 
concerned. 
18.  In a  resolution  of  27  June 1963  on the powers and responsibilities of the European 
Parliament (Doc. 31/1963), Parliament stated that the direct election of representatives to  the 
European Parliament was  an essential factor for  the democratization of the Community, and 
urged the Councils of Ministers and Governments to  assume their full  responsibility for  the 
early entry into force of the draft convention. 
19.  On  12  March  1969  the  European Parliament adopted the following  resolution (Doc. 
214/68-69): 
having regard to the fact that Article 138 (3) of the EEC Treaty provides for the election of 
its Members by direct universal suffrage, 
having regard to the fact that Parliament submitted as  long ago as  on 17 May 1960 a draft 
convention on elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, 
having regard  to  the fact  that the  Council has  to  date  taken  no decision  on this  draft 
convention and has not considered the matter for six years, 
instructs  its  President  to  call  upon  the  Council  to  apply  without  further  delay  the 
procedure  laid  down  in  the Council  to  Parliament's  draft,  and to  refer  the  Council  to 
Article 175 (1) and (2) of the EEC Treaty. 
20.  On 12 May  1969 the Council instructed the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
to report to it on the question of elections by direct universal suffrage. 
21.  At their meeting in The Hague on  1 and 2  December 1969,  the  Heads of State  or 
Government  published  a  final  communique,1  which  contained  the  following  passage 
(paragraph 5): 
'The question of direct elections shall be given further consideration by the Council.' 
22.  The European Parliament then adopted on 3 February 1970 a resolution on the basis of 
a report by Mr Dehousse (Doc. 210/69-70); the most important passage in this resolution was 
as follows: 
1.  notes that the Heads of State or Government, while inviting the Council to  give  further 
consideration  to  the  question  of  direct  general  elections,  laid  down  no  timetable  or 
time-limit for such consideration; 
1  Printed in the Commission's Third General Report, p. 426. 
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3.  calls  for the creation by mutual agreement of a suitable consultation procedure between 
Parliament and the Council, in order to define concrete provisions on the basis of the draft 
drawn up by Parliament in 1960 to enable Article 138 of the EEC Treaty, Article 108 of the 
EAEC Treaty and Article 21  of the ECSC Treaty to be implemented. 
23.  Under the terms of this dialogue requested by Parliament, meetings were held on 26 
June  1970, 8  December 1970  and 2 March  1972  between a delegation from  the European 
Parliament or its Political Affairs  Committee and the President-in-Office of the Council. It 
became apparent that the Council's working party had still not evolved a unanimous position 
on the plan proposed by the European Parliament. 
24.  Parliament therefore made the following recommendations in its  resolution of 5 July 
1972 on the forthcoming Summit Conference (Doc. 73/72): 
'The  request  first  made  by  the  European  Parliament  in  1960,  and  emphatically 
repeated on several occasions since for  its  Members to be elected by direct universal 
suffrage in accordance with Article 138 (3)  of the EEC Treaty, still stands. The search 
for ways and means of removing the practical and political obstacles which have so far 
postponed implementation of this measure must be begun immediately and pursued 
resolutely. 
The widening of Parliament's powers is not linked with the issue of its direct election, 
and cannot be postponed until such elections are held.' 
When the Summit Conference failed  to adopt a position on the question of direct elections, 
Parliament stated on 14  November 1972 (Doc. 194/72): 
'It regrets that no definite dates have been laid down for the general and direct election 
of  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  and  no  instructions  given  to  solve  the 
remaining difficulties.' 
25.  At the same time as  it was  urging the adoption of its  1960  proposal by the Council, 
Parliament  contacted  the  authors  of  the  national  bills  for  the  introduction  of  European 
elections. On 6 October 1971  there was a meeting with the Political Affairs Committee. These 
bills  mostly  made  provision  for  the  direct election  of the delegations  from  the  respective 
national parliaments. There were considerable differences between the details of the schemes. 
To date, however, no such law has been passed in any Member State. 
26.  Until 1970, Mr Dehousse was rapporteur for the Political Affairs Committee. After his 
departure, the Political Affairs  Committee appointed Mr Lautenschlager the new rapporteur 
on  14  May  1971.  Mr  Lautenschlager  was  made  responsible  for  ascertaining  whether  the 
conclusions which Parliament had reached in  1960  should be  altered after eleven years.  In 
view of the enlargement of the European Communities on  1 January 1973,  there was  also 
undoubtedly a need to adapt Parliament's draft of 1960 to the changed circumstances. 
The European Parliament therefore decided at its  sitting of 4 June 1973  to draw up a new 
report on the introduction of elections by direct universal suffrage. After Mr Lautenschlager 
had leit the Political Affairs  Committee, Mr Patijn was  appointed the new rapporteur on 13 
September 1973. 
51 C  - Opinion of the Legal Affairs Committee 
Draftsman: Mr Hans Lautenschlager 
I 
1.  The  Treaties  establishing  the  European  Communities  contain  identical  provisions 
concerning the formation and composition of the European Parliament:1 
1.  The  Assembly  shall  consist  of  delegates  who  shall  be  designated  by  the  respective 
Parliaments from  among their members in accordance with the procedure laid down by 
each Member State. 
2.  The number of these delegates shall be as  follows: 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
14 
10 
36 
36 
10 
36 
6 
14 
36 
3.  The  Assembly  shall  draw  up  proposals  for  elections  by  direct  universal  suffrage  in 
accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States. 
The Council shall, acting unanimously, lay down the appropriate provisions, which it shall 
recommend  to  Member  States  for  adoption  in  accordance  with  their  respective 
constitutional requirements. 
2.  At  the  present  time  the  European  Parliament  is  constituted  in  accordance  with  the 
procedure described in paragraph 1 of these provisions; seats are allocated in accordance with 
paragraph 2.  However, as  shown by the task entrusted to  the European Parliament and the 
Council by paragraph 3, this 'indirect' election procedure is to be replaced by 'direct universal 
suffrage'. The purpose of the Draft Convention prepared by the Political Affairs Committee is 
to introduce a new election procedure on the basis of Article  138(3) EEC Treaty.2  It should 
not be confused, therefore, with the proposals under discussion in various Member States for 
changes in the relevant national systems of appointing delegates. As  the text of the Treaty 
already shows the European Parliament can only directly influence the form of the elections 
by direct universal suffrage by way of paragraph 3. 
As  long as  the  European  Parliament is  still  made up of  representatives  designated  by the 
national  parliaments from  among their members, it is  a  matter for  the individual Member 
States to establish the details of this procedure and amend it if necessary. 
t  Article 21  ECSC Treaty, Article  108  EAEC Treaty and Article 138  EEC Treaty. 
z  Article 21  (3)  ECSC Treaty; Article  108  (3)  EAEC Treaty. 
52 3.  Any draft convention, but particularly the draft text for the introduction of elections by 
direct universal suffrage, which is so important, always raises an abundance of additional legal 
problems.  The  wording  of  the  draft  of  the  Political  Affairs  Committee  and  the  lengthy 
explanatory  statement  given  by  its  rapporteur  show  that  the  legal  aspects  have  been 
thoroughly examined. 
The Legal Affairs Committee will therefore confine itself to  a few  further comments on the 
following problems: 
(a)  relationship  between  paragraphs  1 and 2  of Article  138  EEC  Treaty (Article  21  ECSC 
Treaty, Article 108  EAEC Treaty) and paragraph 3 of those provisions; 
(b)  the concept of a 'uniform election procedure'; 
(c)  legal aspects of the links with national parliaments; 
(d)  incompatibility provisions; 
(e)  number of Members; 
(f)  transitional period; 
(g)  Article 14  of the Draft Convention; 
(h)  further consideration of the Draft Convention by the Council; 
(i)  action against the Council for failure to act. 
II 
(a)  The  relationship  between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article  138  EEC Treaty  (Article  21 
ECSC Treaty, Article 108 EAEC Treaty) and paragraph 3 of  those provisions 
4.  As already mentioned, the first two paragraphs of these provisions constitute the present 
legal basis for both the allocation of seats and the procedure for  the designation of delegates. 
This situation must necessarily continue until a European Parliament meets which has been 
elected by direct suffrage on the basis of a procedure introduced in accordance with paragraph 
3.  It should be noted, therefore, that these provisions which have been in force  hitherto will 
not become ineffective on the adoption of a convention for  the introduction of elections by 
direct universal suffrage. Article 15(2) of the Draft Convention adopted by the Political Affairs 
Committee takes this into account. 
5.  Therefore, even if it is  possible to hold elections to the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage by 1978 or even before, the Parliaments of the Member States will retain the 
right, until the directly elected Parliament meets,  to lay down  independently the details for 
the appointment of the Members of the European Parliament until that date. This is  not the 
place to analyse the scope of Article 138(1) of the EEC Treaty or, in particular, to deliver an 
opinion  as  to  how far  the various  schemes adopted  at  national  level  to  establish  the link 
between the Parliaments by elections comply with the Treaty as  regards the appointment of 
the national delegations to the European Parliament. 
53 In  any  case  - from  the  legal  point  of  view  - the  discussion  and  adoption  of  a  draft 
submitted  by  the  European  Parliament  pursuant  to  Article  138(3)  does  not  affect  the 
application and amendment of the national rules until a directly elected parliament meets. 
6.  With regard to  the relationship between the individual paragraphs of Article  138  EEC 
Treaty (Article 21  ECSC Treaty, Article 108  EAEC Treaty), it should be pointed out that the 
allocation of seats in paragraph 2 is  clearly limited to the present election procedure referred 
to in paragraph 1. If this is  replaced by a new election procedure, it must be established at the 
same time whether the allocation of seats  is  to  be  retained or altered. The proposal of the 
Political Affairs Committee includes a new allocation of seats, thus establishing the necessary 
link with the election procedure. 
(b)  The concept of  a  (untform election procedure' 
7.  The interpretation of this concept was  already examined in detail by the authors of the 
first  Draft  Convention  submitted  by  Parliament  in  1960.  The  rapporteur of  the  Political 
Affairs Committee has continued this discussion by proposing that the term 'uniform election 
procedure' should be interpreted flexibly, i.e., in accordance with the actual state of common 
political  procedures, and only certain basic  requirements of democratic elections should be 
declared indispensable. These basic  requirements are  that European elections must be free, 
equal,  secret,  direct  and  general.  The  Legal  Affairs  Committee  assumes  that  these  basic 
requirements are in fact met by the national electoral systems to be used on a temporary basis 
according to Article 7(2). 
The  concept  of  'uniformity'  will  acquire  a  different  value  when  further  parallels  have 
developed between the election procedures of the individual Member States. This approach 
therefore requires the development of a more standardized European election system at a later 
date. The Draft Convention makes provision in Article 7(1)  for Parliament to undertake this 
task. 
8.  The Legal Affairs Committee considers this to  be a suitable way of taking advantage of 
the  common  features  existing at  present between  the  election  procedures  of  the  Member 
States for the first European elections. This method is  also admissible, since, according to the 
case law of the European Court of Justice, it is  now acceptable in Community law for a legal 
act - i.e., in this case a uniform election procedure - to be introduced in stages. 
9.  When defining this uniform election procedure, which has yet to be worked out, the 
cooperation of the Legal Affairs  Committee should be sought. The comments following the 
Draft Convention should therefore be amended to this effect. 
10.  For the first direct elections the Draft Convention refers  mainly to the national rules 
applying at the time. Only a few  provisions, namely 
date of the election (Articles 9,  1  0,  13 ), 
duration of the mandate (Article 3), 
scrutiny (Article 11 ), 
54 are standardized. With regard to scrutiny, judicial control at Community level has rightly not 
yet been introduced. The rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee is considering whether 
to  involve  the  European  Court  of  Justice  at  the  point when  the  elections  take  place  in 
accordance  with  the  uniform  procedure.  For  the  moment,  the  national  authorities  are 
responsible  for  ensuring  that  the  elections  are  held  in  accordance  with  the  law  (i.e.,  in 
accordance with the national electoral law). They are also competent, however, for establishing 
whether this electoral law has been infringed. The European Parliament is already responsible 
for the verification of credentials; direct elections will be even more reason for it to retain this 
responsibility. 
(c)  Legal aspects of  the links with national parliaments 
11.  Article  5  of  the  Draft  Convention  provides  for  cumulation of  the  national  and  the 
European mandates. This eliminates the rigid ruling of the 1960 draft which prescribed that 
one-third of  the delegates to  the European Parliament must simultaneously be  members of 
the national parliaments. 
The question arises as  to whether it is  advisable for  members of the national parliaments to 
stand for  elections  to  the  European  Parliament. The organizational  links between  the two 
parliamentary levels have not as  yet been developed to any great extent; however, does a link 
between  the  parliaments  not  involve  a  certain  infringement  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
European  Parliament and thereby detract  from  the significance of direct universal  suffrage 
within the meaning of Article 138(3) of the EEC Treaty? In any case it is  essential to remove 
the compulsion to exercise a dual mandate. 
In the long term the independent position of the European Parliament must be emphasized 
by  the  absence  of  dual  mandates. The  Legal  Affairs  Committee  therefore  suggests  a  new 
wording for  Article  5.  This will  ensure that dual  mandates can  only be  held for  a  limited 
period. Article 5 should read as  follows: 
'After the entry into force of the procedure provided for in Article 7(1), membership of 
the European Parliament shall not be compatible with membership of a Parliament of 
a Member State.' 
In  his  first  term  of  office  a  member  of  a  national  parliament  elected  to  the  European 
Parliament can chogse on the basis of the specific situation in his country and the time at his 
disposal, whether he wishes to exercise a dual  mandate or not. The national parliament can 
give no instructions on this choice. 
The wording of Article  5  makes it clear,  however,  that the national  mandate has  no  legal 
effects  on  the  European  mandate.  Accordingly,  if  a  directly  elected  member who  is  still 
exercising a dual  mandate loses  his national seat (for instance, because of differences in the 
length of the legislative period), his European mandate will simply continue. Likewise, it is 
left to the national legislator to alleviate the effects of exercising a dual mandate for instance 
by creating a special status as  regards  membership of the national  parliament for  members 
with a dual mandate. 
The electoral principles mentioned under 7 above do, however, set a limit to the freedom of 
action of national legislators. It would be inadmissible for a national electoral law to lay down 
that only persons who are  members of a national parliament could stand for election to  the 
European Parliament. 
55 (d)  Incompatibility provisions 
12.  The incompatibility provision in Article 6 of the Draft Convention is  in two  parts: a 
definitive  list  of  incompatibilities  with  various  offices  in  the  Community,  and  a  broad 
reference  to  corresponding  national  provisions.  This  combination  is  advantageous.  It 
establishes with the desired clarity the principle that a person exercising different functions 
should  not  decide  on  the  same  matter.  The  reference  to  national  law,  moreover,  allows 
different usages in the Member States to  be taken into account. Thus, for example, the times 
and legal effects of the resignation of a national official from public service in order to sit in 
parliament differ from country to country. 
13.  As  regards employees of the European Communites, it should be noted that the Staff 
Regulations  (Article  15)  already  provide  for  leave  for  the  purpose  of  candidature  for  and 
exercise of elective public office. 
(e)  Number of  Members 
14.  The determination  of the  total  number of  Members  of  a  directly  elected  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  allocation  of  seats  to  the  individual  Member  States  is  primarily  a 
political problem, not a legal one. 
The distribution of seats should, of course, not lead to discrimination against individual States 
or against the citizens of a State. 
Both the Political Affairs  Committee rapporteur's original proposal and the text adopted by 
the majority in the committee reflect an endeavour to allow all citizens as  far as  possible the 
same  influence  on  the  composition  of  the  European  Parliament,  and  also  to  guarantee 
representation of all States. The compromise adopted for this purpose cannot be criticized on 
legal grounds. 
15.  Nevertheless,  the  Legal  Affairs  Committee considers  it desirable  to  decide  the  total 
number of seats according to the functions of the European Parliament. The proposed figure 
of 550 seats means almost a tripling of the present figure. The committee is  of the opinion 
that an increase to 355 seats is sufficient to take account of the foreseeable development of the 
European Parliament - at least for the first two terms. It therefore proposes that this figure, 
with  the  distribution  of  seats  on  which  it  is  based,  be  reinstated,  and  that  subsequent 
experience and developments be allowed  to  decide whether the number of seats should be 
raised. 
(f)  Transitional period 
16.  In the Draft Convention the term 'transitional period' no longer occurs, by contrast 
with the 1960 proposals. This is in accordance with the Treaties, which do not provide for any 
transitional  period  in  connection  with  the  introduction  of  universal  direct  elections. 
Elsewhere in the EEC Treaty (Article 8), this term is used to denote the transitional period for 
the establishment of the common market, but this period has long expired. 
56 The considerable delays which have already taken place in the introduction of direct elections 
also make it inadvisable to propose a further transitional period. 
On the other hand, the  preconditions for  the creation of  certain features  - for  instance a 
completely uniform electoral system  - can only develop under a directly elected parliament. 
17.  Here, too, the Draft Convention has been worded very flexibly, to  make it possible to 
hold the first and also the subsequent elections under the provisions of the Draft Convention, 
or else  - provided the necessary consensus can be arrived at - apply a new system based on 
further progress towards integration. In view of the abovementioned Court of Justice decision 
on the application in stages of a legal act, there can be no objection to the Convention taking 
this form. 
(g)  Article 14 
18.  Apart  from  the  uniform  electoral  system,  which  is  to  be  introduced  through  the 
classical  procedure for  amending the Treaties (the  powers contained in Article  138(3) being 
transferred  to  Article  7(1),  the  adaptations  and  additions  to  the  Treaty  will  otherwise  be 
effected in accordance with the procedure which is essentially that of Article 235 (EEC). 
As  regards the legal considerations on this provision, reference may be made to the Political 
Affairs  Committee rapporteur's comments on Article  14. It should be recalled that the draft 
provides  Parliament with  the  right of  co-decision  on amendments or supplements  to  the 
Treaty. In view of Parliament's position as the body mainly affected, it is to be hoped that this 
formulation can be maintained in the further discussions on the draft. 
(h)  Further consideration of  the Draft Convention 
19.  According to  the text of the Treaties, direct elections to  the European Parliament by 
universal  suffrage  are  to  be  introduced  by  a  special  procedure.  This  procedure  provides 
essentially for three stages: 
submission of proposals by Parliament; 
consideration  of  Parliament's  proposals  by  the  Council;  and  their  rejection  or 
recommendation to the Member States for adoption; 
the Treaty to be concluded among the Member States.1 
20.  As  regards  the  further  consideration  by  the  Council, the text  of  the Treaties  is  not 
absolutely clear whether  - and if so  how far  - the Council can depart from  Parliament's 
proposals. The translations of the text concerned differ considerably from each other: 
'Der Rat erHiBt einstimmig die  entsprechenden Bestimmungen und empfiehlt sie den 
Mitgliedstaaten zur Annahme gemaB ihren verfassungsrechtlichen Vorschriften.' 
1  Article 138(3) does not make it compulsory for direct elections to be introduced by way of a Treaty between the Member States (see the exception in Article 
236 EEC), but this method is  the most suitable. 
57 'De  Raad  stelt  met  eenparigheid  van  stemmen  de  desbetreffende  bepalingen  vast, 
waarvan  hij  de  aanneming door de  Lid-Staten  overeenkomstig hun onderscheidene 
grondwettelijke bepalingen aanbeveelt.' 
'Le  Conseil  statuant  a  l'unanimite  arretera  les  dispositions  dont  il  recommandera 
1' adoption  par  les  .Etats  membres,  conformement  a  leurs  regles  constitutionelles 
respectives.' 
'11  Consiglio, con deliberazione unanime, stabilid le disposizioni di cui raccomandera 
l'adozione  da  parte  degli  Stati  Membri,  conformemente  aile  loro  rispettive  norme 
constituzionali.' 
'The Council shall, acting unanimously, lay down the appropriate provisions, which it 
shall recommend to Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements.' 
'Radet  fastsretter  herom  med  enstemmighed  forskrifter,  som  det  henstiller  til 
Medlemsstaterne  at  vedtage  i  overensstemmelse  med  deres  forfatningsmressige 
bestemmelser.' 
21.  However, the general sense of Article 13 8(3) is that it is incumbent on the Council and 
Parliament to  cooperate in meeting the obligation laid down therein. Even  though the two 
institutions have different tasks  to carry out, these tasks  each serve  the common goal which 
both institutions must endeavour to attain jointly. 
From this viewpoint, it is  unthinkable for  the  Council to  make significant changes to  the 
Draft  Convention  without  the  approval  of  Parliament.  Even  in  the  ordinary  legislative 
procedure,  this  would  initiate  renewed  consultation  of  Parliament.  In  the  case  of  the 
consideration and adoption by the Council of the Draft Convention on direct elections, it is 
all the more necessary for Parliament's agreement to be ensured. 
22.  The Convention introducing elections by direct universal suffrage is  to enter into force 
when all Member States have deposited the instrument of ratification. If the agreement of all 
the States to the holding of these elections cannot be obtained by 1978, the problem will arise 
whether the text of the Treaty is  to remain a dead letter, or else those States who have ratified 
the convention should not then agree to hold direct elections. 
It seems premature to  provide regulations on this  point now,  since such  provisions  might 
even increase the delaying effect mentioned. 
(i)  Complaint of  failure to act 
23.  It has  already been mentioned that the Council and Parliament are  obliged to  work 
towards the attainment of the Treaty objective of elections by direct universal suffrage. 
The Council must take a decision on Parliament's plan within a reasonable period. It is  not 
for us here to consider whether a complaint by Parliament against the Council on grounds of 
failure  to act in respect of the direct election plans, on the basis of Article  17 5 EEC, would 
have been successful in past years. 
58 The admissibility of such a complaint can certainly be regarded  as  the prevailing opinion 
today.1 
As  regards grounds for a complaint, the submission of this new Draft Convention sets  new 
dates. If it becomes apparent that the Council is  not using this period actively  in order to 
reconcile differing views and to seek a compromise, but is  again acting passively over a long 
period, then a complaint of failure to act would be justified. 
It is  to be hoped that these considerations will remain hypothetical and that the Council will 
pass Parliament's draft to the Member States without delay. 
24.  The Legal Affairs Committee 
recommends  the  European  Parliament  to  consider  how  the  introduction  of  direct 
elections can be linked with the extension of the powers of the European Parliament, for 
instance by 
granting comprehensive budgetary powers, 
the introduction of a legislative right, to be supervised by a second chamber, 
a different allocation of the right of initiative, 
since it should be ensured that in complying with Article  138, the all-round significance 
of this provision for changing the status of the European Parliament is  not forgotten; 
welcomes the fact that this Draft Convention has been submitted; 
approves the draft, with the above reservations; 
hopes that it will  be asked  to  play a  part in the working out of the common electoral 
system. 
I  See the communication on the opinion requested by President Behrendt, Annex to the Bulletin of the European Parliament No 12/1972. 
59 ANNEX 
Report of the Political Affairs Committee 
on  the  adoption  of a  Draft  Convention  introducing  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage (Doc. 368/74) 
AMENDMENTS No 11  AND No 22 
tabled by Mr H  Lautenschlager 
on  behalf of  the Legal Affairs Committee 
AMENDMENT No 1 
Article 2 (I) of  the  Draft  Convention  on  elections  to  the  European  Parliament by  direct 
universal suffrage to read as follows: 
Article 2 
1.  The number of representatives elected in each Member State shall be as  follows: 
Explanation 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
23 
17 
71 
65 
13 
66 
6 
27 
67 
355 
The aim  of the amendment is  to  restore  the  number of seats  originally  proposed  by the 
rapporteur, for the following reasons: 
1  adopted by IS votes in favour with one abstention. 
2  adopted by 8 votes in favour and 7 votes against. 
61 The number of Members of the European Parliament has a triple function: 
to ensure fair representation of all the citizens of the Community; 
to  ensure  conditions  such  that  the  European  Parliament  can  exercise  its  rights  and 
discharge its duties in the best possible way; 
provision must be made for the possibility of future increases in numbers in the event of 
enlargement of the Communities (e.g.  possible accession of Greece, Portugal or Norway) 
or growth in Parliament's workload. 
An  increase  in  the  number of  seats  to  550  would  not  now  fulfil  these  requirements.  In 
particular,  the  accession  of  one  of  the  abovementioned  States  would  tend  to  enlarge  the 
European Parliament unduly to  almost 700  Members. It is  to  be feared  that this great size 
would not be beneficial to  the quality of Parliament's work. Moreover,  the existing ratio of 
representatives  from  small and medium States  to  representatives  from  large  Member States 
would be abruptly changed to the detriment of the smaller States. 
According to the draft prepared by the Political Affairs Committee, Ireland for example would 
have  10  representatives as  at present, Denmark's representation would increase to  14, whilst 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany would have their number of representatives 
virtually tripled. 
The amendment proposed by the Legal Affairs  Committee, on the other hand, envisages  13 
representatives for Ireland, 17  for Denmark and for the four Member States with the highest 
population increases w_~ich would in no case go beyond double the present figure. 
The Legal  Affairs  Committee's proposal  for  the distribution  of  seats  between  the Member 
States  is  also  based on a mathematical model. The essential objectives of this model are  as 
follows: 
so  far as  possible, a proportional ratio would be established between the population of a 
State and the number of its representatives in the European Parliament; 
the  new  distribution  of  seats  must  not  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  present  number of 
representatives from any one side; 
the size of the delegation to  be elected in each State should be such that all  significant 
political forces in that State can be represented in the European Parliament. 
Only a compromise can enable these objectives to be achieved to any extent. The proposed 
figure  of 355 representatives and the distribution of seats between the Member States on the 
basis of the following calculation are fair and adequate and make provision for any growth in 
the workload of the European Parliament and possible enlargement of the Communities: 
(a)  Up to a population of 1 million each State receives 6 seats. 
62 (b)  States with a population between 1 million and 2.5  million are given 6 further seats. 
(c)  Up to  a  population of  5  million, each  State  receives  1 further  seat  for  each  additional 
500 000 inhabitants. 
(d)  For a population between 5 million and 10  million each State receives  1 further seat for 
each additional 750 000 inhabitants. 
(e)  For a population between 10  million and 50  million each State receives  1 further seat for 
each additional 1 million inhabitants or part thereof. 
(f)  For  a  population  exceeding  50  million,  each  State  recetves  1  further  seat  for  each 
additional 1.5  million inhabitants or part thereof. 
The seat distribution provided for  in Article 2 results from  the application of this system to 
Member States' populations in 1973. Details will be found in the following table. 
AMENDMENT No 2 
Article 5 of the Draft Convention on elections to the European Parliament by direct universal 
suffrage to read as  follows: 
'After the entry into force of the procedure provided for in Article 7 (1),  membership 
of the European Parliament shall not be compatible with membership of a Parliament 
of a Member State.' 
Explanation 
A  representative should be  permitted to  combine a  national  parliamentary mandate with a 
European  mandate only during a  transitional  period. This dual  mandate will  no longer be 
justified  after  the  introduction  of  the  uniform  election  procedure. The  two  parliamentary 
levels should function quite independently and in parallel. 
At this stage of the Community's development there would seem to  be no further need for 
individual States to exercise influence on Community legislation in the European Parliament. 
In the discussions so far held on the future institutional structure an outline has emerged for a 
Chamber  of  States  which  would  enable  the  Member  States  to  influence  Community 
legislation. 
It  would  significantly  disturb  the  balance  of  the  future  system  if  representatives  to  the 
European Parliament were  tied to  the national parliaments by the maintenance of  the dual 
mandate. 
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66 IN THE CHAIR: MR BERKHOUWER 
President 
(The sitting was opened at 10.15 a.m.) 
President.  - The sitting is  open. At the  request of the  Christian-Democratic Group the 
sitting is beginning a little later than planned. 
1. Approval of  the minutes 
President. - The minutes of proceedings of yesterday's sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? 
The minutes of proceedings are approved. 
2. Convention introducing elections to the European Parliament by direct  uni~!Jersal suffrage 
President. - The next item is  the report drawn up by Mr Patijn on behalf of the Political 
Affairs  Committee  on  the  adoption  of  a  Draft  Convention  introducing  elections  to  the 
European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. (Doc. 368/74) 
I would remind the House that it was decided yesterday to allot speaking time in this debate 
according to certain rules which have been brought to your attention and are recorded in the 
minutes of proceedings of yesterday's sitting. 
On behalf of all  those  present,  I  am  pleased  to  welcome Mr  Dehousse  to  the  House this 
morning. In 1960 he was rapporteur on the same subject. 
(Applause) 
I call Mr Scott-Hopkins for a procedural motion. 
Mr Scott-Hopkins. - Mr President, I have no wish to hold up the proceedJtngs, but may I 
ask your guidance? I understand the importance of this debate and I understand the necessity 
of this debate to be as widely known throughout our Community as  possible, but is  it really 
necessary to have so many of these gentlemen in the middle of the Chamber? It makes this 
not a  debating chamber but something entirely different, and I  suggest that some form  of 
compromise be arranged by yourself with all  these gentlemen of the press with their lights 
and so on. Perhaps it can be done a little more discreetly. Our constituents throughout the 
Community must know what we are saying on this very important matter, but this is  really 
going too far. 
President.  - Mr  Scott-Hopkins,  these  gentlemen  will  only  be  here  for  a  short  time. 
Furthermore I shall ask then as  far as  possible to film the whole Assembly, but for not more 
than 15  minutes at the most. 
I call Mr Patijn, who has asked to present his report. 
67 Mr  Patijn, rapporteur.  - (NL) Mr President, in May  1960 the European Parliament met for 
three days  in order to establish a draft convention introducing direct elections of Members. 
Now, almost 15  years later, we are devoting only one day to this. 
Has our interest in our own elections diminished since them? By  no means-indeed, quite 
the reverse is  true. The need for  European elections is  greater today than ever before. I shall 
return to this point shortly. 
In 1975 we can build on the great amount of work that has been done in recent years, and can 
take up the thread where it was  left off.  Without delving too  far  into past history,  I would 
nevertheless like to recall a few  names to memory. First and foremost there is  Mr Dehousse, 
whom you have just mentioned, Mr President, and who performed excellent work in 1960 as 
chairman  of  the Working Party  on  European  elections,  and  was  also  the  Political  Affairs 
Committee's rapporteur on this matter until 1970. 
As  your rapporteur,  therefore,  I  have  great  pleasure  in welcoming the 'father of  European 
elections', here today. Mr Dehousse, your presence is  a source of stimulation to me as  your 
'son and heir' in this  matter; you and I  will  know by the end of the day whether I  am a 
prodigal son or not. 
I should also like to mention the other members of the 1960 Working Party and I would draw 
your attention to  the fact  that three of them, Mr Faure, Mr Poher and Mr Schuijt, are  still 
members of our Parliament. 
Finally  I  should  remind  you  of  the  great  amount  of  work  which  my  predecessor  Mr 
Lautenschlager has done as  rapporteur. I have  profited enormously from his experience, and 
he will  shortly present an extremely valuable  opinion in  his  capacity as  rapporteur of  the 
Legal Affairs Committee. 
All that had already been written and said about European elections thus greatly facilitated my 
task as  rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee. On the other hand it also made it more 
difficult.  Firstly,  three new Member States  have  joined the European  Communities and an 
almost completely new generation of politicians has grown up. In addition, I knew that the 
Council has hitherto never managed to  reach any decision on direct elections of Members of 
the European Parliament. 
Thus, the political climate was somewhat uncertain when I took on this task in autumn 1973. 
Was the European Parliament once more going to draw up a detailed draft convention which 
would find its way into the Council filing cabinets, never to be seen again? 
However, the Heads of State and Government surprised us at the Paris Summit in December 
with their statement that direct elections to the European Parliament should be introduced as 
soon as possible. True, two delegations had reservations, but the majority of governments have 
now approved the principle of European elections. The Council is  waiting for our proposals, 
and  as  far  as  your  rapporteur is  concerned, the  Council  can  start  its  work  tomorrow and 
complete it very swiftly. If the Council again wants to take 15 years to reach agreement, it can 
cenainly spend a whole year on each individual article proposed. But I would stress that the 
proposals on which we  shall vote  today and the political climate which emerged at the last 
summit make a rapid decision possible. 
The  need  for  a  rapid  decision  was  constantly  in  my  mind  when  I  was  formulating  my 
proposals. Like the  1960 rapporteurs, I worked from  the premise that a speedy decision on 
68 European  elections  was  of  vital  importance.  Consequently  I  had  to  exercise  considerable 
restraint  with  regard  to  the  evolution  of  a  uniform  procedure.  Anything which  need  not 
absolutely be decided today has been deferred for consideration in the context of the uniform 
electoral system which the European Parliament itself will have to work out. I decided to work 
in this way for very specific reasons. During my extraordinarily useful and informative tour of 
the capitals of the nine Member States, almost everyone  I  spoke  to  recommended that we 
should first organize the elections on the basis of national rules and the rest would follow. The 
Political Affairs Committee and the Legal Affairs Committee share this view. 
The real political significance of direct European elections lies not in the extent to which they 
are uniform, but in the fact that they are held at all. Opponents of direct elections have been 
telling us  for  long enough that the European Parliament must have power before it can be 
directly elected, while at  the same time withholding these  powers  from  Parliament on  the 
hypocritical grounds that we  are not directly elected. 
The European Parliament must break this vicious circle and make it quite clear that the one 
does not depend on the other. Of course we  must continue to fight for increased powers  -
particularly legislative  powers  - for  the  European  Parliament,  but that is  a  very  different 
question from whether we  will meet shortly as  representatives of the people, with a mandate 
from the peoples of Europe rather than from our national parliaments. Once we have acquired 
legitimacy by virtue of our direct link with the European voters, we shall have an even more 
legitimate right to demand that the governments grant us  powers. 
There is an additional, very practical point. Unless we are released from the burden of our dual 
task, i.e. our duties to our individual countries and to  Europe, we  in the European Parliament 
will  remain amateurs. We perform our legislative and supervisory task in Europe only when 
our duties  to  our national  parliaments or our constituencies  allow.  The  major  part of our 
responsibilities is  still at home, and we  can only carry out our task here by dint of excessive 
efforts and at the expense of our families and ourselves. 
This  must  stop.  The  development  of  the  European  Community  requires  professional 
parliamentary control. European elections are an aid to this and no more. 
If, with the vote on my report this evening, we  take a further step on the long and difficult 
road to European elections, it will not be an occasion for jubilation, since it will mean that we 
are  again  submitting proposals  to  the Council which, in  15  years,  has  done nothing about 
European elections. We shall therefore have to make it very clear to the Council that we  are 
not prepared to tolerate another delay of this kind. We shall insist that the Council adheres to 
the  terms  of  the  communique  issued  by  the  Paris  Summit,  i.e.  a  decision  in  197 6  and 
elections in 1978. 
The European Parliament will therefore begin work tomorrow on a threefold task. Firstly, we 
shall have to put pressure on the Council in the immediate future to compel ilt  to take a swift 
decision on direct elections to the European Parliament. The European Parliament must not 
and cannot tolerate another 15  years of unbroken silence on the part of the Council. 
Secondly,  the  European  Parliament must consider the  uniform  electoral  procedure.  I  have 
learned from  my experience over the last year that Parliament here faces  an enormous task 
which involves  a great deal  of responsibility and which we  must tackle  without too  much 
delay. 
69 Thirdly, we  must prepare for  the first  European  elections. Your rapporteur feels  this  is  an 
exceptionally important task. We must make it clear to our political parties that they have to 
think seriously  about what they want from  the  European  elections  and  how they see  the 
development of European politics, since their views  on this can vary greatly in accordance 
with their different principles. Above all, however, we must prepare the peoples of Europe and 
explain to them the whys and wherefores of our work in the European Parliament, not for our 
own sakes, but for theirs. 
To conclude, the report we are discussing today is  only a beginning. We will be dealing for a 
long time yet with the question of direct elections to the European Parliament and, of course, 
with the related question of the powers of the Parliament. We must have no illusions: no one 
simply by virtue of European elections is  going to hand us  powers, or legitimacy on a plate. 
We ourselves  must fight  for  them.  But anyone who  hopes  and believes,  as  I  do,  that the 
European Community will be able to do something for our peoples must be prepared to make 
great efforts to achieve democratic control and, therefore, the direct election of the Members 
of the European Parliament. 
(Applause) 
President.  - I  call  Mr  Lautenschlager,  draftsman  of  the  opinion  of  the  Legal  Affairs 
Committee. 
Mr Lautenschlager.  - (D) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, under Article 138(3) of the 
EEC  Treaty  and  the  corresponding  provisions  of  the  ECSC  and  Euratom  Treaties,  the 
European Parliament must submit to  the Council of Ministers a draft convention on direct 
elections to the European Parliament. Parliament fulfilled this condition as  early as  1962, and 
it is  a modified draft convention which is  to be adopted today. It should be pointed out that 
Parliament certainly cannot be reproached for this twelve-year delay. It must, however, be said 
that in spite  of  the great importance of the discussions  on a  draft convention introducing 
direct  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Bureau  was  unable  to  shake  off  the 
self-imposed  restrictions  of  the division  of  responsibilities-for  instance,  the  Legal  Affairs 
Committee should have been asked to advise on a whole series of legal matters. It was  only 
after a suggestion to this effect from the Legal Affairs Committee that the Bureau decided, on 
13  November  197 4-i.e.  after  the  Patijn  report  had been  adopted  by  the  Political  Affairs 
Committee on 7 November 197 4-to ask the Legal Affairs Committee for its opinion as well. 
The  result  of  this  is  that  the  House  is  now faced  with  two  reports,  which  certainly  does 
nothing to make our deliberations simpler. 
The Legal Affairs Committee first of all studied the question of continuity, in other words it 
had  to  see  whether,  after  the  Convention  came  into  force,  the  outgoing  Parliament was 
automatically dissolved under Article 138(3) of the EEC Treaty, or whether it would remain in 
office  until  the  new  Parliament-i.e. the  directly  elected  Parliament-met. The  terms  of 
reference of the outgoing Parliament in the Treaty were so  imperative that we  came to  the 
view  that  it  was  essential  to  have  an  uninterrupted  transition  to  the  directly  elected 
Parliament. This requirement is satisfied by Article 15  in conjunction with Article 1  0(3) of the 
Draft Convention. It also means that the national parliaments retain the right to fill  the seats 
allocated to the individual Member States in accordance with the old procedure. 
70 The next point studied was  the seat distribution. It must be pointed out in this context that 
the seat distribution  laid  down  in Article  138(2)  of  the EEC Treaty in the version  for  the 
Treaties of Accession is linked unequivocally and exclusively to Article 138(1) of the Treaty, so 
that  any  convention  on  direct  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  must  also  contain 
provisions regarding the distribution of seats. The actual  number of seats will  doubtless  be 
discussed in the context of the proposed amendments to the Patijn report. 
One of  the  greatest  problems  over  the years  has  been  the uniform  electoral  system. It is 
understandable  that each  Member State  felt  its  own  system  was  best and  tried  to  have  it 
accepted by the others. To escape from this impasse, it was essential to study whether the term 
'uniform'  necessarily  referred  to  an  entire  system.  Since  all  Member  States  profess  their 
allegiance to democracy, in other words to  a form of government in which the people is  the 
source of power, there is a guarantee that by means of elections the people can make its views 
effectively known on political decisions. This, in turn, means that all the electoral laws in the 
Member States satisfy the five  minimum requirements for democratic elections: they are free 
-as are all citizens-, they are equal-we do not have an electoral system based on classes-, 
they are secret, they are direct-no electoral college is involved-and they are universal. These 
were  the criteria on which  the Political Affairs  Committee agreed  as  being covered  by the 
term 'uniform'. 
The harmonization  of  the  national  electoral  laws  will  then be  undertaken  by  the directly 
elected Parliament, as  provided for in Article 7(1) of the Draft Convention. The national laws 
will also apply to the other procedural aspects in the first direct election. Only the timing of 
the election, the period of the mandate and verification are  settled in the Convention. This 
last item was  necessary since the national electoral laws are not subject to supervision by the 
European Court of Justice. 
Almost the longest time was spent by the Legal Affairs Committee on the combination of the 
mandates in the national and European Parliaments. After a thorough debate, it decided to 
accept the proposal to allow the dual mandate for  a transitional period, while rejecting it in 
principle.  Mr  President,  I  myself  and  the  speakers  for  my group will  be  making  further 
comments on this aspect in connection with the amendments tabled on this point. 
The number of seats was also the subject of a detailed debate in the Legal Affairs Committee, 
and we finally decided to submit the amendment which you have before you. Essentially, the 
Legal  Affairs  Committee saw  no  need  to  base  the  Parliament on  principles of  maximum 
representation, in other words to lay down a representative size, but felt  that, as  Parliament 
could still be enlarged if need be, it was better to avoid laying down a size which could not be 
changed at a  later date. We must also  remember that we  have  applications from  potential 
member countries and that their representatives would have  to be added to  this figure, with 
the result that Parliament might become so large that its work would be affected. That was all 
I wanted to say as spokesman of the Legal Affairs Committee for the time being-more when 
we come to move the amendments. 
The transitional period proposed originally is  no longer contained in the Convention. There 
have been so  many political changes in the meantime that there is  really no further need to 
discuss it. 
The  remaining  paragraphs  of  the  report  by  the  Legal  Affairs  Committee  concern  legal 
questions dealing with the further processing of the Draft Convention after its  approval  by 
I 
71 Parliament. We reached the conclusion that if the Council of Ministers wishes to  make any 
changes to the Draft Convention in the form approved here today, Parliament must always be 
consulted. There must, in other words, be cooperation between the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament, since the right of initiative for  Parliament laid down explicitly in 
the Treaty requires  that Parliament must be consulted right up to  the very last minute, i.e. 
until approval by the Council of Ministers. 
We could also deal here with the action against the Council for failure to act, but this would 
probably take too long today. Ladies and gentlemen, you know that Parliament looked in to 
this question a long time ago-it must be about six or seven years-, but that it decided not to 
bring an action against  the  Council of Ministers  before  the  European  Court of Justice for 
failure to act, since the then current strict interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty forced 
Parliament to drop the action it has planned. Since then, there has been a change of attitude 
in all the Community institutions, and we feel that an action for failure to act would now have 
some prospect of success-at least as regards its admissibility. We hope, however-and I must 
emphasize this as strongly as  possible-that the Council of Ministers does not allow things to 
go so far that Parliament is obliged to bring an action against it for failure to act. 
Mr President, our debate today should also be used as an occasion to point out to the Council 
of Ministers and the governments of the Member States that the direct elections to a European 
Parliament are not intended to  represent the final  stage of development, but that, alongside 
this-although, as Mr Patijn has just pointed out, not necessarily linked to it-there should be 
an extension of Parliament's powers and responsibilities. Budgetary powers stand at the top of 
the list, along with some form of involvement of the European Parliament in legislation and 
the granting to  the European Parliament of a right of initiative in the creation of  European 
law. This is something which must not be forgotten. If our interpretation is correct, it is one of 
the points contained in paragraph 12  of the Summit Conference communique, and it is  now 
up to the Council of Ministers to satisfy this most pressing wish of the European Parliament. 
Mr President, it is the opinion of the Legal Affairs Committee that the European Parliament is 
today taking one of its most important decisions, and it would be a good thing if this decision 
were backed by a convincing, indeed an overwhelming majority in the final vote this evening. 
(Applause) 
President. - Ladies and gentlemen, I think it would be a good thing for this very important 
debate to be publicized as fully as possible throughout the Community; hence the presence of 
television, 
(Applause from the Socialist Group) 
to whom have given instructions that all  the institutions and all  the parties should be given 
the most objective possible coverage. This will happen once or twice again later in the debate 
when we get round to voting. I hope everyone is satisfied with this arrangement. 
I call Mr Ortoli, whom I contratulate on behalf of us all on being reappointed President of the 
Commission of the European Communities. 
Mr Ortoli, President of  the Commission of  the European Communities.  - (F) Mr President, 
first of all should like to thank you for your kind words. I am pleased to be re-elected at a time 
when we  are  debating a subject which is  of major importance for  Europe. If we  do  indeed 
72 succeed  in implementing the Treaty to  the full,  in other words  investing Europe with real 
power, we shall have effected a decisive change in the coming years by moving from the first 
preparatory phase of European construction to the establishment of the real  Europe. This is 
why as  a  European and as  a  democrat I  find  this  conjunction between  the  renewal  of my 
mandate as  President and the prospect of direct elections to Parliament most !felicitous. 
Mr  President,  the  fact  that  Parliament  is  today  deliberating  on  the  direct  election  of  its 
Members reflects a positive and very significant development. In spite of doubts, in spite of 
persistent  threats,  Europe  seems  to  be  moving in  the  right direction, at least  as  far  as  its 
democratization is  concerned. For thirteen years,  since  1960, when Mr Dehousse-whom I 
am glad to see here today-produced his report, the objective of election by universal suffrage 
has been one of your and our constant preoccupations, but has disappeared from the priorities 
of our governments. The work of your Political Affairs Committee and the Draft Convention 
presented by Mr Patijn on renewed bases, which take account of the new factors  involved in 
the construction  of  Europe  and in particular the enlargement of  the  Community and the 
opportunities offered by European Union, thus reflect a very substantial change of attitude. 
We know-and the events of 197 4 have only reinforced this conviction - that the difficulties 
and the challenges facing Europe are leading, for  reasons both of principle and necessity, to 
prospects  of  progress  in  the  institutional  field,  in  particular  in  the  direction  of  greater 
European democracy. Indeed, in  the period of confrontation with world problems which is 
ahead of us  I do not believe that we shall succeed in convincing our peoples that Europe is 
both a  necessity and a  refuge  unless  they feel  a greater sense of participation in this great 
undertaking. 
But it is  particularly essential that we  should henceforth not be  the only ones to share this 
feeling. While for years the governments of the Member States have shown obvious reluctance 
to  take  concrete  steps  towards  direct  elections  to  your Assembly,  the  Heads  of  State  and 
Government at their recent Paris Summit have, in a decision of major political significance, 
fixed  dates,  laid down objectives and provided a very profound and very  powerful impetus. 
Parliament's role in this must not be underestimated. I am convinced, for instance, that the 
quality of the work done by your Political Affairs Committee and in particular the logical and 
realistic character of Mr Patijn's draft played a great part in the developments leading to  the 
results  of  last  December.  This  is  also  true  of  the  pressure  which  the  Commission  has 
untiringly brought to bear, both in public and in private, and the desires and preoccupations 
which I myself expressed clearly at the Summit. 
But we  must also admit that the political leaders of our countries have succeeded in giving 
concrete form to the general feeling that it is  not only possible but necessary to open up the 
way  to  institutional  progress  in  Europe.  For me  this  illustrates  the usefulness  of meetings 
between Heads of Government-which I,  like many of us, sometimes have my doubts about, 
as you know-when they are properly prepared and centred on a limited agenda. They are a 
way  of  introducing  major  political  initiatives  without  the  protracted  debates  and  risk  of 
bogging down which characterize other gatherings. The problem of how to implement these 
policies  remains.  Mr  Patijn  said  this  quite  clearly.  I  do  not underestimate  the  difficulties 
involved,  nor am  I  unaware  of the  reservations  expressed by  two  Member States  as  to  the 
conclusions of the Heads of Government. But I believe nonetheless that this is  an important 
step forward. 
Europe is advancing towards a new institutional equilibrium on a democratic basis. There is a 
logical link, which cannot be denied, between the election of Parliament by universal suffrage 
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Assembly amounts effectively to raising the problem of Parliament's legislative powers, given 
its  added  political  weight  and,  ultimately,  to  anticipating developments  towards  European 
Union and the general institutional equilibrium it will bring about. From this point of view 
the Paris communique represents the first brick in the construction of European Union. 
It is self-evident that the thinking and the work which have been going on in recent months 
will  have to be continued and intensified if  this logical sequence of ideas is  to be converted 
into an overall strategy. This will be a difficult task, we must not pretend it won't; I myself can 
already see difficulties and dangers. The greatest hazard is foolhardiness, and we can avoid this 
only by maintaining maximum flexibility in our overall strategy, in order to avoid the creation 
of formal  links between  the various  aspects  of institutional development in Europe, which 
could lead to political stalemate. 
In other words  I  hope that, while keeping this overall  strategy in view,  we  shall be able to 
achieve  specific  aims-and  the  direct  election  of  Parliament  is  one  of  the  most 
important-without  seeking  to  lay  down  every  detail  of  the  construction  beforehand. 
Otherwise in fifteen  years'  time we  shall find ourselves thanking Mr Patijn and telling him 
that he did a very good job and that now at last we can get down to doing something concrete. 
(Laughter) 
We  must  also  avoid  the  danger  of  over-bureaucratic  preparation  and  thinking.  The 
Community's  institutions  are  now  faced  with  a  series  of  deadlines  in  respect  of  certain 
commitments. For 1975, the approval by Parliament of a draft convention, the submission of a 
report  on  European  Union  by  each  of  the  institutions,  and  the  preparation  of  a 
comprehensive report by Mr Tindemans; for  1976, action by the Council on your proposals; 
and for 1978, the first direct elections to Parliament. These different procedures form part of a 
whole;  the development of a  new institutional system  for  Europe. This must be  part of a 
process of creation and ongoing reflection, and cannot under any circumstances eliminate the 
powers of any of the institutions, or remove their right to  make proposals and to intervene at 
any time. Procedures make it  possible for  ideas  and initiatives to  be channelled in a useful 
direction. They must not become sterile straitjackets impeding the spontaneity and popular 
enthusiasm which are essential to the success of such an ambitious enterprise. However, I can 
understand that the closeness of the deadlines, in particular 1978, may cause a certain amount 
of confusion and anxiety. In my opinion such fears  are  legitimate, for  time is  short, but we 
must not be paralysed by them. 
Let  us  not be frightened  by our own  boldness,  for  one thing is  certain,  the  creation  of  a 
cumulative  process,  a  dynamic  interlinking  of  the  institutions  can  only  be  beneficial  for 
Europe. 
It is  difficult at this stage to say any more about the form and content of the final edifice of 
which  the  election  of  your Assembly  by  universal  suffrage  will  be  the  foundation  stone. 
I  myself believe-though this  is  at  the moment no more than a  personal opinion-that a 
strong executive with wide powers and adapted to the requirements of modern government is 
a natural counterpart to a Parliament, elected by the citizens of Europe. This, however, is  no 
more than a preliminary judgment. 
On  the  other hand,  I  am  fully  convinced  that  the  policies  decided  at  the  Paris  Summit 
symbolize  the  return, after  the doubts of  1974,  to  a  more constructive  state  of  mind. The 
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progress  through  institutional  developments  and  those  who  put economic  and  monetary 
recovery  above  all  else, seems to  have  been settled satisfactorily. There has  been a salutary 
awakening, as  I said a few  moments ago. We have reached a point today where the reality of 
Europe, the problems it must face and the realization of our ambitions require a step forward 
at the institutional level. 
This is  why I am pleased that, despite the present crisis in Europe, despite the pressures of 
external payments, inflation and unemployment, those in the highest positions have shown 
ambition and real political courage, inspired by forward-looking ideas on the institutions, and 
have  put  Europe  back  on  the  right  path,  the  path  of  integration,  by  confirming  and 
completing the  European  project  born  of  the Treaty  of  Rome  and  put  into  focus  at  the 
October 1972 Summit. 
This does not dispose of all  the problems, nor does it remove all  my doubts about European 
initiatives  which  smack  too  much  of  intergovernmental  collaboration.  But  today  we  are 
discussing a subject which allows room for hope rather than doubt. 
This  path  towards  European  integration  has  been  rediscovered  by  the  Heads  of  State  and 
Government in another, and perhaps more significant way,  for  their stimulus relates  to  the 
democratic ideal itself, which is  part of the common inheritance of our nine countries. 
For the first  time, indeed, the goal  of European  Union  is  being approached in a  concrete 
manner via  the route of universal suffrage. This is  not only of symbolic but of considerable 
practical  significance,  since  it  represents  a  commitment  to  build  the  new  European 
institutional system in accordance with democratic principles. It seems obvious  to  me that 
this essential element cannot be ignored in the final construction. 
This is an extremely significant step, since excessive stress on the technical aspects of building 
Europe  could lead  to  the fundamental  requirements of  democracy being disregarded  or at 
least undervalued. 
The fact  that democracy is  the primary objective of the new Europe seems to  me to  have  a 
further significance. The fact which the Europe of tomorrow will present to the world will be 
that of democracy, which represents not only its  most precious asset,  but perhaps its  most 
original one, too, and which, in a world in upheaval where individual rights and liberties are 
so  often  trodden  under foot,  perhaps  best  portrays  its  identity.  In short, the setting-up of 
democratic machinery is unarguably the best way to start building Europe. It means setting in 
motion important dynamic  forces,  which  must play,  and  I  believe  will  play,  an  extremely 
positive  role  in the subsequent construction of Europe by strengthening its  legitimacy and 
hence the impact of the initiatives taken in its name. 
You are right about this, Mr Patijn. You spoke of Parliament's legitimacy, but it goes further 
than this; it is  the legitimacy of Europe which is involved vis-a-vis its peoples, in so far as  its 
peoples are democratic peoples. They will be tomorrow, because direct elections to Parliament 
will  place  the citizens at  the very  heart of  Europe  and forge  the strongest  possible  bonds 
between their views and resolve and the construction of Europe. 
But already  there  are  bound to  be  positive  aspects  and  positive  effects,  as  the  impending 
prospect-1978  is  tomorrow after all-of elections to  the European Parliament by universal 
suffrage  must help to give  a purpose and a more specific direction to  our present efforts to 
75 overcome Europe's economic and social difficulties. The policies decided at the Paris Summit 
must get things moving and convince our citizens that the measures proposed or undertaken 
at Community level are aimed at helping them to control a destiny which is their own, and in 
the determination of which they will shortly be very directly associated. 
I hope I have not been misunderstood and that my words will not be thought over-optimistic 
or  over-triumphant.  On  the  contrary,  this  is  a  time  of  struggle.  I  speak  as  a  man  who 
recognizes the added responsibilities which henceforth are his and those of the Commission. 
Responsiblities which require us  to  do all we  can to give form to the forward-looking ideas 
stated in Paris, and which also  require us  to  justify the confidence we  have asked others to 
have  in  us  by  performing  the  particularly  heavy  tasks  which  we  have  accepted  in  the 
Community in its present form. 
The reassuring prospects for the future cannot indeed absolve us from the often thankless and 
always  difficult work of the present. And the present already consists in bringing about the 
future,  in  other words  in  obtaining rapidly  the  decision  of the governments on  the  Draft 
Convention which you are about to vote on, and in setting in motion in the very near future 
the process of democratization required by the Treaty. 
Although I have spoken for longer than the rapporteurs, which is unusual, I should like to add 
a final  comment. The matter we  are dealing with today-the presence of television cameras 
has shown this-has a prime virtue: it has enabled us to turn to the peoples of Europe and tell 
them a little more about the type of future and the type of institutions which will be theirs. 
But  I  think that one  of  the things-and this  will  be  my conclusion-which we  must do 
straightaway is  to bring the struggle out into the open. Since we are going to  have elections, 
we  hope, in  three years'  time,  there must be a greater effort to  arouse  public interest,  the 
impact  of  Europe  must  be  much  more  powerful.  I  think  this  idea  of  democracy,  this 
profoundly creative perspective must be presented properly, for  Europeans will have to vote 
for  Europe, and they must therefore be encouraged to  understand that the Europe they are 
being offered will open the way to a real debate about democracy in Europe and about Europe 
itself. 
You may rest assured that the Commission is  absolutely determined, now that Europe seems 
to be back on the rails again, to engage openly in this struggle to win over public opinion and 
to  convince our peoples,  co~fident in  the belief that the essence  of Europe  is  that it is  a 
democracy. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Klepsch to speak on behalf of the Christian-Democratic Group. 
Mr Klepsch. - (D) Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by saying that my Group is glad that 
we have been able to reach a decision in Parliament and to submit this proposal so soon after 
the Summit gave us the green light. I should like to extend my sincere thanks to all those who 
worked  on  this  Draft  Convention,  and  particularly  to  Mr  Patijn  for  the  expertise  and 
experience which he provided and for his efforts to produce a proposal which Parliament will 
be able to approve by the largest possible majority. 
My  Group is  able  to  support all  sections  of  the  report of the Political  Affairs  Committee. 
There are two  points on which my Group has slightly differing views,  and I shall return to 
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starting point and have been provided with definite dates which give us an opportunity to take 
the great step forwards towards the creation of a European Parliament elected directly by the 
peoples of the European Community. 
We remember the continued efforts  of Parliament to  accomplish this task. The rapporteur 
referred to them in his introduction, and I shall therefore not dwell upon them. I should like 
to state most emphatically that the occasional criticism of this Parliament -levelled even by 
people in the highest quarters-that it did not recognize  its  duty and was  not acting as  a 
driving  force  and initiator in the very  field  of achieving greater influence  for  the  peoples 
through their parliamentary representatives was  always  misplaced. This Parliament has tried 
to press forward at all times and with all the means placed at its disposal. 
The old argument-powers or direct elections-has,  I feel,  now fortunately receded into the 
background. It is  the old question of which comes first-the chicken or the egg. We at any 
rate  are  convinced  that,  once  the  decision  in  favour  of  direct  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament has been taken, the question of Parliament's powers will  be the subject of more 
intensive deliberation and that by the time the directly elected Parliament meets for the first 
time considerable progress will have been made in this question. 
Ladies and gentlemen, it is  precisely in the context of the process of democratization that a 
directly elected European Parliament is  a dominant factor. In years past, we  have rightly been 
increasingly  critical  of  the  fact  that  there  is  a  widening  gap  as' regards  opportunities  to 
influence and supervise measures taken by the Council of Ministers outside the provisions of 
the Treaty, since the national  parliaments have  relinquished more and more powers. They 
often do not fully realize the extent to which they no longer have a say in matters, but we here 
see very clearly that this lacuna in democratic supervision, of representation of the will of the 
peoples,  must be  eliminated. This,  I  believe,  was  why  the  Summit  realized  that  the  step 
towards a directly elected European Parliament had to be taken. One of the aims of this Draft 
Convention is in fact to ensure that the legitimacy of the European Community is enhanced, 
so as  to make the path towards European Union smoother. Ladies and gentlemen, there is  no 
doubt that this decision represents a departure which will lead to a new quality for this House. 
When approving this  Draft  Convention, it must therefore  be  pointed out that we  are  not 
aiming at half measures, that we don't just want to take half a step forwards in order to achieve 
the improved status of a more or less consultative assembly and work towards the final aim of 
a  genuine Parliament in  easy  stages.  In our debates  today  and  in  the deliberations  in  the 
months  to  come, we  must  bear  in  mind  the  aim  of  creating  a  fully  effective  European 
Parliament.  Direct election  of  the  Members  provides  direct  access.  Whereas  our work  of 
representation has  previously been determined by the national parliaments, there will  now, 
after  the  first  European  elections,  be  a  direct  relationship  between  electors  and  elected, 
between  the  Members  of  this  House  and  the  citizens  of  the  European  Community,  the 
individual members of the peoples who form the basis of this Community. 
Having stated this principle, I would add that in my view the future, directly elected European 
Parliament's main responsibility will be to preserve an overall view, to focus attention on the 
interests of the Community as such, and to ensure adequate representation of our peoples and 
the regions. 
One of the features  of this responsiblity is  that questions which have  to  be left out of this 
Draft Convention are of particular importance. If we envisage having European elections in 
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in this House represent a starting point in this respect-should be established at European 
level in such a way that the electors of the European Parliament are given an opportunity to 
choose between different political credos and to  determine the course of European politics. 
I  therefore believe-and although this cannot be  incorporated in a draft of this kind, it is 
nevertheless  important  for  future  work-that we  must start  coalescing  European  political 
forces and give them clearer expression than before. 
We have the job of electing a Parliament for this Community. I stress this point because the 
question of the future enlargement and growth of the Community is, of course, an interesting 
one. At present, nobody can say when and how this will  come about, apart from the case of 
the Association agreements, which include provisions for  the attainment of full  membership. 
I am therefore somewhat disappointed that the Legal Affairs  Committee, when enumerating 
potential Member States,  omitted to  place  the  main emphasis on associated  countries and 
peoples linked to us  with a view to full  membership. We must avoid entering the realm of 
speculation and regarding even countries which have just declined membership, Norway for 
instance, as  being immediate candidates. 
I  should like  to  say  that it is  difficult at  present to  tell  how large  the Community will  be. 
Naturally,  we  all  hope  that  if  possible,  all  democratically  organized  States  and also  those 
which may become completely democratic, such as  Spain,  may one day join  the European 
Community. At the moment, however,  it is  the Community as  it is  now for  which we  are 
taking decisions and it  is  to  this Community to which the ideas embodied in our decisions 
must relate. 
There  is  something else  I  should  like  to  say.  There  are  four  major  fields  in  which  any 
parliament has to assume democratic responsbilities. 
First of all, there is the predominant right of all parliaments, that of supervising the budget, in 
our case the Community budget. As has been announced, we can soon expect an extension of 
our powers in this respect. Perhaps, however, we  are sometimes in danger of restricting our 
aims to those of participating in the legislative process and in budgetary matters. These things 
are necessary, but we  must not lose sight of two major duties incumbent upon any democratic 
parliament. 
First of all  there is  the job of supervising the exercise of power, something I touched upon 
before. The predominant rights and duties of any parliament include that of supervising those 
who exercise power and, in doing so, of taking account of the wishes of individual groups of 
electors. This supervision must be exercised by parliamentarians who have the time needed to 
master the complexity and ramifications of the questions involved, and it is  in this light that 
we  must view  the duties  of a  future  European  Parliament. If the diverse  structures  of  the 
countries  linked  together  in  this  Community  are  to  be  harmonized,  the  parliamentary 
representatives must have an extremely deep insight into the problems of the other peoples 
and sectors in the Community. 
It must therefore be stated quite clearly right from the start that a European Parliament must 
make demands on its Members far beyond those encountered at national level. If Parliament 
is to take decisions on behalf of the European Community and exercise a decisive influence, it 
is  essential that it be aware of absolutely all the interests of the Community and tie them in 
with the attitudes deriving from the various national backgrounds. 
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European  Parliament.  Precisely  because  it  is  elected  by  the  people  and  there  is  a  direct 
relationship  between  electors  and  elected,  this  Parliament  has  the  same  basic  duty  as  a 
national parliament to cultivate the links with the electors, to  maintain the constant flow  of 
information between electors and elected, and to ensure that sufficient account is  taken of the 
different viewpoints reflected in this continuous exchange of opinions. 
Again, it must be admitted that the burden of the dual mandate-I shall return to this point 
in  a  mitlute-naturally puts  the Members  under extreme  pressure.  If, however,  we  take  a 
closer look, I feel  sure we will recognize that the directly elected European Parliament which 
we hope will be starting work in  1978  will  have an enormous workload, for it will also have 
the  task  of  being  the  driving  force  behind  further  moves  towards  European  unity.  We 
Christian-Democrats are firmly convinced that our future depends on the extent to which we 
succeed in making progress towards the political unification of Europe and in securing the 
principal objective of political European union. I am sure that this Parliament will have to be 
a deciding force  in this field.  Allow me to comment on some questions which arise  in  this 
context. 
I should first of all like to say something in recognition of Parliament's work. The wide range 
of duties of this Parliament is  not fully recognized in many sectors of the public and even in 
the national parliaments I should like to take this opportunity of stressing that the work done 
by this House in becoming acquainted with the problems of other Member States, in drawing 
up compromise solutions and establishing a consensus, in acquiring expert knowledge and in 
obtaining an overall view of the complex and ramified problems which face  the Community 
and which vary from  country to country, is  of immeasureable value for further development. 
The work which has been done over the last few  years  in preparation for the activity of the 
future directly elected European Parliament is  something with which we  could not dispense. 
Going  by  the  number of  proposed  amendments  to  Article  2,  we  can  obviously  expect  a 
discussion on the number of Members. For those in my Group, the essential question is  as 
follows:  Is  this going to  be a genuinely democratic Parliament which satisfies  the criterion 
that each citizen should, as far as possible, have an equal influence on its composition, i.e. that 
the vote of each citizen should, as far as possible, have equal weight? Should the Members sent 
to Parliament by the electors each represent, as  far  as  possible, the same number of voters? 
This is  the principle behind the decision of the Political Affairs Committee, and it is  also the 
basis for one of the proposed amendments. 
Alongside  this,  there  are  other  questions  which  can  be  viewed  from  different  aspects 
depending  on  the  problems  involved,  and  there  is  also  the  attitude,  which  has  some 
supporters in my own Group, that the starting point should really be the text of the Treaty of 
Rome, thereby more or less following the Dehousse proposal-either by retaining the present 
number,  as  proposed  by  Mr  Nyborg,  or by multiplying it  by  two  or three,  although  this 
procedure is  not suggested in any of the proposed amendments. I must, however, emphasize 
our view  that Parliament's conception of  its  own  role  and the  tasks  which I  have  tried  to 
describe mean that we must not regard ourselves as a 'conventicle of the chosen few' at a level 
above that of the national parliaments and remote from the voters. It was  undoubtedly right 
for us  in the Political Affairs  Committee, and I assume in all  the bodies, to discuss whether 
the number of sets allocated to the smallest country should be taken as  a basis, but there was 
complete agreement that Luxembourg would have to be regarded as  a special case within the 
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My  Group agreed  with  this  view,  and  I  therefore  do  not deny that there has  been a  tiny 
departure from the principle which I have just described. 
I should like  to  comment briefly upon another question under discussion  here, that of the 
dual mandate. Here again, I can state that my Group agrees with the concept laid down by the 
rapporteur  in  his  report,  since  it  ensures  maximum  flexibility  and  leaves  it  largely  to 
Parliament to take the necessary decision. An opinion also held in my Group, however, is that 
we  could  adopt  the  revised  version  of  Amendment  No  16,  so  as  to  lay  down  the 
incompatibility of the dual mandate. Speaking personally,  I feel  sure in any case  that, in a 
directly elected European Parliament with the tasks which we want it to  have, the possibility 
of a dual  mandate is  completely unrealistic. What parliamentarian could, in the long term, 
bear this double workload? 
I feel  that there are some who view this question from an angle which belongs more to  the 
past than to the future. When we  come to vote  on this Draft Convention, we  who have  to 
decide upon these amendments must fix our eyes on the future. I am grateful to Mr Ortoli for 
the remarks he has just made in this respect. For us Christian Democrats, the essential thing is 
to develop the democratic structure of  Europe and to  ensure that political European union 
does not remain a remote aim, but becomes tangible and attainable, and that we have a means 
of achieving this in a Parliament which is in direct contact with the peoples of Europe. We all 
know that every opinion poll taken in our countries shows that more than two  thirds of the 
European  citizens  interviewed are  in  favour  of this  European  political  community. This is 
something which has often been expressed unanimously in this House. I should therefore like 
to stress particularly the fact that, in the discussions on this Draft Convention, we consider the 
decisive advance to be legitimation through universal elections. 
We are fully aware  that there is  still a lot to be done. It is  naturally something of a blemish 
that we have not yet reached any agreement on the electoral procedure, but I am sure that we 
shall achieve it in this House. I am glad that we have at any rate managed to agree on having a 
single date for the elections, and I share the rapporteur's opinion, expressed in his report, that 
it would be a good thing if this date did not coincide with that of a national election. In this 
way, the Members of the European Parliament would be elected on the same day all over the 
Community, and without there being any risk of this election being confused with any other. 
In conclusion, let me say that we support the Patijn report. We realize that we still have a lot 
of  hard work before us  if we  are actually to  achieve by  1978  everything that appears  to  us 
today to be not only desirable, but essential. 
The President of the Commission, who indicated his readiness to give us his support, and the 
Heads of State or Government, who also indicated their support at the Paris Summit, must be 
taken at their word. The European Parliament will today be taking a decision which makes 
clear  its  interpretation  of  its  own  role.  Let  us  take  this  step  forwards  towards  a  genuine, 
fully-functioning and democratic Parliament. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Schmidt to speak on behalf of the Socialist Group. 
Mr  Schmidt.  - (D)  Mr  President,  we  have  often  talked  in  this  House  about  so-called 
'institutional  equilibrium',  and  we  have  time  and  again  rightly  complained  that  this 
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the  Council  has  been steadily weakened  and that this  Parliament does  not have  adequate 
powers. One thing we  rarely mentioned, however, was  that there is  one extremely important 
person  in  the  Community  who  is  completely  excluded  from  participating  in  European 
decisions,  namely  the  European  citizen.  His  exclusion  from  these  political  decisions  is 
extremely unjust, and in my view has hindered integration more than any other factor. 
When  this  Community was  first  established,  there  was  great  enthusiasm  for  Europe,  and 
politicians  were  prodded  on  by  the  citizens.  Now  that  the  citizens  have  been  excluded 
completely from  participation, the impetus from that side has declined somewhat. When we 
talk today about direct elections to a European Parliament, it is  not we  ourselves who are the 
point  at  issue,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  but  the  participation  of  the  citizens  of  Europe  in 
European  decisions.  This  appears  to  me  to  be  one  of  the  main  aspects  of  our  present 
discussions on this question. 
The second point which I should like to bring up is  that the lengthy period of time between 
the presentation of the report in 1960 and our debate today is  a clear indication of where the 
European  dilemma lies,  that we  have  made  no  progress  over all  these  years  in one of  the 
central factors in the construction of Europe. We hope that today's debate will not mark the 
beginning of another equally long period, but that the Council will adhere to its own  197 6 
deadline for a decision on this matter. We in the Socialist Group and, I assume, Parliament as 
a whole, will do everything in our power to draw attention repeatedly to this deadline. 
Now  for  the  Draft  Convention  presented  by  Mr  Patijn  on  behalf of  the  Political  Affairs 
Committee. We welcome above all  the fact  that this Draft Convention restricts itself to  the 
essentials. The  1960  report-and this  it  probably understandable in the context of current 
attitudes at that time-attempted to solve a number of questions which, in our view, need not 
necessarily be  settled immediately, e.g.  the minimum voting age,  the admission of political 
parties, etc. Although it was  probably not the deciding factor, this may have been one reason 
why it was  not discussed further. The fact that the present report restricts itself to statements 
on the election date, the validity of the mandate and the number of Members means, in our 
opinion, that it has  a considerably greater chance of  being implemented than Parliament's 
report of 1960. 
Another  point  is  this:  We  do  not deny  that  the  Draft  Convention  has-as Mr  Klepsch 
said-one 'blemish' in that it does not incorporate a uniform procedure. We Socialists would 
naturally  have  much  preferred  a  solution  without  flaws  for  the whole  of  Europe,  but we 
believe  that,  politically,  this  Draft  Convention  satisfies  those  requirements  which  can 
realistically be made at the present time, if we are to make any progress in this direction. It is 
possible  that  some  legal  problems  might  arise  in  this  connection,  but  I  shall  leave  my 
colleague Mr Broeksz to deal with that point later on. 
A fourth  point. We as  a Group are  in full  agreement with the three objectives of the Patijn 
report: the adaptation of the 1960 Draft to meet modern requirements and to take account of 
the  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  Europe  since  then; secondly,  an  extension  of  the 
legitimacy of the Community, and I must point out to Mr Ortoli in this context that it is  not 
purely  and  simply  a  question  of  increasing  the  legitimacy  of  Parliament.  Of  all  the 
institutions,  Parliament has  the 'most'  legitimacy,  since  each  of  us  here  has  been  elected 
somewhere and sent here by the national parliament. 
(Scattered applause) 
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introduce European elections. 
Now let me turn to the connection between powers and elections. There is one thing I must 
emphasize strongly on behalf of the Socialist Group: we  will  not let anybody take away the 
legislative powers of this House in return for giving us direct elections. 
(Scattered applause) 
There is  no dividing line between powers and elections. In the long term, there can be no 
direct elections to a Parliament which has no powers. We are not involved in a package deal. 
It should nevertheless be stressed that this Parliament must stand on two legs, that it must be 
legitimitized directly by the citizens, but that it also  needs the powers  to  be able  to  tell  the 
citizens what they are voting for, what their representatives in this House intend and are able 
to do for the citizens of Europe. 
It is  for this reason that the question of the deadline arises. We shall not really be able to say 
that the democratization of this Community is complete until the constant task of fighting for 
increased budgetary and legislative powers for this House has been ended, until these powers 
are granted in full, and until Parliament is  elected by universal suffrage. It will be a constant 
struggle until we  have achieved this. May  I also draw attention to  the Summit communique 
and make it clear that, for us, the two ideas expressed are of equal importance. The statement 
from the Summit that Parliament's proposals are awaited with interest is  just as  important as 
the statement that additional legislative powers will have to be granted to this Parliament. 
Then  there  is  one  point on which  we  disagree  with  the  report  from  the  Political  Affairs 
Committee. I refer to the increase in the number of Members to 550. Ladies and gentlemen, 
we  know how difficult it is,  in a Community composed of countries of such varying size, to 
implement the principle which we  basically support and which Mr Klepsch has mentioned, 
that is 'one man, one vote', or 'each vote must carry the same weight'. Even Mr Klepsch had to 
admit that,  if  we  look  at  the case  of  Luxembourg,  his  proposal  does  not fully  reflect  this 
principle. Wherever a principle is breached, there is a danger spot, and we must ask ourselves 
how we are to escape from this dilemma. I think there are two things we  need: representation 
which is  as  fair and balanced as  possible on the one hand, and a Parliament which is  capable 
of working on the other. If, at a time when the wave  of accessions is  probably not over, we 
envisage a  Parliament of nearly 600  Members, and if we  proceed on the probably justified 
assumption that no parliament in the world has ever managed to reduce its numbers-only to 
grow  larger-, we  must  expect  a  steady  increase  in  numbers  if  more  countries  join  the 
Community. This would mean, however, that Parliament would become unworkable, and an 
unworkable Parliament cannot fulfil  its task, and this is  not the kind of Parliament we want. 
Let us therefore stick to Mr Patijn's proposals, since increases would then be possible if new 
countries joined. 
We believe in any case that the interests of small countries are better protected, and that there 
is  less  immobility  in  this  proposal  than  in  the  proposal  made  by  the  Political  Affairs 
Committee. 
One further point on which I should like to make a clear statement. The Socialist Group is of 
the opinion that, as far as  the future is concerned, the dual mandate is out of the question. We 
know that the dual mandate is  undoubtedly necessary for the time being. None of us  could 
fulfil our duties if we  did not also have an opportunity to engage in national politics. 
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mandate is  more important to  us,  the national  mandate or the European one. It is  simply 
impossible to exercise both of them simultaneously and to the same degree. I think most of us 
have placed more emphasis on the European mandate, and in future it will simply no longer 
be possible to exercise a dual mandate. Let me give an example. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany it is  legally possible to be a member of both a Land parliament, and the Bundestag 
but there is not one member of the German Bundestag who is at the same time a member of a 
Land parliament. In future, this will apply equally to the case of the European Parliament, no 
matter what decision we reach here today. I feel we  must be consistent and make it clear from 
the beginning that dual mandates will be impossible in future. We should therefore lay down 
a  regulation  which,  while  not  necessarily  definitive,  allows  this  dual  mandate  until  final 
elections are  held. From then on, we  should proceed on the assumption that it is  no longer 
possible. 
On behalf of the Socialist Group, I should like, in conclusion, above all to express our thanks 
to  Mr  Patijn.  I  feel  it  is  impossible  to  be  appreciative  enough  of  the work  he  has  done, 
travelling throughout Europe and establishing what was  feasible  and what was  impossible. If 
this work had been done simply at a desk, it would not have  had nearly as  much chance of 
being accepted here today as  the Patijn  report. Mr Patijn,  may I  extend to  you the sincere 
thanks of the Socialist Group. 
(Applause) 
And now, ladies and gentl~men, one final  remark. There are  politicians in Europe who feel 
that  the  European  Parliament  will  probably  never  have  sufficient  powers  for  effective 
supervision of the enormous organization which has arisen here. There are some who say that 
it would be better to let parliamentary sovereignty remain with the national parliaments. To 
echo Mr Klepsch, I should like to point out that whoever says this has failed to recognize the 
slow undermining of democracy, the quiet sapping of the powers of the national parliaments 
and  their  replacement  by  unsupervised  actions,  by  an  impenetrable  jungle.  Decisions 
involving  sums  of  thousands  of  millions  are  taken  without  any  democratic  supervision. 
Anyone who pleads for the retention of the sovereignty of the national parliaments, even in a 
European context, is  essentially attacking parliamentary supervision. This is something which 
we Socialists cannot accept. What we  need is adequate democratic supervision, since the only 
Europe which has a future is a Europe with democratic structures. This is what we want. 
(Loud applause) 
President. - I Call Mr Jozeau-Marigne to speak on behalf of the Liberal and Allies Group. 
Mr  Jozeau-Marigne.  - (F)  Mr  President,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  this  is  certainly  an 
exceptionally important day for  this Assembly. Indeed, I feel  we  are  turning a corner in the 
struggle and in the procedures we have known for so  many years. 
This  first  campaign  was  led  by  Mr  Dehousse  to  whom  we  are  bound-I  use  the  word 
advisedly-by close ties of friendship forged during his constant leadership of what might be 
termed the 'good fight', particularly in our Legal Affairs Committee. 
(Applause) 
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which the representative of the Socialist Group has just been speaking-but also at the legal 
level. Indeed, though Mr Patijn's report relates to an extremely important political matter, the 
legal aspects it raises are nevertheless most sig~ificant. 
Some Members, ladies and gentlemen, have just raised the question of the legitimacy of our 
Assembly. I shall not do so. I shall not do so, partly because it was correct to stress the political 
aspect, but also because when our committees were working along the lines of the report from 
the  Political Affairs  Committee and the opinion of  the  Legal  Affairs  Committee, we  were 
acting in full conformity with the 1957 Treaty, particularly Articles 137 and 138. 
The text of Article 137 expressly stated that the Assembly should consist of representatives of 
the peoples of the States brought together in the Community: moreover Members should be 
designated by the respective parliaments from  among their members. This was  necessary at 
the time as we were still in our infancy. It is the 1957 Treaty which, after stating this principle 
and after specifying the number and distribution of delegates, stipulates that the Assembly 
shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform 
procedure in all Member States. 
It is  this duty, laid on us by the 1957 Treaty, that we  are in the process of fulfilling today. It 
has often been deplored-time and time again by Professor Dehousse-that such a long time 
should  elapse  between  the  application  of  the  first  paragraph  and  that  of  the  third.  It  is 
therefore very gratifying that the Paris Summit has permitted rediscussion of this important 
matter and that the national forces of each country must now commit themselves on Europe, 
and consequently draw up their strategies. We can say today that the European Parliament is 
to progress from the theory to the reality. How pleased I was, Mr Ortoli, to hear you say just 
now that the existing policies of our governments had not included these matters, and that we 
had to wait for the Paris Summit to highlight them again. We must therefore point out these 
legal aspects against the political background which Mr Patijn so justly stressed. 
It is  not for the Liberal Group, ladies and gentlemen, to go into every aspect of the problem. 
We are  in agreement with  the main principles.  However,  I  should like, in a  few  words,  to 
indicate our views on the text and on the amendments to be discussed today. 
The  previous  speakers,  have,  quite  rightly,  stressed  their  concern  about  the  number  of 
Members of which Parliament is  to consist. I must state straightaway that the Liberal Group 
generally shares the views expressed by the last speaker from the Socialist Group. I therefore 
told  Mr  Lautenschlager,  whose  work  and  whose  opinion  on  behalf  of  the  Legal  Affairs 
Committee I greatly admire, that it does not seem feasible to me to accept the considerable 
figure of 550 Members proposed by the Political Affairs Committee as  a basis for beginning a 
Parliament. 
Indeed, ladies  and gentlemen, as  the representative  of the Christian-Democratic Group so 
rightly said just now, it is  to be hoped that in the future Europe's position will be such that a 
number of countries, whether present or future associates-for we should not forget that this 
Convention can establish the situation for  many years  to  come-will  wish to  join us.  If we 
now think in  terms  of at  least  550  Members  for  the  nine countries  currently making up 
Europe, there might well be as many as  800 in the Assembly in the future. What sort of useful 
work  could  it  then  do?  Let  us  first  consider  the  Assembly's  work  and  then  that  of  the 
Members. 
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they  would  be  unable  to  produce  any  documents.  Even  now  this  is  too  often  true  when 
dealing with tricky problems. A number of us on the committees are unhappy with the long 
drawnout debates which make it impossible to present conclusions to Parliament as  rapidly as 
is  required. 
Moreover committee work would be even more difficult as,  don't forget, we  have  to work in 
several  languages. The problem would become almost impossible to solve, and work carried 
out  under  such  circumstances  could  prejudice  the  political  influence  of  the  European 
Parliament. The work of an Assembly such as this must be of a high standard if it is actually to 
help build Europe. 
So  much for  the Assembly.  Now what about the Members? Just now,  Mr  Schmidt rightly 
asked  how one man could carry out two  mandates. It is  a fact,  I  repeat, that it is  the  1957 
Treaty  which  stipulates  that  Members  should  be  designated  from  within  our  national 
parliaments.  There  was  no  other  possibility  at  the  time.  Now,  however,  if,  as  we  all 
wholeheartedly hope, Europe goes on to gain major economic and political significance, the 
work will increase so  much that we  may well ask, since we  already find the dual mandate so 
burdensome, how either mandate could be accomplished. Our very electors, the citizens of 
Europe, will be entitled to ask whether we are still capable of being national citizens. 
That then  is  the  problem  and heaven  knows what the solution  to  it is.  Recently,  regional 
institutions were set up in France and the members of the National Assembly were obliged to 
become members of the regional assemblies. To make this possible, the statute provides that 
meetings  of  the  regional  assemblies  may  not be  held when  the  National  Assembly  is  in 
session. There's an impossible situation for you. Would we here, at the European level, be able 
to arrange sessions of the European Parliament which did not coincide with sessions of the 
national parliaments? It certainly would not be easy,  particularly as we  are dealing with nine 
countries. 
Without wanting to  draw  out the debate,  I  have  simply indicated a  few  difficulties  which 
make  us  feel  that we  should  not  unduly  increase  our  numbers  and which,  as  far  as  the 
problem of incompatibility is concerned, lead us to the conclusions which Mr Lautenschlager 
described so well earlier. 
However,  ladies  and  gentlemen, we  also  have  to  consider  election  dates.  It goes  without 
saying,  Mr  Patijn,  that in  a  text such as  this,  it  is  impossible  to  cover everything.  Indeed, 
depending on whether incompatibility is considered at the present time or over the long term, 
various possibilities occur. Either, over a transitional period, it is  felt that the dual mandate is 
compatible but not obligatory, or the principle of incompatibility is  accepted as  irrevocable. 
At the same time, we  also  have to consider the question-a most important one-of liaison 
between  the  European  Parliament and the national  parliaments. All  of  us  here,  ladies  and 
gentlemen, must think seriously about this problem. One of the previous speakers spoke of 
the very tricky problem of liaison between the citizen and his representative. Will it not be 
extremely  difficult  to  ensure  liaison  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  national 
parliaments? We shall have  to find a transitional solution and provide for various situations. 
The rapporteurs or members of the committees could remain in  contact with our national 
parliaments, rather as  you  have  done, Mr  Patijn, by travelling extensively to examine more 
closely  and  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  what  was  possible,  what  was  useful  and  what  was 
impossible. Allow me to  point out, without producing a whole catalogue, another difficulty 
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institutions do not take place in any country on the same day as  national elections? It would 
not do if those whom Mr Schmidt earlier described as  citizens of Europe were to lose sight 
somewhat of  European  problems owing to  involvement with  far  more  national  problems, 
particularly  in  some  countries  where,  because  of  the  winner-take-all  electoral  system, 
domestic problems gain more attention than problems of a European character. 
We all have a task to accomplish together and during this debate today we must see whether, 
on  the  basis  of  the  amendments  to  be  made,  the  text  under  scrutiny-I  am  thinking 
particularly of Articles 7, 9 and 13 -should not, at a later stage, form the basis of a coordinated 
effort. But, of course, as  national members of parliament you know all  about that. Don't we 
have to do this every day of our working lives? 
Mr Schmidt told us just now that our struggle was  not yet over and that we would still have to 
solve the problem of powers. That is of course quite true. However, it is equally true that today 
our thinking, our determination and the new dimension we can provide will have enabled us 
to accomplish an important task. And we  shall have  done so  fully  respecting our European 
convictions  and  the  opinions  of  each  nation.  I  should  again  like  to  congratulate  Mr 
Lautenschlager who was concerned in his amendment on the number of representatives with 
ensuring adequate  representation  of the small  countries such as  Luxembourg. There  is  no 
doubt that the text itself-and this is, of course, the intention of the basic Treaty-relates to a 
parliament  consisting of  only  one  chamber.  But if  there  is  only one  chamber, while  the 
citizens will  naturally have  to  be represented,  the smaller States will  also  have  to  be given 
minimum representation. It would not be right for them to have no voice, and thus to be at 
the mercy of the larger States. 
On this note I wish to conclude. However, I should also like to join with Mr Ortoli in saying 
that by taking this decision today, by taking this forward step, in full awareness that our work 
is not yet finished and that we  have not yet solved all the problems, we shall perhaps succeed, 
by mutual understanding and effective joint action, in bringing the governments face  to face 
with the reality and the political will of Europe, and particularly of this Assembly. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Kirk to speak on behalf of the European Conservative Group. 
Mr  Kirk.  - Mr President, like  all  those who have  preceded me,  I should like  to  start by 
complimenting Mr Patijn on the document that he has laid before us  today. As one who has 
had the privilege of working with his father in a number of fields over very many years, I am 
not sure whether I  would agree  with  his  description  of himself as  a  prodigal  son. On the 
contrary, I think this is  a case where the son has succeeded the father and, like a wise child, 
not  only  knows  but  follows,  his  father's  example,  and  the  result  is  the  very  remarkable 
document that we have before us. Like other members of the Political Affairs Committee who 
have worked with him on drawing up this document, I know the amount of effort that has 
gone into it. 
I should like also to add to the tributes that have been paid to Fernand Dehousse. By curious 
coincidence, the first  day that I ever sat in the European Assembly was  the day that he was 
elected President of it, and that is going back some years. So, for me, this is almost old home 
86 week. It is very nice to meet so many old friends again, and one of the old friends, of course, is 
the question of direct elections. 
This is  something which has been very much on the minds of Members of this Parliament 
since  long  before  we  joined  it  and,  as  Members  may  recall,  it  is  something which  the 
European  Conservative  Group  has  supported  from  the  very  first  day  that  we  joined. 
Unfortunately, the governments of two  countries which our group represents have  placed a 
reservation on this matter; nevertheless, all three of the parties that we represent in this group 
are convinced that direct elections to the European Parliament are an urgent necessity. I think 
it is important, Sir, that I should make this clear from the start, if only in the light of an article 
in  The  Times yesterday which may have  been read by the rapporteur and perhaps by other 
Members and which puzzled me considerably. It puzzled me because it seemed totally to fail 
to  grasp  the  significance  of  what  we  are  doing  here  today.  It was  puzzling  because  the 
commentator who wrote it is  a man who is  very eminent, has commented much on politics 
over the years,  and indeed, has attended many part-sessions of the  European  Parliament. I 
think it ought to  be made plain, in the light of that article, that, as  Mr Jozeau-Marigne said, 
there are, of course, political as well as  legal implications here, there are practical implications 
as  well, and Mr Schmidt's very eloquent speech underlined what those practical implications 
were. 
So  far  as  the political principles are  concerned, I think the doubts reflected by the writer in 
The  Times  on  the  effect  that  this  debate  might  have  on  internal  British  politics  in  the 
immediate future-I have  always  been very careful not to  inflict British internal politics on 
this  Parliament,  but  I  think  in  this  particular  case  one  must  mention them-were  fully 
answered by the remarkable speech we  heard from  the President of the Commission, which 
set the context of what we  are  doing today in the framework of the general development of 
Europe over the next five or ten years. More than anything else, we need to bring this home to 
people in all the nine countries and, perhaps, first and foremost to people in my own country, 
who,  we  understand, will  be  called  upon  to  vote  on  this  matter in  the  near  future.  It  is 
important that they should understand precisely what it is they are voting for or against, and it 
is  important too  that they should understand that, in the Europe  that we  are  building, the 
common picture of the Europe of bureaucracies is an untrue picture. We are trying to build a 
Europe  in  which  every  citizen  participates  in  the  same  way  that  they  participate  in  the 
national governments and parliaments of their own countries. 
(Applause from the Conservative Group) 
I think it is essential that this misunderstanding in The  Times yesterday should be cleared up. 
Today we  may be taking a step towards a  federal  Europe for  those who want to go in that 
direction. It may be a step away from it for those who do not, but the essential thing is  that it 
is  a  step  towards  the  participation  of  the  peoples  of  our  countries  in  the  work  of  the 
Community as a whole, bringing the Community closer to them and therefore giving them a 
say in the way they want the Community to go. It is  absolutely essential therefore that this 
step should be taken today and that it should be taken clearly, so that when the British people 
are called upon to  take a decision on this matter later this year-if they are-they will know 
that they will have a share in the Community on which they are voting. 
(Applause from the Conservative Group) 
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virtually everybody else. 
This Parliament cannot continue to function for very  much longer on the basis of the dual 
mandate. That is quite clear to all of us who take part in it. It is quite clear, or should be quite 
clear, to all of those who observe it.  However, there is  a point here which I think has  to be 
brought  out  because  it  is  a  matter  of  some  importance.  In  doing  away  with  the  dual 
mandate-if we do-we must be careful not to do away with the connection between what we 
do here and what is done in the national parliaments. There is a distinction, I think, between 
the two. I don't think there is  any need for  Members to be members of both-indeed, I see 
the difficulty in their being members of both. Nevertheless, it has become clear in the two 
years  that I  have  been a Member here that the cooperation of national  parliaments in our 
work is going to be needed for a very long time ahead, and some way must be found, whether 
through  the  follow-up  to  this  Convention  or  by  some  other  means,  to  ensure  that  this 
connection is  kept. To that extent I agree with the article in  The  Times yesterday. I do  not 
think  that  the  dual  mandate  is  necessary.  However,  I  would  not  go  so  far  as  Mr 
Lautenschlager, or indeed Mr Jozeau-Marigne, and forbid it. If somewhere in Europe there are 
supermen who feel  that they can carry both burdens at once, why should we prevent them? I 
think we should allow them, if they wish, to expose their talents to us in this way. There have 
been men who have indeed in the recent past been members not only of their own national 
parliaments but of the North Atlantic Assembly, the Council of Europe, Western European 
Union  and  the  European  Parliament.  I  can  think  of  one  very  eminent  member  of  the 
Christian-Democratic Group who  until  a  few  months ago  fulfilled  all  those  mandates and 
fulfilled them with great distinction and effect. Now, if Members wish to do it, why shouldn't 
they?  I  think  there  is  a  lot  to  be  said  for  it,  and  that  we  should  oppose  the  ban  Mr 
Lautenschlager would have us  put upon the dual mandate. Certainly it is  the intention of my 
group to vote against this ban. 
There are a mass of other points, of course, which arise from this document, such as  the date 
of 1978, which arises really from the Summit Communique. I am quite prepared to agree with 
it. I fear,  however, that it will be extremely difficult to keep to it.  Not because of any lack of 
good intentions, but because of the mass of work which has to be done-I think Parliament 
must be clear about this-before these elections can take place. The devising of a common 
electoral system that shall be acceptable to  all  nine member governments is  not going to be 
easy. The creation, if I may put it like that, of European political parties in order to ensure a 
proper ideological debate when these elections take  place, the registration of the electorate 
throughout the whole of the nine countries for  the European elections, the age  of election, 
matters of this kind which differ to a considerable extent between the member countries will 
not be easy either. All these may seem matters of detail, but three years is not a very long time 
to  clear up all  the problems that will  face  us  when we  vote,  as  I  am  sure  we  shall, by an 
overwhelming  majority  for  this  document later  tonight. Therefore  though  I  will  certainly 
cheerfully vote for Mr Patijn's amendment for 1978, in the hope that this will hurry things up, 
I myself shall not be greatly surprised, nor indeed overwhelmingly disappointed, if we  find 
that we  are back at the original date of 1980 before this comes into effect. 
Having said that, I merely wish once again to  repeat that I think this has been a magnificent 
achievement on the part of the rapporteur. The attendance at this debate today, the interest 
that has  been  reflected  from  outside, shows  the  importance of it not just to  us  but to  the 
88 citizens of Europe as  a whole, and I hope very much that Parliament will vote for  it by an 
overwhelming majority. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr de la Malene to speak on behalf of the Group of European Progressive 
Democrats. 
Mr  de  Ia  Malene.  - (F)  Mr  President, ladies  and gentlemen, speaking on behalf of  my 
friends,  I should like to group my comments under two  headings, firstly  those dealing with 
the relevance of discussing the text before us  today, and secondly those relating to  the text 
itself. 
It may be useful  to  explain briefly what we  expect and hope for  from  the construction of 
Europe.  We  have  spoken  and  still  speak  of  a  European  Europe  and  a  Europe  of  States. 
L 'Europe  des  patries is  an  apocryphal  expression  which  was  never  uttered,  but  European 
Europe and a Europe of States are terms we still employ. Why? Because we  feel that to create 
Europe must be our ambition, just as  we feel  that Europe cannot be other than legitimate. 
First the ambition. We are ambitious for our country, as we  believe you are, quite rightly, for 
yours. And when we say we  are ambitious for  Europe, we mean that the Europe to which we 
aspire, far from making inroads on the independence of our countries which we  feel  it is  our 
duty to  enhance and maintain in their own interests, must, on the contrary, be strong and 
independent in itself. 
What kind of  Europe would it be without its  own,  independent foreign  policy, one which 
differed  from  any  other,  not  a  priori of  course-that would  be  absurd-but  potentially? 
Simply a powerless diplomacy. 
What kind of Europe could maintain it  had a  foreign  policy without having the necessary 
means to implement it, namely a common independent defence system? 
In the world as it is today, is  it always necessary to be on a par with the major powers, to have 
one's own policy and defence system and to be listened to  in  respect of one's interests? Of 
course not! We only need to look around us. 
Let me be quite clear. I am not making any grandiose claim for power, let alone advocating 
any kind of imperialist attitudes-far from  it. What I am saying is  that we  must allow the 
highly developed, industrialized  peoples of Europe, rich  in culture, strong in numbers, but 
nevertheless weak in so  many respects-as  we  can see only too well today-to  be masters of 
their destiny, masters of their choice of civilization and of society, to defend their legitimate 
interests and to  play their part in improving the peaceful organization of this planet. This is 
our ambition, for our individual countries and for Europe. 
Next  legitimacy.  We  are  living  in  an  era  when,  in  Europe  more  than  anywhere  else, 
everything is  being questioned and challenged, above all authority and power. Power can no 
longer simply be imposed. If it is,  it is  merely a semblance, void of any real  existence, and 
heaven knows how many examples of this can be seen throughout the world. There is nothing 
worse, because you think you have built something and in fact you have done nothing at all. 
And  as  you  have  done  nothing  about  power,  power  emerges  or  is  exercised 
elsewhere-another  situation  with  which  we  are  only  too  familiar.  In  a  world  where 
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considered legitimate, it must be based on maximum solidarity. Despite the progress made, 
particularly  among  the  young  with  their  sometimes  naive  but  always  enthusiastic 
discussions-the meaning of frontiers, progress or discussions which certainly go far  beyond  .. 
the frontiers of the Europe of the Nine-it is nonetheless true that solidarity within our States 
is  still by far  the strongest and most striking reality on which to build and advance. Without 
solidarity, there can be no majority rule. Without majority rule, there can be no democracy, no 
legitimacy, and without legitimacy, no real authority, only a  fa~ade, a mere fa~ade, a pretence. 
We  do  not want  fa~ades, we  do  not want  pretence;  that  is  why we  speak  not only  of  a 
European Europe but of a Europe of States. 
During my fifteen years in this Parliament, I have seen many attempts to construct Europe, 
and either successively or simultaneously, but mostly successively, these attempts have  been 
concerned either with the why or with the how. 
By the why,  I mean the process of defining or developing common policies or objectives on 
the short term, as  for  example the common agricultural  policy, or more ambitious  foreign 
policy objectives, such as  defining a common policy with respect to the Middle East conflict. 
The why consists of deciding, bit by bit, little by little, ambitiously or not so ambitiously, what 
the policy of tomorrow's Europe is  to be in every field. 
The how, on the other hand, is  the procedure, the means of making progress, in other words 
the institutions conceived in a dynamic perspective. 
The two  aspects-the  why and the how-have  their craftsmen and their eras.  On the one 
hand we have seen the creation of suitable institutions, on the other the definition of common 
objectives. For instance, it was said. 'Let us follow the institutional route, let us try to create a 
new force in the world, Europe. To benefit what policy? Whatever the people want'. 
A  little later,  it was  realized that owing to  lack of agreement on the objectives, no-one was 
prepared to  commit himself to  the venture, even  if  the refusals  were  often disguised. And 
disagreement on the  how was  only a thinly concealed pretext for disagreement on the basic 
objectives.  However,  as  Europe  was  the only possibility,  the  why and  how cycle  has  been 
repeated again and again. 
Today, we  are faced once more with a proposal hinging us  back to the how. In order to assess 
its present relevance, its value, and its prospects, experience has taught us that we should look 
carefully at what went before it and at the surrounding circumstances. 
What has become of the why over the last few  years, the last few  months, the last few  days? 
Has there been any gradual advance  in foreign  policy, in the common policies, have  there 
been  concrete  results  or rapprochements which  justify  involving  the  how? If we  cast  our 
minds back and support this new, extremely important step for a moment and take a brief 
look at recent history and the present situation in Europe, what do we see? 
From Six, we have now become Nine. We have made progress, there is  no doubt about it. But 
what will become of it? The British claim to 'renegotiate' or even leave Europe is  now having 
an effect on all the plans and decisions of the Community. 
No doubt we  are  now  more  numerous and  more  representative  of  Europe.  But while  our 
increased  heterogeneity and size  have  made action  and decision-making more difficult, we 
have had first the world monetary crisis and then the current crisis of raw material and energy 
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Monetary Union, the European front neither resisted the difficulties nor the pressures from 
the other side  of the Atlantic. The lira,  the pound sterling and now the franc  are  floating. 
Efforts  have  been  made  to  reduce  the  consequences  by  introducing  safeguards  and 
compensatory measures, but now long can the Community policies now in force hold out? 
Then came the energy crisis. All our Member States were in more or less the same boat. But 
where is  the common energy policy? What has become of the common enriched uranium 
policy? What has happened to our common policy vis-a-vis the oil-producing countries? 
The monetary crisis and the energy crisis, and their offspring inflation, or rather stagflation, 
are  becoming  increasingly  if  irregularly  widespread.  Serious  employment  problems  are 
looming  on  the  horizon,  and  instead  of  there  being  a  coming  together,  instead  of  the 
emergence of a common approach, we see  here and there the first signs of a 'devil take the 
hindmost' attitude, as  if Europe were only a luxury to be enjoyed in periods of calm. 
Whether the crisis gets worse or simply continues, the infection will  spread. Little by little 
Europe  will  lose  its  substance  until  only an  empty institutional  shell  remains, bearing no 
relationship either to reality or to authority. 
Like the rest of the world, Europe is going through a crisis. 
But  over  and  above  this-and  it  is  even  more  worrying-is  the  reluctance,  if  not  the 
downright refusal, experienced on every occasion, to try to define a common foreign policy. It 
is as  if in this area, and even more so in the area of defence, Europe did not come within the 
competence of the Nine of the European Institutions, indeed, as  if this were not a European 
responsibility at all.  It is  as  if this area had been set aside to be dealt with elsewhere within 
some other much larger framework. 
But of what value is a Europe restricted to milk or steel prices? 
What is  Europe  worth  if  it cannot organize  its  own  diplomacy  and  defence  without  the 
assistance of its great transatlantic ally? 
Acceptance of this argument, which has  been clearly stated-though thank heavens  not in 
Europe-whether explicit, or as  is  more often  the case,  implicit, is  incompatible with any 
hope of seeing a political Europe come into being at some time in the future. Unfortunately, 
however, that is  our impression, I might even say conviction, about the attitudes of most of 
the Nine to  foreign  policy. Whether the issue  is  a  monetary crisis,  the vital  reform  of the 
international monetary system, the role  of  reserve  currencies, the role  of gold or of SDR's, 
whether it is  the energy crisis, or Europe's relationships with the oil-producing countries, or 
the manufacture of enriched uranium, whether it is a matter of European policy in the Middle 
East conflict, or last but not least, of any of our defence problems this is  the conclusion we 
unfortunately have to draw. 
It is  in this climate then, where despite successive summit conferences, despite proposals or 
plans  made  here or there  on the  why of Europe, nothing or precious  little  seems  to  have 
crystallized  that  it  is  proposed  that we  rush  enthusiastically  to  implement  the  results  of 
another 'summit'. 
On the one hand, we see an inability to define objectives or the refusal to define objectives for 
Europe, while at the same time we are asked to take an important step in the institutional area. 
No one can tell us where we're going, but they're sure we're going to get there. 
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of this  kind at this  juncture. We have  often  said,  and still  say  'yes'  to  the election of the 
European  Parliamentary Assembly  by  universal  suffrage  if  that  is  to  lead  us  to  a  strong, 
independent Europe. But if this objective was  not wanted, what would such an insitutional 
step be, other than an embarrassment or an  obstacle for  those who, if  Europe failed  them, 
would try to remain masters of their destiny? These are the main reasons which have led us to 
consider whether this is  the right time for such a move. 
I shall now go on to consider the text itself. 
But before doing so, I should like to express my very sincere congratulations to Mr Patijn for 
his work, his text and his report which appear to me-to us all-to be models of intellectual 
honesty and clarity. I should like him to know that I speak both on my own behalf and that of 
my Group. 
As  regards the text, I shall  limit my comments to what appear to  me to be the three major 
difficulties. 
The  first  is  to  examine whether it  is  right  for  our Assembly  to  be elected  in  an  isolated 
manner, without any accompanying modifications  to  the  institutions  or their powers. The 
second  relates  to  the  electoral  procedure and the  third to  the  number and distribution  of 
Members. 
Firstly, isolated election seems to us to be questionable. What is the objective? The ostensible, 
recognized  objective  is  threefold:  in  one way  or another to  establish  a  better equilibrium 
between the institutions, to make this Parliament more legitimate and to make its operations 
more effective.  I  shall  not dwell  on  the  third objective.  A  better equilibrium between  the 
institutions: in this connection a basic question ought to be put. Is it necessary to improve the 
equilibrium? It is  only  necessary  to  adjust  the  equilibrium  between  the  institutions  after 
considerable progress has been made enabling a different institutional balance. I am not sure, 
bearing in mind what I said earlier, that we  have reached this stage. But if,  nevertheless, we 
answer the question in the affirmative and say yes, equilibrium has to  be improved, I do not 
think it is  possible-and the difficulty was  seen in  1960-to  consider election by universal 
suffrage without also considering the Assembly's powers and the relationship of this elected 
Assembly, equipped with pbwers, to all the other institutions. Simply to have the Parliament 
elected  by  universal  suffrage  without  changing  its  powers  and  without  changing  its 
relationship with the other institutions seems to us to be a most unfortunate development. 
Now  to  the  second  argument,  the  second  objective:  to  acquire  legitimacy  through  the 
elections. Let me first say that I have always considered this Assembly to be legitimate and I 
am not aware that the Upper Houses in the various countries where their members are elected 
indirectly, are felt to be illegitimate assemblies. Obviously, therefore, it's not legitimacy in this 
sense that we're after. What should be said is  that an effort is  being made to ensure greater 
participation. To enable  people to  take  part in choosing the Members  of our Assembly is 
certainly a praiseworthy objective. 
However, in the present framework,  if we simply hold elections and forget, as  I said earlier, 
about our powers  and relationship with other institutions, are we  entitled to  feel  that such 
elections will  provide the desired result-allowing the people to participate? First of all, will 
people be interested in an assembly with such limited powers as  ours? Secondly, if there are 
elections, what issues will the candidates raise? Here, of course, we are specialists in European 
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compelled to oppost a colleague from the Liberal Group on a European issue, I shall have the 
greatest difficulty in making clear where I stand vis-a-vis him. The voters will  find it rather 
difficult to place me. 
The electoral issues will  in fact  be based on domestic policy, and the elections will thus not 
depend on European policies, but on differences of domestic policy. Another difficulty is  that 
we cannot set up a huge assembly. Yet the number of electors will be extremely large. Will it 
then be possible  to encourage participation from  our peoples, who are already subjected to 
more than enough elections, in an election where the representatives are very distant figures 
and where they cannot see any differences among the various candidates? 
Inevitably, the choices will be made by the parties and thus the electors' votes will in fact play 
a very small part. In other words, the desired objective, participation of  our peoples in this 
election, seems unlikely to be achieved. In fact, the real objective is  to strengthen Parliament 
so  that in the future it may become a sort of European constituent assembly able to promote 
future construction. 
The second difficulty is  the problem of the electoral system. According to the text, universal 
suffrage is  to be ensured by applying a uniform procedure. This uniform procedure obviously 
relates  only  to  the  electoral  procedure-it  cannot  relate  to  anything  else.  Indeed,  our 
rapporteur is  so  well  aware  of  this  that he  proposes  that initially  the  difficulty should be 
avoided and that only at  a later stage  should an attempt be made to  reach  agreement on a 
uniform electoral procedure. 
However,  I should like to  draw his attention, and that of this  House, to  the fact  that if we 
evade this second difficulty, we may be providing the Council with a loophole for delaying its 
decision  on  the  grounds  that  Parliament  has  not  succeeded  in  agreeing  on  an  electoral 
procedure. 
The third difficulty is  probably the most important and I should like to consider it for a few 
moments before concluding. It concerns the number and distribution of seats.  My  Group's 
position on this  matter is  quite clear.  Indeed, we  have  tabled an amendment to which we 
attach great importance in the institutional context. It seems to us quite impossible to aspire 
to one thing and its opposite at one and the same time. If we  are trying to acquire legitimacy 
and representativeness, if we want to  have more authority in our decision-making, we cannot 
adopt a  system  of weighting. That is  illogical.  You  cannot try  to  obtain  one  thing while 
employing  an  approach  which  leads  to  something  else.  Nor  can  you  mix  the  methods. 
No-one is  more concerned than we are about defending the interests of the smaller States. I 
would even say that it is our basic aim. But we would point out to all the representatives of the 
smaller States that election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage is  not the way to 
defend their interests. This should be done by other institutional means. Once again we  can 
see that it is  not enough to consider the question of the election of Parliament by universal 
suffrage on its own. 
We must, then, not make a  pretence or a  fa<;ade  of our institutions. The basic  rule  of any 
parliament is  that all the citizens represented in it are represented on a uniform basis ... 
Mr Giraud.  - (F) It is  not the case in the French Senate ... 
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expediency amounts to saying you don't really believe in it and I find this most unfortunate. 
It is on the basis of all these aspects, relating to the relevance and the procedure, that we shall 
approach this debate. We make no secret of the fact that we  find the remarkable gulf between 
the progress on the institutional front and the lack of  it as  regards the objectives extremely 
alarming. We do not wish to see  the development of new institutions being used as  an alibi 
vis-a-vis certain individuals and public opinion. The institutions are a necessary tool, but they 
are useless without policy or will. If such will were not to be shown, if such policies were not 
to  be implemented, the institutions would merely become fa<,;ades  and would certainly cause 
more harm than good. 
(Applause) 
President.  - I  call  Mr  D'Angelosante  to  speak  on  behalf of  the  Communist and Allies 
Group. 
Mr  D'  Angelosante.  - (I) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, we  have  always  considered 
the direct election of this Parliament a very important step towards making the Community 
more  democratic  and giving  it  a  structure  sensitive  to  the  social,  economic  and  political 
demands of the workers and democratic forces in Europe. 
Ever since we entered this House, we have clearly and emphatically taken this stand, which we 
also promote and defend wherever our party is represented and whenever we have a chance to 
do so.  However, over the last few years we  have also  realized that this objective can only be 
achieved if we pursue a strong campaign not only against the external forces bent on blocking 
the path to  democracy, but also  against those who ostensibly favour but in fact  oppose the 
process. There has  never been a lack, nor is  there now, of  fears,  delays  and obstacles either 
consciously  or  subconsciously  placed  before  us.  Thus we  are  faced  with  concepts  which 
weaken democracy and with attitudes which, though expressed in democratic language, are 
actually only a poor disguise for enterests, positions and ideas in direct conflict with the stated 
principles. We have always taken a firm stand against attitudes such as  these. 
Ladies  and gentlemen, we  in the Communist Group certainly make  no  pretence that the 
objective of democratizing the Community as a whole consists solely of increasing democracy 
in the operations of one of its institutions, the European Parliament, which in fact has almost 
no power at all. Far more is  necessary to accomplish this, or even to reach a satisfactory stage 
of development! 
However, we feel  that the direct election of the European Parliament is  an important step in 
the process. We feel  that it is of value in itself as similar steps have been in the past. We have 
always considered a sound democratic system to be a positive driving force even in the face of 
backward economic, social and political structures. Indeed, it provides an important means of 
combating such  structures. Thus we  have  always  done  our utmost to  defend  proportional 
representation, decentralization and strong, democratic local centres of power. 
Let us not forget the limitations posed by this objective. 
The disparity  between  the  Parliament and other Community  machinery,  the  tendency to 
make  outdated  political  choices,  the  absence  of  power,  the  contrast  between  the  elected 
Parliam.~nt and a Council based on negotiated rules, are factors which have and-even under 
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functioning of democracy in this  Parliament. However,  it is  an important step  and we  are 
firmly convinced that by allowing the people to deal with these problems, we shall be helping 
to solve them. 
Nonetheless, ladies and gentlemen, we  have  observed only too  clearly that this  Parliament, 
which has always called for the decision before us  today, has not always shown the necessary 
courage and necessary respect for the principles we  defend. Whenever, as  today, we  have had 
before u:.;  a text claiming to be a blueprint for the attainment of what seems to be our greatest 
aspiration,  we  have  found  limitations  and  shortcomings,  making  us  doubt  whether  this 
Parliament is  really anxious to tackle and solve this important matter. 
Like some of the earlier speakers, I wish to consider some of these shortcomings, in the hope 
that the rapporteur will note our comments and that Parliament itself will look more closely 
at this draft, certain aspects of which, in our opinion, raise serious difficulties for the process 
of institutional democratization which we all support. 
My  first· point concerns the stages  in adopting the uniform electoral  procedure. Today,  14 
January 1975, we  find ourselves  in the same position as  Parliament was  at  the time of the 
Dehousse draft. 
Owing  to  his  firm  conviction  that  the  problem  is  insoluble,  the  rapporteur  has  simply 
disguised or avoided the difficulties in favour of a few assertions aimed at causing a minimum 
of distress and disagreement by being as  neutral as  possible. Thus, once again, fifteen  years 
later, we  are faced with a programme involving two  phases, one transitional, the other final. 
Mr Patijn-whose report I have read with great care-denies this. Yet I fail  to understand how 
he can. You only have to read the text of the Draft Convention to realize that at least half of it 
is  concerned  with  dividing  the  process  of  electing  the  European  Parliament  into  two 
phases-one phase in which more or less everything would be in the hands of the individual 
States  and a  second  phase  which would  see  the  implementation of  the uniform  electoral 
procedure,  about which  Mr  Patijn  does  not give  us  enough  information,  not even  in  his 
comments in the text. 
We should not forget  that we  are  speaking of elections, and not discussing abstractions or 
insignificant matters in a gentlemen's club. But if we  are to have uniform European elections, 
how  can  we  accept  that  a  variety  of  legal  rules  should  govern  which  parties  are  to  be 
represented  in  the  elections?  Is  it  conceivable  that  in  certain  countries  parties  which  are 
already represented in this House and which form a legitimate group would not be permitted 
to take part in the elections? 
In  comparison with  Mr  Dehousse's text,  Mr Patijn's  current text  is  even  more  retrograde. 
Although the Dehousse draft made the admission  of  parties to  the elections subject to  the 
national rules it at least restricted this arrangement to the transitional period. Mr Patijn, on the 
other  hand,  has  now  decided  once  and  for  all-that  the  question  of  which  parties  may 
participate  should be  decided  by the  national  procedures, subject  of  course  to  any  future 
reform of the system. 
I am amazed that no-one, not even the rapporteur himself, has considered taking advantage of 
the  decisions  of  the  recent Summit which,  by bringing forward  the dates  for  elections  to 
Parliament, made possible the drafting of a text aiming at genuinely European elections in 
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or from the governments, and that it is  here that objections and opposition have arisen. 
The Legal Affairs  Committee, having examined this aspect of the problem, considers that a 
process  or a  series  of acts  such  as  those  leading to  the establishment and application of  a 
uniform electoral procedure for the Community, can be divided into different phases. I have 
my doubts  about this.  I  would  simply remind Mr  Patijn  that Article  138(3)  of  the Treaty 
requires the Council of Ministers to act unanimously, - that is, to take one decision, not two 
or more. I therefore wonder if, when we reach the second stage in our plan (as we claim to be 
able to do)- or perhaps even the third-the Council of Ministers will not have valid grounds 
for  stating  that  it  has  already  completed  its  task  and  that  the  electoral  procedure  is  that 
decided on the basis of this draft. 
Of course, Mr Patijn, like the clever lawyer he is,  has found the solution. Article 15(1) on the 
Draft Convention repeals Article 138(3) of the Treaty and, in so doing, removes the legal basis 
provided by the Treaty for a uniform electoral procedure. 
Another  point  I  wish  to  raise  is  proportional  representation,  a  matter  of  great  political 
importance, and for us, absolutely essential. Not only does he not refer to this in connection 
with the future uniform electoral procedure, but in his notes to the text, Mr Patijn states that a 
system  of proportional representation is  not necessary. We are  completely opposed to  this 
approach to  the problem. We shall  never accept discrimination, and consider proportional 
representation  to  be absolutely essential  in a  democratic  election. Even from  a  conceptual 
point of view there can be no uniform electoral procedure if both proportional representation 
and the simple majority system are used indiscriminately. This Parliament will thus have to be 
told  how we  can  use  the  term  'uniform electoral  procedure'  when  in  some countries  the 
election will be based on the list system of proportional representation and in other countries 
a constituency system will be used on the basis of the majority vote. Even Mr Patijn, with all 
his  ingenuity, has  not succeeded  in  reconciling this  disparity, which in our opinion is  an 
outright contradiction in terms, and as such, is quite unacceptable, particularly as there can be 
no common electoral procedure as long as the individual States are free to decide on the form 
elections will take. Here again we  have contradictions. France, of course, will opt for its own 
system. Yet this Convention will make it impossible for France to go on using its system as it 
specifies that elections must be held on one day only, whereas in France, as  we  all  know, the 
two-ballot system is customary. 
On the other hand, I do not see why we should worry about the so-called dangers inherent in 
proportional representation, since all  the criticisms of  this system relate to the instability of 
those governments which use it. As we have no government here, our only task is  to see how 
the peoples can be better represented in this Parliament. 
Finally, Article 14 introduces a strange provision on the basis of which in the future, by means 
of a completely new procedure which is  not provided for in the Treaty, further measures may 
be introduced and the electoral system may be changed. An attempt has been made to draw a 
comparison between this provision and Article 236. However, I would ask Mr Patijn whether 
such a comparison is  possible. 
If it is  possible,  there  is  no  need  to  include  this  provision,  as  Article  236  already  exists. 
However, to me it does not seem to be possible, as the legal basis of Article 236 is that we have 
no specific provisions in the Treaty for regulating this matter. 
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of Article 138(3), of the Treaty, whereby he deprives us of the only real legal basis for planning 
common  elections  and  substitutes  this  machinery  which,  in  my  opinion,  has  many 
shortcomings. 
These are  the  rather  serious  limitations  in  the  Draft  Convention which certainly  indicate 
weakness of political purpose; the limitations relate to basic aspects of politics, principle and 
law,  and affect the very substance of the solutions put forward,  causing grave  doubts about 
their ability to achieve the main objective. 
In order not to complicate the debate-and also because we are convinced we shall be unable 
to settle this matter today-we have only proposed one amendment. However, in view of what 
has  already emerged from  the  text and the speeches, we  can  state  now that owing to  the 
conflict between our full  agreement with the basic principle and our severe criticism of the 
way in which the principles are expounded, we have no choice but to abstain from voting. 
(Applause from the Communist and Allies Group) 
President. - The proceedings will now be suspended until 3 p.m. 
The House will rise. 
(The sitting was suspended at 12.50 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.mJ 
IN THE CHAIR: MR MARTENS 
Vice-President 
President. - The sitting is  resumed. 
3.  Welcome  to  the  Turkish  Delegation  to  the  joint  Parliamentary  Committee  of the 
EEC-Turkey Association 
President. - I am pleased to welcome on behalf of Parliament the Members of the Turkish 
Delegation to the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Turkey Association. 
(Applause) 
4. Convention introducing elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage 
(continued) 
President. - The next item is  the continued consideration of the report by Mr Patijn on 
direct elections to the European Parliament (Doc. 368/7  4). 
I call Mr Outers. 
Mr Outers. - (F) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, in speaking in today's debate it is  not 
my intention to sing the  praises of the Draft before us,  or to  draw attention to  its  merits; 
others have spoken before me, and I shall not repeat what has already been said extremely 
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Lautenschlager on behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee. 
I am one of those who believe that, in view of the fact that the Treaty of Rome was signed 17 
years  ago,  it  is  about  time  that  our Assembly  implemented  one  of  the  most  important 
provisions  of  that Treaty,  namely Article  138.  I  also  believe-and here  I  echo  Mr  de  la 
Malene-that the people should obviously be consulted, not only to determine who will sit in 
the future  Parliament, but above all  to ask Europeans to state their opinion on the political 
choices concerning the kind of Europe they wish to see,  on both the economic and social 
levels; in other words, the kind of society that Europe wants to build. 
Mr President, I will merely touch on four points which in my view are bound to give rise to 
certain reservations as  regards the Draft we have before us. 
The first concerns one of the most delicate aspects of the Draft, of which much has been said 
already; I mean, the number of delegates to be sent to the Assembly. As I said when the Legal 
Affairs Committee was discussing this matter, the compromise offered to us today-and I am 
speaking primarily of Mr  Lautenschlager's proposal-is  not entirely satisfactory. It seems to 
me that this is  because it attempts to reconcile two  ideas or objectives which are  apparently 
difficult to  reconcile within the same Assembly, where we  are  trying both to give  the nine 
Member States a proper system of representation by taking into account the relative numerical 
sizes  of  their  populations,  and  at  the  same  time  to  ensure  a  system  of  proportional 
representation for  those populations. The two principles are at odds with each other and the 
decision we have reached seems to me incompatible with either. 
This is  no new problem. All States throughout the world which have adopted the federal or 
confederal pattern have had exactly the same difficulties. But I am obliged to  point out that 
they have solved them by a different method from the one we are adopting today. They have 
observed these principles by creating two Chambers, one representing the populations, which 
consequently takes account of the numerical size  of the populations in question, the other 
representing the States and comprising an equal number of representatives according to the 
number of  nationalities  or States.  In  the  United States,  for  example,  the  State  of  Nevada, 
which is a desert with a necessarily small number of inhabitants, has exactly the same number 
of representatives as  the very populous State of New York. To deal with such a situation they 
have  created  two  assemblies,  and one of them, the  House of  Representatives,  corresponds 
completely as regards what one might call its 'political geography' to the 'human geography' it 
claims to  represent. If I may, I should like to reply to  an interruption made during Mr de Ia 
Malene's speech; reference was  made to the French Senate, but there again, and I repeat, that 
is a second Assembly. Consequently, that point did not seem particularly relevant. 
We are  now trying to  combine these two  ideas, but in my view the plan providing for  355 
Members conforms neither to  the first  principle nor the second. I do  not consider that the 
relatively small States-and I am in a good position to talk about them, since I come from one 
where  the  population  is  not very  large-receive any outstanding safeguards;  I  would  have 
preferred to see them represented in a second Chamber, and in fact the report before us does 
refer  to  the possibility  that a  second Chamber for  Member States  will  be  created  at  some 
unspecified time in the future. 
But what is  the present situation? I have  made some calculations and I find that in certain 
countries  there will  be  three or four  representatives  for  every  million inhabitants, while in 
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vary  between  1  and  17.  And this  is  what you  call  'representation of the peoples'.  I  doubt 
whether the peoples are going to feel  particularly well  represented so  long as  such blatant 
discrepancies exist. I repeat, therefore, that the only satisfactory solution to this problem is  to 
set up two Chambers. 
May  I  now in a short aside comment on the rather paradoxical attitude adopted by certain 
persons.  I  find  that  it  is  the  most  ardent  advocates  of  supranationality-which  means  a 
completely  integrated  Europe,  where  by  definition  the  role  of  individual  States  will  be 
gradually  whittled  down  and  may  even  disappear  one  day-who  are  now  becoming  the 
keenest supporters of a solution which consists in further sanctifying the existence of these 
States and increasing their representation. Universal suffrage in an integrated system usually 
means 'one man, one vote', whereas the compromise we  have now, as  can be seen from  the 
statement of the grounds on which it is  based, tends to favour certain Member States at the 
expense of others. Of course,  I  am not opposed to  such a solution but only to  the way  in 
which it has been implemented. 
The second problem I should like to deal with briefly is that of the uniform procedure. At this 
point I should like to  pay tribute to  the mental gymnastics of the lawyers who, since  1960, 
have managed to convince us that the uniform procedure in all Member States, referred to in 
Paragraph 3 of Article 138, actually means that the procedure may be different in each of the 
Member States. I personally see this as  a legalistic tour de force,  but I am not saying that the 
neat way  in  which  this  volte-face  has  been  given  legal  sanction  is  a  bad  thing in  itself. 
Nevertheless, I think that one day we  shall have  to  turn towards a solution that pays  more 
regard to  the texts. Of course, there is  some mention of this in the Draft we  have before us, 
and  in  Article  7,  in  particular,  we  are  told  that the  European  Parliament will  draw  up  a 
proposal for a uniform electoral system by 1980. What worries me is that we are not told what 
will happen if the work which has been going on since 1960, that is, the search for a uniform 
procedure,  fails  to  produce  results  by  1980;  or by  1978,  since  another date  is  now being 
mentioned. Does this mean that paragraph 1 of Article 7 is  no longer applicable, and that the 
second paragraph is to be applied automatically? The text is  not very clear in this respect, and 
I  think  that,  in  view  of  that  hypothetical  situation,  we  should  be  given  more  precise 
information so that we do not end up in a kind of legal void. 
My third observation concerns Article 5.  I have no criticism of it, in fact,  I voted for it in the 
Legal  Affairs  Committee. If I  may remind you,  this  article  refers  to  the dual  mandate of 
national  parliamentarian  and  European  parliamentarian.  For  the  time  being,  this  dual 
mandate is permitted in principle. It should end in 1980 and I think this is the right solution. 
It is a good idea to provide a preliminary, transitional solution, but I do not quite understand 
the explanation given in Mr Lautenschlager's report. He tells us that at that point the role of 
the States will be less important in the Assembly, as  there will then be a second Chamber-a 
Chamber of States. But I see that Article 7 of the Draft makes no mention of an institutional 
reform, only a reform of the uniform electoral system. The argument thus loses much of its 
weight if one keeps strictly to the text of Article 7 as worded at present. 
One final observation, Mr President. The report by the Legal Affairs Committee mentions the 
complaint of failure  to act referred to in Article  17 5 of the Treaty for cases where proposals 
made by our Assembly are not taken up by the Council. There is,  however, another situation 
where a complaint of failure  to act may arise,  and of which nothing has  been said-I  am 
thinking particularly of cases where States fail  to act. 
99 This is  no academic theory. Suppose a State were to fail  to implement the electoral procedure 
to which it was  normally bound. I repeat, this is  a possibility we  must bear in mind, for  it 
cannot  be  totally  excluded.  For  example,  in  spite  of  the  requirement  of  Article  138, 
representation in this Assembly is  not complete, since one Member State has not yet sent its 
full  complement  of  representatives.  One  might  even  question  the  composition  of  this 
Assembly  on  the  very  grounds  that  one  Member  State  has  not  yet  designated  all  its 
representatives.  What would  happen  if  this  State,  or any  other,  were  to  adopt  the  same 
attitude? What would be the situation then? As  far as  I am concerned, these States should be 
compelled to choose between observing the Treaty and leaving the Community. 
That concludes the observations I wanted to  make regarding the text which has been put to 
us, Mr President. In spite of its shortcomings, I shall vote for  the Draft as  a whole, because, 
basically,  it is  a valid aspiration. I  see  it as  a useful  and adequate method of achieving the 
European  revival  we  all  desire.  Furthermore, it embodies by its  very  nature the democratic 
ideal to which the peoples of Europe are so deeply attached. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Cifarelli. 
Mr Cifarelli. - (I) Mr President, I am very grateful to the colleagues in my Group for giving 
me the opportunity to speak on this important problem. This allows the voice to be heard in a 
debate  of such great significance  of one reared  in  a  democratic  school  of  thought and an 
Italian political tradition which is  closely linked with the problem of  European unification. 
Next to the monuments in memory of Churchill and Adenauer at our seat in Strasbourg there 
is  another,  presented  to  the  European  Parliament by  the  Mayor  of  Genoa,  in  memory of 
Guiseppe Mazzini, the apostle of Italian unification, which even at that time was modelled on 
the  unification  of  Germany,  the  unification  of  Poland  and  above  all  the  democratic 
unification of Europe. I want to stress this fact not because my concept of democracy has any 
need  for  heroes,  even  if  I  respect a  great  historical  figure,  but because  I  believe  that our 
judgment must always  be  based on a historical awareness which must help us  set our aims 
realistically. 
While thanking Mr Patijn for his work, I should like to stress that, seen from this angle, this 
very comparison, this juxtaposition of the young parliamentarian, Mr Patijn, and a Nestor of 
the European Parliament like Professor Dehousse, means a lot to  those who, like myself, are 
rather older than Mr Patijn. In the early 1950's Mr Dehousse's generation was  moved to  see 
politicians in the same European assembly debating together in the languages of the peoples 
which had been involved in two  European civil wars,  i.e.  the First and Second World Wars 
which had wrought such damage to our continent's future. Mr Patijn's generation has grown 
up with  this  reality of peace among Europeans and hence might now be inclined towards 
maximalism. However, I must give credit to Mr Patijn for drafting his report in gradualist and 
concrete terms which should now be given full approval. 
Leaving apart the legal aspects of Mr Patijn's draft, which have already been dealt with by Mr 
Schmidt, and other considerations and reasons behind our vote, which will be outlined by Mr 
Broeksz, I should like to underline certain points which I feel  are most important. First of all, 
this debate is  taking place in a spirit which excludes grandiose self-congratulation. We do not 
feel that a decisive change is being made, one that will transform the face of Europe, even if it 
100 is  a positive and highly significant step forward. Mr Ortoli's arguments this morning were, in 
my opinion, highly pertinent and lucid. We are not making this advance, let it be noted, in an 
attempt to implement what might be termed the Kirk thesis. As you will no doubt remember, 
when the United Kingdom representatives entered this Assembly, their spokesman, Mr Kirk, 
quoted a British maxim: Parliament may assume to itself any powers which are not absolutely 
forbidden to it. 
We have to admit that in all  these years we  have not applied this teaching, or statement of 
experience, nor have Mr Kirk and his  friends  in this Parliament. It was  the recent Summit 
which finally gave expression to the feelings of public opinion of the citizens of Europe, of 
the peoples of Europe, and-as we  all know-laid down in paragraph  12  that Parliament is 
associated  with  the achievement of  European  unity,  that elections  to  Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage must be held as  soon as  possible and that Parliament will be given greater 
powers, including legislative ones. This, I would say, is  the crux of the matter, and although it 
would be foolish  to be over-optimistic or to imagine that the battle is  already won, we  may 
fairly consider the possibility of elections by direct universal suffrage by 1978  as  the point of 
no return as  regards the democratic future of the Community institutions. Not because this 
will give Parliament the democratic legitimacy which it has hitherto derived from the Treaty 
and the fact that we  are elected by the people to the national parliaments which then appoint 
us  here,  but because,  faced  with  the growing tasks  of the  Community and  the  increasing 
demands of Europe at a time when the future of the Community is  particularly at stake, we 
can now look forward  to elections to the European Parliament by equal and direct universal 
suffrage  at the very moment when we  have  achieved something else.  Quite apart from  the 
commitment  undertaken  in  paragraph  12  by  the  Heads  of  State  and  Government  in 
December last, we  have fought for and obtained something else, namely substantial budgetary 
powers, the acquisition of which represents a resounding vindication of Parliament. 
Against this background we can now reply to certain questions which have arisen in today's 
debate. You heard Mr Outers a moment ago  say that, in fact,  this  House (as  elected by the 
methods  laid  down  in  the  Draft  Convention)  will  be  an  unsatisfactory  cross  between  a 
parliament of the people and a parliament of States. He referred-we  all agree that this is  the 
model-to  the  American  constitution,  which  provides  for  two  Houses,  a  model  which, 
moreover,  exists  not  only  in  the  United  States  of  America  but  also  in  Switzerland  and 
elsewhere.  Well,  I  would  like  to  read  the  following  section  from  the  197 4  Summit 
communique: 'the European Assembly is  composed of representatives of the peoples of the 
States united within the Community'. 
It might seem superfluous, but I think that the European Parliament should include not only 
the representatives of the peoples but also a Chamber of States. 
Ladies  and gentlemen, in approving these  proposals, which are  gradualist and concrete, we 
must not forget  that certain  basic  problems, such as  some consequences of  the  principles 
incorporated  which  we  may  find  troublesome,  are  due  to  the  present  situation  and  its 
limitations. But let us hope that the future offers better prospects! 
This morning Mr D'Angelosante advised us  not to abandon lightly the conditions laid down 
in  paragraph  3  of  Article  138  of  the Treaty.  Admittedly,  if  you  want  to  look  for  hidden 
meanings or if you fear  that in the future there will  be a lack of political resolve to  achieve 
progress, it could be dangerous to scrap paragraph 3 of Article 138 of the Treaty of Rome. And 
indeed,  Mr  D'Angelosante's  comment  that  the  ideal  electoral  system,  at  least  as  far  as 
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democratic point of view. However, I would like to say to Mr D'Angelosante that to think we 
cannot  strengthen  the  democratic  roots  of  the  European  Parliament  before  the  electoral 
system is in force is tantamount, in the words of the ancient poet, to sitting on the bank of the 
river and waiting for the water to stop flowing before crossing to the other side. I should also 
like  to  tell  Mr  D'  Angelosante,  and  I  do  not  think  he  will  mind  my  doing so,  that  his 
theoretically  correct  but  basically  maximalist  position  reminds  me  that  Lenin  defined 
maximalism as  'one of the teething troubles of Communism'. As  far  as  Mr D'Angelosante is 
concerned, this judgment can be applied to his Europeanism. 
Obviously, with this concrete outlook and awareness of the past and of the future prospects, I 
cannot accept the somewhat sceptical approach of Mr de La Malene who, once more, gave an 
airing to certain of his Group's familiar cliches. We are ready to do everything for Europe, he 
says, but Europe needs to be independent. 
In actual fact, of course, Europe needs to be created first; it needs to live. By the very fact of its 
existence, inevitably, and yet with total realism in its political expectations, Europe will want 
and be able to be independent, and will accept an autonomous and decisive role in the world 
vis-a-vis America, Russia, the sheikhs and other forces and situations which may arise. But if 
we do not create a united Europe our situation will be impossible. 
Looking back we recall with emotion the years of the great illusions, the SO's when the fathers 
of the European Community maintained that it was sufficient to convoke a parliament which 
could declare itself sovereign and act as  a European constituent assembly. 
It was  a time of courage and noble ideals, the time of the ad hoc Parliament when basically 
everybody had in mind the example of the French Revolution and the Oath of the Tennis 
Court. 
However,  there  was  no  revolution  in  progress  but rather a  painful  struggle  for  moral  and 
material reconstruction in a world divided into opposing blocs. Today's world is  still divided 
and possibly irreversibly so,  but something was  achieved in yesterday's  Community. In the 
SO's there were too many illusions; in the 60's there were too many obstacles, both hidden and 
open, and too  much scepticism. Maybe  now we  can start to work on a  more concrete and 
constructive basis. I should like to finish by saying that we must never forget how States are 
created: they are created either by force of arms, or by peaceful and democratic means, or by 
revolutions, with the exploits of conquerors, as  has  happened so  often  in  the  past, or they 
emerge from  the will  of the  people.  I  feel  we  must do everything to allow this will  to  be 
expressed  as  fully  as  possible.  Commissioner Spinelli will  remember the great debates  we 
federalists  had on the question of the European people. Let us allow the European people to 
express itself, we said: years ago we really thought it possible to  arouse civil disobedience in 
Europe as  did Gandhi when fighting to awaken his people and gain independence for India. 
Let us give this European people the opportunity to speak and vote and let us make ourselves 
heard by these citizens of Europe. 
This morning I was astonished to hear a Member protesting against the presence of radio and 
television  from  various  countries,  with  their  men  and  their equipment. We  ought  to  be 
rejoicing, since this is  surely our objective: to speak to the European people in the hope that 
we  shall  in  the very  near future  be  the  increasingly effective  representatives,  not of  nine 
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civilized Europe we seek, i.e. the European people. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Lord Gladwyn. 
Lord Gladwyn. - Mr President, I should like first, if I may, to express all my admiration for 
the way in which our rapporteur has succeeded not so  much in cutting as  in actually untying 
several  Gordian  knots.  His  scheme  is,  undoubtedly,  the  one  most  likely  to  gain  general 
support, more especially, as  the Liberal Group believes, now that he has accepted this smaller 
number of  355.  It  is  also  evidently  the  fruit,  if  I  may  say  so,  of  tremendous  and  patient 
endeavours during the past year to  reconcile all sorts of conflicting tendencies. In Mr Patijn, 
we have the makings of a real statesman. 
My  dear colleagues, this is  a great day for  Europe and more especially for  the Liberals, who 
have always been in the vanguard of progress towards European unity. But there are still many 
lions in the path. After all,  the Ministers will  have  to  approve a draft convention-and it is 
hoped they will  do so  after long and free  discussions with  this Parliament-by unanimous 
vote, and then all  the national parliaments will  have  to  ratify it.  Nor will  the Ministers even 
give preliminary consideration to the Convention until the question of British membership is 
out of the way, and when and if they do achieve unanimity-that will be no mean feat-it is 
by no means certain that all the Nine national parliaments will follow suit. After hearing Mr 
de  Ia  Malene  this  morning, we  must,  for  instance,  be  in  some  doubt whether the  French 
parliament will  do  anything of  the sort.  Mr  Jozeau-Marigne  has  already,  most eloquently, 
explained the opposition, in general, of our group on the main issues, so this afternoon I shall 
limit myself to  some short remarks on ways  and means of getting round some of the still 
remaining stumbling-blocks. 
First, the question of the weighted representation in this Parliament of the smaller States. To 
my mind, this proposal cannot possibly be dissociated from  the possibility, or otherwise, of 
establishing a Chamber of States or Senate in the Union which it is, after all, still the declared 
intention of the Nine governments to achieve in 1980. For, if such a proposal goes through, it 
will be evident that, as  under the American system, the smaller members of the Community 
will  by reason  of that fact  alone, by being members of the Senate, possess  power out of  all 
proportion  to  their size.  If, in  addition,  the  Council,  or  the  European  Council,  is  going 
increasingly  to  take  its  decisions  by  qualified  majority  vote,  as  proposed  by  the  French 
President himself, the smaller States, or some of them, by combining with one larger State, 
would  also  exercise  a  sort of collective veto  thus  rendering their power and influence pro 
tanto even greater.  It might well,  therefore, be held by some parliaments that the grant of 
special representation to  the smaller powers in this Parliament is  hardly compatible with a 
Chamber of States. I only say that this is a view that may be held, and I hasten to add that I do 
not say this because I am opposed to any special representation of the smaller States in this 
Parliament. On the contrary, I am all for it. I am merely trying to draw attention to its likely 
consequences. 
Then  there  is  the  matter  which  is  likely  to  be  the  chief  concern  of  the  British 
parliament-namely, the vexed question of what is  called the dual mandate. It is  not that I 
believe  that my country-once it  has  decided  to  stay  in  the  Community-is likely  to  be 
particularly  suspicious  or nationalistic,  or more  suspicious  or more  nationalistic  than  any 
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might call a say in the proceedings of the Community and that it would thus greatly prefer 
some system  providing  for  what is  known  as  an  'organic  link'  between  Westminster and 
Strasbourg.  And  such  a  link  can,  in  practice,  only  be  achieved  by  some  form  of  dual 
membership, even if it is  only of a limited and temporary nature such as  that proposed by Mr 
Patijn, unless I have got him wrong. 
It is  no doubt useless to say this-since the die has  now been cast, and after all  cast by the 
Ministers themselves-but I myself have always  thought that the best way to arrive at a fully 
European system of direct elections would be to  have  a preliminary period of, say,  10  years 
during  which  the  existing  (nominated)  parliamentary  delegations-possibly  doubled  in 
numbers-were  directly  elected  by  means  of  each  nation's  choice  while  remaining, 
technically at least, members of their national parliaments. That, of course, at the moment is 
out. But this would at least have resulted in an organic link, and at the same time put an end 
to the present system whereby-in the United Kingdom at least-a member of the House of 
Commons, if he takes his European duties seriously, is  faced with the prospect of a nervous 
breakdown, or the disruption of his family, or the loss of his seat, or possibly all three. 
(Applause) 
Is  it  therefore  conceivable-I  repeat,  conceivable-that  it  would  still  be  compatible  with 
Article  5  of the  proposed  Convention for  the  British  Parliament, pending agreement on a 
uniform electoral procedure -which may well  take years, even after the new parliament has 
been elected and is  actually exercising its powers-to introduce a system whereby the British 
elected members of the European Parliament were also deemed, in some way, to be members 
of the British Parliament? If the total membership of the European Parliament is fixed at 355, 
an  addition  of  67  to  the  House  of  Commons-or less  if  some were  in the Lords-might 
perhaps be an inconvenience that could at least be tolerated (Of course, if it were a question of 
accepting an additional  116, it would be out of the question). So  I would ask  the rapporteur 
whether, in  his  view,  such a  solution  is  possible. Of course  it would only be a  provisional 
solution.  In  the  long  run,  no  doubt,  the  principle  of  incompatibility  would  have  to  be 
accepted.  I  don't deny that.  But  surely  the  great  thing is  to  get  the  new  directly-elected 
parliament  functioning  as  soon  as  possible:  a  uniform  electoral  procedure,  agreement  on 
which  might  well  not  be  possible  for  years,  seems  to  me  at  least  to  be  a  secondary 
consideration. 
Had  time  permitted,  which  it  does  not,  I  would  have  also  liked  to  refer  to  regional 
representation. However, my colleague Russel Johnston will doubtless deal with that. For my 
part, I would only just say this. My own hope would be that a British delegation of 67 would 
provide sufficient representation, not to an independent Scotland or Wales, or an independent 
Brittany or Bavaria for that matter, but for an adequate number of Scots, Welsh, Bretons and 
Bavarians, who would largely account for their actions to some regional assembly with limited 
if real powers. 
Be that as  it may, I repeat that our vote tonight is  likely to be a great day for Europe and that 
no one more than myself will rejoice if Mr Patijn's conception wins tonight an overwhelming 
vote. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Scelba. 
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down  in  Mr  Patijn's  draft.  I  agree,  of  course  with  the  basic  principle  and  the  urgency of 
proceeding to the vote; I have been campaigning for  it for  15  years, so  I need not stress the 
desirability of speeding up the democratization of Parliament. 
My  remarks  are  aimed  at  offering  the  rapporteur  and  Parliament  reasons  for  certain 
improvements  to  the  draft  submitted  to  the  Council  of  Ministers,  who will  have  the  last 
word-certain  alternatives on the assumption  that the differencies  of opinion expressed  in 
this Parliament regarding certain provisions in Mr Patijn's draft will again arise in the Council. 
For practical reasons I shall follow the text of the draft as  presented by the rapporteur. 
Article 2 refers to the number of Members and the breakdown by State. 
As  regards  the number of Members, the  1960 draft provided for  a threefold increase in the 
current  number. This was  based,  however,  on  a  Community comprising six  States  and  a 
threefold increase would have resulted in a Parliament of 426 Members. But taking the same 
criterion  for  a  Community  of  nine  States,  we  would  now  have  a  total  of  some  600 
parliamentarians. 
Divergent views have already been expressed in this House regarding the number of Members 
and I shall not opt for  one solution rather than another. Personally, I would be in favour of 
doubling the current number of parliamentarians, in line with a proposal made in view of the 
enlargement of the Community by the Bureau of Parliament when I was  president. Double 
the number of Members for nine countries would result in a Parliament of around 400, which 
is a fairly reasonable figure even allowing for the possible accession of other countries. But if it 
is desired to increase our numbers, the present figure could be multiplied by 2.5  or 3. 
The  other  problem  regarding  the  breakdown,  is  a  more  delicate  one  from  the  political 
viewpoint. 
On this point Mr Patijn's draft differs clearly from the Treaties of Rome and, in fact whereas 
the Treaties of Rome had established a weighted distribution of seats among Member States, 
Mr Patijn's draft uses different criteria. I totally disagree with the proposal made in Mr Patijn's 
draft.  The authors  of  the  Treaties  were  great  democrats  and  knew  full  well  the  value  of 
attaching more or less equal importance to each vote while agreeing to more relaxation of this 
rigid criterion. The proposal to attach the same importance to the votes of all countries in the 
Community came from the Gaullists for controversial reasons as  they were opposed to direct 
elections to the European Parliament. This draft, however, would now reduce the number of 
French representatives in the European Parliament. I am not speaking for Italy, which would 
benefit from Mr Patijn's draft, but I do think that to break away from the criteria laid down in 
the Treaties of Rome is  a political mistake; these criteria were  based on a great number of 
considerations  which  are  still  valid.  Furthermore,  I  cannot  imagine  France  with  fewer 
Members in the European Parliament than Italy, the United Kingdom or Germany. Nor do I 
think it possible, Mr President. We members of this Parliament must avoid creating problems 
for the Council of Ministers. There must be special reasons for breaking away from the system 
specified  in  the  Treaties;  I  personally  fail  to  see  them  and  am  therefore  in  favour  of 
maintaining the system of distribution of seats as  laid down in the Treaties of Rome. 
The  other point  I  should  like  to  comment on  is  paragraph  2  of  Article  4  which  reads: 
'National legislation  shall  ensure that the  representatives  receive  the same guarantees as  to 
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This  is  an  error,  Mr  Patijn;  why  assign  these  guarantees  to  national  legislation?  It  is 
Community law that establishes the criteria of independence for  European parliamentarians 
and  these  criteria must also  be accepted  at  the  national  level.  Why reduce  a  Community 
criterion to a purely national level? I am thus opposed to paragraph 2 of Article 4. 
Article 5 deals with the problem of compatibility of the two mandates. Enough has already 
been said on this score.  I  should like to remind everyone, Mr President, that a  transitional 
period, as  in  the  present draft,  was  also  contained in  the  1960  draft,  but with completely 
different criteria. In 1960 we had provided for a transitional period in which one third of the 
Members of the  European Parliament would be elected from  national  parliaments and the 
other two  thirds  by  universal  suffrage.  This  was  to  ensure  that qualified  parliamentarians 
would participate in the European Parliament, especially in its initial stages. Now, in contrast, 
all  the Members of the European Parliament are  to  be elected by universal suffrage even if 
they have a national mandate. 
I  would  now like  to  ask  if  there  is  a  single  parliamentarian in  this  House who would  be 
prepared to stand as  candidate for the European Parliament after already fighting an election 
campaign  for  his  own  national  parliament  and  risk  being  defeated.  To  my  mind  no 
parliamentarian  elected  to  his  national  parliament  would  be  prepared  to  fight  a  second 
election campaign for the European Parliament when the issue is  doubtful; in any case, what 
would be the advantage? 
But this may only be a practical consideration. The real grounds for dispute are on pages 23 
and  25  of  Mr  Patijn's  report  which  clearly  rejects  compatibility  of  the  two  mandates.  I 
therefore support this position and believe the dual mandate to  be incompatible even for  a 
transitional period merely limited to the first legislative period in 1978. 
Mr President, I should now like to pass to Article 6, paragraph 2, which states that 'Subject to 
the entry into force of special rules pursuant to Article 7(1) of this Convention, the provisions 
of each Member State relating to incompatibility with a national parliamentary mandate shall 
be applied'. 
Forgive  me for saying so,  Mr Patijn, but if you had known more about the  1960 draft you 
would not have suggested this provision and the Political Affairs Committee would not have 
approved  it since  there  is  an enormous difference  between  incompatibility for  election  to 
national parliaments and incompatibility for election to the European Parliament. In Italy the 
mayors  of  towns  consisting  of  40 000  inhabitants  cannot  be  elected  to  the  national 
parliament. But why should any such mayor not be allowed to be elected as  a Member of a 
European Parliament? 
The 1960 draft included a regulation which has been completely invalidated, if I may say so, 
by this new provision. 
And now to Article 7 which states that a proposal for a uniform electoral system will have to 
be approved by 1978. Let us not deceive ourselves, the draft we approve today will last beyond 
1980.  It  is  easier  to  square  the  circle  then  to  create  a  uniform  electoral  system  which 
reconciles the proportional system with the majority one. 
We shall never find a solution acceptable to the British, to the Germans, and to the countries 
governed on a  strictly proportional system. Thus, the current system which allows  Member 
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1980  as  the deadline but leave  the task of deciding on a new electoral system to the future 
Parliament elected by universal suffrage. To fix  a specific date for that decision seems to  me 
entirely unrealistic. 
Article  14, Mr President, is  particularly serious in that it assigns the Council of Ministers the 
task  of  making  provisions  for  the  implementation  of  direct  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament. These are  legislative and not substantive provisions which are  already contained 
in the Draft Convention. We are  continually protesting against the Luxembourg Agreement 
which  provides  for  unanimity and  demanding the  majority  criterion  provided  for  by  the 
Treaties, and then we go and oblige the Council, in our Convention, to adopt by unanimous 
decision simple provisions for the implementing of elections to  the European Parliament by 
direct universal suffrage. This is  really  too  much, Mr  President.  It would even  enable each 
State to prevent elections by universal suffrage. May I ask who will foot the bill for elections to 
the European Parliament? The European Community or the individual Member States? In the 
latter case, any one State finding itself in financial difficulties and unable to bear the cost of a 
second election to the European Parliament can make use  of this provision of unanimity to 
prevent elections. 
This is  really a step backward rather than a democratic step forward. 
My final remarks concern Article 15  which provides for the repeal of Article 138  of the EEC 
Treaty and the corresponding Articles 21  of the ECSC Treaty and 108  of the EAEC Treaty. I 
am against the provisions laid down in Article  15. The articles in question form the basis of 
direct elections and I do not see why we should cancel them. 
This is  a debasement of  Community values  in that the Treaty obligation would be  merely 
transferred to the Council of Ministers. 
Mr President, as  you can see, my remarks are not dictated by any conservative attachment to 
the past but by democratic consideration. The European Parliament is  an expression of real 
and  effective  democracy  and  I  cannot agree  to  the  Council's  being  assigned  the  task  of 
establishing, by unanimous decision, such important provisions. 
These are  the comments I  should like  to  bring to  the attention of the rapporteur and the 
House. One final  point, Mr  President, regarding Article  8 which states  that 'the provisions 
governing the admission of political parties to elections in each Member State shall apply to 
elections to the European Parliament'. The corresponding article in the 1960 draft specified 
that the admission of political parties to elections in each Member State should be governed 
by constitutional provisions. For example, in Italy it is written in the constitution that a fascist 
party has no right of citizenship. But it would be inadmissible that a government should limit 
by statute  the  participation  of political  parties  in elections  to  the  European  Parliament.  I 
consider the deletion of the reference to the constitution to be an undemocratic step and am 
thus opposed to this change which is  a step backward compared with the 1960 position. 
Mr President, it was  not my intention to  patronize the  1960 draft,  but I  must say  that the 
persons who drafted it were closer to the spirit of the Treaties than we  perhaps are and were 
more inspired by the ideal of a united Europe than we can be said to be today. 
(Applause) 
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Sir Derek Walker-Smith.  - As  time is  precious this afternoon, I shall confine within a 
single sentence my respectful congratulations to Mr Patijn on his devoted and c.:onscientious 
labours in producing this report. 
There are, I think two reasons for the introduction of direct elections. The first is, of course, a 
reason of law. The Treaties require it. Article  138  (3)  is  mandatory and there is  therefore an 
obligation.  Both States  and  individuals  should be astute  to  fulfil  their obligations.  It  is  of 
course an obligation which could only be removed by a formal amendment of the Treaty. As 
things stand, there is in law a discretion only as  to the methods by which this result should be 
achieved. The result itself of direct elections is  a clearly imposed obligation. 
The second reason is  rooted in the philosophy of representative institutions in a democratic 
society. It is  axiomatic that the status and significance, the strength and the authority of any 
parliamentary assembly depend on the closeness of its links with those it seeks to represent. 
The  more  direct  the  link,  the  broader the  base  on  which  the  representative  character  of 
parliament  rests.  In  a  democratic  and  politically  sophisticated  society,  indirect  elections, 
representation by nomination, a delegated authority, cannot in principle be a wholly effective 
substitute for those closer and more intimate links between parliament and people, between 
the  represented  and  the  representative.  Public  participation  is  a  basic  ingredient  in  the 
practice of democracy. These two considerations of law and principle are in my view the real 
and sufficient justification for instituting a system of direct elections. 
For  myself,  I  would  prefer  to  have  the  case  put  solely  on  the  firm  ground  of  these 
considerations. I would have preferred that in the preamble it had not been found necessary to 
invoke abstract terms such as  the process of European unification and integration, which are 
generalized aspirations and mean different things to  different people. For the avoidance of 
doubt, Mr Kirk mentioned the implications for federation and fairly said that direct elections 
might bring it nearer or might take it further away. In my view, direct elections neither need 
nor should be put forward' as  a means to achieve and expedite full  political federation. Some 
within the Community want this. Others do not. And the views of the citizens of the Member 
States must await a clearer and more defined expression until direct elections are in operation. 
What will happen in the long run. I do not pretend to say. I do not court the risks of prophecy 
in an uncertain and unpredictable world. But the constitutional position is clear. Federation is 
not part of the Treaties, neither expressly nor by necessary implication. To move to a  full 
political federation would require new treaties, in turn requiring ratification by the individual 
States.  What cannot be  done,  or properly done  without amendment in  due  constitutional 
form, is  to extend the existing Treaties beyond their prescribed and proper compass. If that 
were done, then it would be open to any Member State in the classic phrase to say,  non haec 
in foedera veni: these are not the treaties to which we subscribed. 
Against that general background, Mr President, may I make a brief comment on three matters 
arising under the report: the links with the national parliaments, the uniform procedures, and 
the number and distribution of representatives. Eighteen months ago, in this House, I stressed 
the necessity of close cooperation between this  Parliament and the national parliaments, to 
ensure  that  each  in  his  own  sphere  achieved  democratic  supervision  and  parliamentary 
scrutiny  over  the whole  range  of  executive  activity  and  decision-making.  I  believe  that a 
directly-elected  European  Parliament  must  continue  to  respect  the  rights  and  duties  of 
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close  cooperation  and  understanding  between  parliaments.  It  would  certainly  be  highly 
undesirable if direct elections resulted in any tendency for  these institutions and those who 
comprise them to grow apart. But equally, it may be more difficult to achieve that cooperation 
and understanding, and it may need a more conscious effort to  bring about and maintain it 
when  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  are  no  longer  nominated  by  their  national 
parliament and many or perhaps most are no longer members of it. I believe that after the first 
few years, at any rate, common membership will be the exception. This does not mean that I 
disagree with Article 5 and its acceptance of the principle of compatibility. On the contrary, I 
think it right in  principle to  allow it and right to  leave  it  to the discretion of the Member 
States. It will, however, be a matter of logistics as well as law. What is not forbidden in law will 
in  many  cases  be  prohibited  by  circumstance,  or  at  any  rate  severely  limited.  A 
directly-elected Member of the European Parliament will serve perhaps half a million people. 
The  difficulties  of  the  dual  mandate  and  doing  justice  to  both  are  too  obvious  to  need 
recapitulation. There are, of course, ingenious schemes to overcome the difficulties, but some 
Member States may find it difficult to accept them. 
There  may  be  a  tendency  to  regard  them  as  fancy  franchises,  too  far  removed  from  the 
traditional  conceptions of  parliamentary institutions with which  they are  familiar.  I  think, 
therefore,  we  would  be  wise  to  recognize  from  the  start  the  likelihood  that  common 
membership may well be rare and might, indeed, become extinct. It is better to recognize this 
now,  because it emphasizes the duty of planning to  ensure the necessary cooperation right 
from  the start  and evolving  the  procedures  for  continuing contact and coordination. The 
different  parliamentary  traditions,  the  varying  practices  and  divergent  procedures  of  the 
Member  States,  are  likely  to  create  difficulties  in  evolving  a  satisfactory  and  acceptable 
uniform pattern of election procedures. 
To solve them I think we must pursue the aim of maximum flexibility. I welcome what is said 
in the Patijn report on this matter, and welcome what is said in the Legal Affairs Committee's 
report,  that  only  certain  basic  requirements  of  democratic  elections  should  be  declared 
indispensable, and that European elections must be free, equal, secret and direct. 
That brings me to the last matter, the number and distribution of representatives. Ideally,  I 
would think, to the four requisites specified by the Legal Affairs Committee should be added a 
fifth. Elections should not only be free, equal, secret and direct. They should result as nearly as 
possible in parity of representation. In a practical world this may well be difficult to attain; but 
it is, after all, the democratic ideal, and the suggested distribution falls a good way short of it. 
Indeed, it will be possible for citizens in some parts of the Community to say that they only 
command  perhaps  one-tenth  of  the  representation  of  others  elsewhere.  That  may  be  an 
extreme  case,  but the citizens,  for  example, of  Northern  Ireland with  their representation 
based on the United Kingdom formula will  have  a considerably lower representation than 
that of their neighbours in Eire. There are  reasons for  this, as  we  know; but we  should not 
disguise the fact that a high price is exacted by way of derogation from the principle of parity 
of representation. The price is, of course, highest with the proposal for 335 seats. At least with 
550 seats the disparity is confined to the first 6 seats. With the 355 formula there would be a 
continuing process of discrimination and diminution: the larger the population, the smaller 
the representation. What is needed, I would think, is a Parliament, not too unwieldy, in which 
inequality of representation is  reduced to the minimum possible. 
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Or one that is  wholly acceptable  to  everybody. We are,  however, under a  duty to  devise  a 
system which represents  the highest common factor  of what is  equitable in principle and 
practical in operation. 
And we  must bend our efforts to  the discharge of that duty and to  the strengthening of the 
democratic workings of the Community, in cooperation with our national parliaments and 
with those citizens whom together we seek to represent. 
(Applause) 
President. -- I call Mr Bordu. 
Mr Bordu.  - (F) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the Paris Summit has decided on the 
election  of  Parliament  by  universal  suffrage.  This  decision  impels  us  to  make  a  certain 
number of observations. 
As  you are aware, we  are  keen supporters of the principle of universal suffrage-true to the 
traditions of the French labour movement and the great names of Guesde and Jaures. In our 
own country we  are  striving to  ensure a just framework for  universal suffrage so that a  real 
choice may be offered to the electorate. We wish to speak about proportional representation; 
the  only system  capable  of  giving  a  moral  content to  universal  suffrage,  in  particular  by 
eliminating all forms of discrimination. 
Therefore we  feel  that the election  proposed cannot be  solely evaluated in its  institutional 
context. Even from this point of view, we think that to speak of a democratic process being set 
in motion, to pretend that universal suffrage will give Europe a democratic face-lift, is to show 
a gross disregard for the consequences and the grave shortcomings of such a step. Indeed, can 
anyone  seriously  claim  that the States  and majorities, which are  today strengthening their 
authoritarianism, will  tomorrow contrive by some sleight of hand to  produce a  democratic 
structure for Europe? 
One might be tempted to define the concept of democracy, which is  not merely based on the 
right to vote but takes into account the nature of the policy carried out. The real truth of the 
matter is that a handful of financial giants, backed by their governments, are deciding the fate 
of  250  million  Europeans,  the  large  majority  of  whom  are  workers -victims  of  the 
accumulation of thousands of millions of inflationary dollars, victims of austerity, victims of a 
system in a state of crisis. 
It would be rash  to  assume that the legality of universal suffrage, solemnly confirmed on a 
European level, can henceforth abolish inalienable national obligations and characteristics. To 
ignore national sovereignties, even while paying lip-service to them, is  to  fly  in the face  of 
historical and social realities, to fight shy of the real reason for the troubles facing a capitalist 
Europe where the profit motive reigns supreme. 
Can anyone claim to  have the power to dismantle nations built up by centuries of struggle, 
suffering and hope? Can anyone but a sorcerer's apprentice attempt to meddle with the laws 
of historical development? Some of this was seen in the agricultural debates, and the process 
will shortly be renewed. The conflict of interests which sets capital against labour, sets certain 
multinational groups against each other, sets authoritarianism against democracy, shows that 
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ignoring the masses brings them together. 
How can  the  peoples be brought together under a  single  European  concept when  Europe 
itself  continues  to  be  the  lackey  of  big  business?  Indeed,  what  policy would  be  followed 
tomorrow by a European Parliament elected by universal suffrage? What would be the policy 
of a Europe whose desire for independence is broken down time and again by the crack of the 
American whip? Have not the Heads of State of the Member countries been congratulating 
themselves on the fact that the meeting in the West Indies made certain France would come 
back to  the Atlantic fold,  even  though one of  the safeguards  ensuring both European  and 
national independence was  destroyed in the process? No doubt you will say that, in deciding 
on universal  suffrage,  the Summit wanted to give  this Parliament, and a certain number of 
impatient parliamentarians, a  kind of  gadget to  keep  us  happy for  several  part-sessions  to 
come and which has already helped to  make today a kind of grand historical event. But we 
ourselves do not attach so much value to it. 
Parliament is  going to  take  a decision, but do we  know how many countries the European 
Community will in future consist of? Was there some desire to gratify France, whose term of 
presidency was  about  to  expire?  As  far  as  we  are  concerned,  there  can  be  absolutely  no 
question of approving a procedure which will fly  in the face of the countries' desire to choose 
their own  destiny,  to  decide  their own  future.  Many  speakers  have  referred  to  an  elected 
Parliament which, they say, ought to be granted real powers in order to overcome the so-called 
selfishness of the various nations. 
So  let  us  say,  in  advance,  that we  cannot accept  that a  European  parliamentary  majority, 
indeed, any majority whatsoever, including an American one, should take France's decisions 
for  her,  or  should  oppose  our  national  policy  as  laid  down  in  the  joint  programme  of 
government of the Left. 
In the present circumstances, universal suffrage, far from being the solution to  our problems, 
merely dodges them. 
Of course, we  do not doubt the honesty of those who sincerely believe that this action will 
take  us  some way  along the  road  to  democracy. Although we  agree  with  the principle on 
which it is  based, we  assert  that as  a  political  reality it  is  devoid of meaning. It is  for  this 
reason, following on the statement by our comrade and colleague Mr D'Angelosante, that we 
shall abstain from voting on this question. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Lenihan. 
Mr Lenihan. - Mr President, I think that this is  a very important debate and one which, I 
am very glad  to  say,  has  been given greater emphasis by the recent communique from  the 
Summit. I think it is important, in order to bring a realistic element into our discussion here, 
that we have regard to what the Heads of Government said at the recent meeting. First of all, I 
would refer to paragraph 12, in which they 'await with interest the proposals of the European 
Assembly, on which they wish the Council to act in 1976' -that is,  next year-and add: 'On 
this assumption, elections by direct universal suffrage could take place at any time in or after 
1978'. Now there is a request to us to act immediately and in a practical manner, and for that 
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with the Political Affairs Committee's recommendation at an appropriate time after the Heads 
of Government have made their point of view known. The most fundamental matter before us 
in  the  recommended  Convention  is  that  we  have  direct  universal  elections  on  one  day 
throughout the Community and have  them every  5 years.  This is  fundamental in order to 
ensure the participation of all European peoples in the election of this Parliament. It has been 
the absence of that participation, in my view, that has detracted from the moral and legitimate 
authority of this Parliament over the years. The proposal to hold direct elections on a specific 
day every 5 years will immediately draw the interest and invite the direct participation of our 
peoples in the European parliamentary system. I hope that, again in accordance with what the 
Summit has suggested, we  shall now dispose of the sterile argument on which should come 
first-direct elections or increasing the powers of  Parliament. Let the two go hand in hand 
between  now and  1980: gradually  increasing  powers  for  the  Parliament,  and achieving by 
1980 a positive system of direct elections. In my view, the two should not be regarded as being 
in conflict: they should evolve together in a complementary manner. Indeed, I might say that 
the Heads of Government have emphasized that fact in the fourth paragraph from the top of 
page 5 by saying: 'The competence of the European Assembly will be extended, in particular 
by granting it certain  powers  in  the  Communities'  legislative  process'.  And they  say  that 
following on their guarantee of support for direct universal elections within the Community. 
In my view, it is also important, having regard to the timetable that has been set by the Heads 
of Government, to  be practical with  regard  to  aiming at  a universal  system of elections by 
1980. In practice this is  not possible. The electoral systems in the different countries of the 
Community  vary  to  an  extraordinary  degree.  In  my  view,  the  system  of  proportional 
representation,  preferably  with  the  list  system  as  operates  in  the  Netherlands,  should  be 
operated  universally  on  either a  national  or a  regional  basis  in  time. If we  go  after  that 
particular objective, we shall be years getting agreement on it. That is a personal opinion. 
For the time being and, indeed I feel  for  some considerable time, we  must be realistic and 
leave the system of elections to the national system obtaining in each Member State. That will 
have  to  remain  the  case  even  though  we  shall  be  making  from  this  House  our  own 
recommendations about what we consider to be the desirable system of European elections. In 
practice, it is going to take some considerable time to  have anything like that implemented. 
Another  respect  in  which  I  regard  the  report  as  being  very  practical,  because  of  the 
importance once again of getting something done as  quickly as  possible, concerns the vexed 
matter of the dual mandate. I believe that Article 5 as proposed in the Convention is very well 
worded  in  this  respect  in  that it  merely states  in a  bald  fashion  that membership  of  the 
European  Parliament shall  be  compatible with  membership of  a  parliament of a  Member 
State. In other words, the situation is  open and completely flexible, and while, as  an earlier 
colleague  has  stated,  in  practice  most  members  coming  to  the  European  Parliament, 
developing as we  hope it will develop, will be whole-time members of this Parliament, at the 
same  time  it  should  not  be  ruled  out that  in  particular  cases  there  may  be  people  who 
participate in both their national  parliaments and the  European  Parliament. Therefore this 
should not be ruled out, even though in the ordinary course of events it will not be the case. 
But I am very glad that it is not regarded as being incompatible. It is still compatible, and that 
is a sensible approach to take. 
There is one matter on which I should like to take issue with the Political Affairs Committee 
and  agree  with  Mr  Patijn's  original  proposal.  This  concerns  the  question  of  national 
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have a uniform system of elections throughout the Community it would be very unwise  to 
insist on the one-man-one-vote  principle  rigidly  throughout the  Community, because  the 
electoral systems existing in various member countries already conflict in many respects with 
this principle. If one were to decide, in advance of having a universal system of elections, to 
adhere rigidly to the one-man-one-vote principle, that, in my view, would be a very unwise 
development and would only entrench electoral distortions that exist in Member States; the 
logic  of  events  calls  for  some  continuation  or  adaptation  of  the  existing  national 
representation in the present Parliament. The present representation stands at 198. It could be 
doubled, it could be trebled. I don't think it should be trebled. I say again that the number 
which Mr Patijn has put at 335 is about right but we should either maintain the proportion of 
national representation which exists in our present 198  and preserve that 198  or double that 
figure or, alternatively, adopt the arrangement which Mr Patijn recommended in his original 
report and which was  subsequently rejected  by the  Political Affairs  Committee-that is,  a 
weighted  representation  in  respect of  States  with  a  population  between  1 million  and  2.5 
million, of States  between  5  million  and  10  million, of  States  between  10  million  and 50 
million and in respect of States exceeding 50 million. Mr Patijn adopted an ingenious and, in 
my  view,  a  very  appropriate  balance  between  national  interests  and  population 
('one-man-one-vote') interests, as  set out on page 42 of the report, and a valuable compromise 
between the ultra-rigid one-man-one-vote principle, which can be very antidemocratic when 
combined with an electoral system that is  not fair and proportional, and the present national 
divisions or propositions. It gives rise to a total of 335 which in my view is  about right for a 
European  Parliament.  The  proposal  of  the  Political  Affairs  Committee  to  increase  the 
membership of this Parliament to 550 would not, in my view, be accepted by the Council of 
Ministers  and  I  appeal  to  this  House  to  be  practical  in  what  it  suggests.  We  must show 
ourselves  to  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  be  responsible  people,  and  increasing  the 
membership  of  this  Parliament  from  198  to  550  and  all  the  consequent  bureaucratic 
superstructure that that would involve would just not be acceptable to  the Heads of State or 
Government or to the Council of Ministers at the present time. To bear out what I have just 
said, going back to the request which we have received in the communique from the Heads of 
Government, I would refer to page 5, where the Heads of Government state quite specifically: 
'since the  European Assembly is  composed of  representatives  of  the  peoples  of the States 
united within the Community, each people must be represented in an appropriate manner'. 
I  finish  on this  note that we  there have  a  very direct request from  the  Heads  of State  or 
Government to this Parliament to remember that we are not just counting heads, that we must 
in addition remember that each of the peoples within the Community must be represented in 
an appropriate manner. I think it can be done either by continuing with our existing scheme 
of  proportionality  or  else  adopting  the  very  sensible  balance  which  Mr  Patijn  has 
recommended. I do not think that the Political Affairs Committee's recommendation of 550 
members in this Assembly, based on a head count throughout the Member States with their 
varying systems of election, is  practicable by 1978 or by 1980. 
We  have  made  a  great  start  in  having  this  matter  aired,  but  when  making  our  final 
recommendation to  the Council of Ministers we  must ensure that it must be practical and 
above all else remember that the Heads of State or Government want practical action on this 
question by 1978, and if we submit ridiculous proposals to  them they will be treated in the 
appropriate manner. In my view, Mr Patijn in his original report before it was  changed and 
amended by the committee, sent forward  to  the committee and to  this Parliament excellent 
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of State or Government. Thank you, Mr President. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Scholten. 
Mr Scholten. - (NL) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the adoption of Mr Patijn's report 
should  be  an  important  step  on  the  road  to  further  development  of  a  Parliamentary 
democracy in Europe. I  might say that the direct election of this Parliament would be the 
fulfilment of a wish cherished by myself and my colleagues, and I am particularly gratified 
that a compatriot of mine, Mr Patijn, has played such an important part in the preparation of 
this debate and in the debate itself. As  a Dutch Christian Democrat, I should like to add my 
congratulations to the many he has already received. 
It is  not only an extremely important step, but in view of its  probable consequences, also a 
very radical one. Mr Ortoli spoke this morning of a step of major importance. And this applies 
not only to  this  Parliament, which, whatever the  result of our voting on the amendments 
tabled  with  regard  to  its  size,  will  inevitably  be  faced  with  an  increase  in  the  number of 
Members and an extended range of activities. It is  a radical step particularly for the political 
parties to which we belong, since the national political parties will be obliged to form definite 
groupings at European level in order to contest these direct elections. New links will have to 
be considered and the existing cooperation perhaps extended. The political parties will have 
to draw up programmes at the European level, in which first of all their political principles are 
clearly expressed, but which also deal clearly and unambiguously with the concrete questions 
currently facing the citizens of Europe. 
We must bear in mind that the mere fact of holding direct elections to this Parliament is  not 
in itself sufficient to involve the European citizen actively in European democracy. We must 
show the European citizen that his day-to-day problems and his direct interests are not only 
discussed, but also promoted in this Parliament. Mr Klepsch pointed out clearly this morning 
that for this reason we as  European Members of Parliament must strengthen the link between 
voter and MP. That applies to us all collectively and individually. If it proves possible to keep 
to the proposed timetable before us-decisions in  197  6  and elections in 1978-our parties 
will have to have established European-level political programmes by 1977. I must say that I 
personally share Mr Kirk's doubts as  to whether it will be possible to  keep to this schedule 
and I shall be pleased if these proposals have become reality by 1980. 
With regard to the development of political programmes at European level it is  encouraging 
to note that my own Christian-Democratic Group, for example, is already conducting detailed 
discussions on the drafting of a programme of this kind. Just as,  despite all the criticism and 
negative commentary of our political opponents, the cooperation between the three Christian 
Democratic  groupings  in  my  country  will  lead  shortly  to  the  formation  of  a  single 
Christian-Democratic  union,  the  CDA,  cooperation  between  likeminded  parties  at  the 
European level must be developed further with a view to these direct elections. It would, after 
all,  be extremely detrimental to the growth of a  parliamentary democracy in  Europe if the 
vigour  and  effectiveness  of  a  directly  elected  Parliament were  to  be  paralysed  or at  least 
severely  weakened by excessive  political  fragmentation.  We  must  therefore  recognize  that 
political confrontations in a directly elected Parliament will be much sharper than we  have 
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compromise and agreement will,  in my view  disappear completely on the introduction of 
direct elections. 
Finally I should like to comment briefly on two central issues in today's debate, namely the 
number of  Members  in  the  future  Parliament  and  the  question  of  the  dual  mandate.  As 
regards the number of Members, I and most of my fellow Christian Democrats will give our 
support to the proposal for  550 Members contained in Mr Patijn's report. We shall do so  for 
the following reasons. Given a total population of 250 million, parliamentary representation 
by  550  men  and  women  is  by  no  means  excessive,  particularly  in  comparison  with  the 
existing national parliaments. Secondly, I would point out that in my view we  should avoid 
being faced right from the start with an under-representation of the large Member States. This 
may sound a little odd coming from a representative of one of the smaller Member States, but 
I feel  that the European cause would suffer if the citizens of the large Member States were to 
get the idea that they were under-represented in comparison with the smaller Member States. 
This  would  not  promote  confidence  in  the  representative  character  of  this  Parliament. 
Thirdly, society in general and thus political life, too, has become and continues to become 
much more complex. This means that Members of Parliament must be better informed if they 
are  to  be in  a  position  to  make  political  judgments.  In  this  light 550  is  not an  excessive 
number of representatives for the entire population of Europe. 
This last remark should leave no doubt as  to my firm conviction that the dual mandate must 
be eliminated. Already it is  a source of almost insuperable problems and in the future it will 
certainly be impossible to  fulfil  both tasks efficiently. The question is,  however, whether we 
should leave  this decision  to  the national  parliaments and the  national  political  parties  as 
proposed in Mr Patijn's report, or whether we  must arrive  at a central binding decision, as 
proposed by Mr Lautenschlager. 
I  feel  that,  in  general,  we  can  serve  Europe  best  by  not  restricting  national  freedom  of 
movement any more than is  necessary for  the attainment of our central objectives. I should 
like to apply this principle here too. For this reason I support the present version of the Patijn 
report.  It will  be  a  red-letter  day <for  Christian  Democrats  in  Europe  when we  reach  the 
milestone of directly elected representatives of  the people in the European Parliament. The 
fact that we  can begin to prepare for this today is a source of great satisfaction to us. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Broeksz. 
Mr Broeksz. - (NL) Mr President, Chapter 1 of Part Five of the EEC Treaty, relating to the 
Institutions, does not give the impression at first  reading that the Treaty contains any major 
legal obstacles to the implementation of Article 138(3). The only provision is  that elections by 
direct universal suffrage must be held in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member 
States. 
The fact  that so  many years  have  passed  since its  proposals  of  1960  before  the  European 
Parliament has again ventured to put forward proposals in a serious attempt to apply Article 
138, shows, however, that the political and legal difficulties have in fact been very substantial. 
Mr Patijn has produced very pragmatic and extremely well drawn up proposals, and I should 
like  to  associate  myself  with  the  words  of  thanks  which  my  colleague  Mr  Schmidt  has 
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proposals  is  attributable  to  the  hopeful  sounds  which  were  heard  at  the  last  Summit 
Conference in Paris; these were so  hopeful indeed that the rapporteur rightly took the view 
that the date for  the elections could be changed from  1980 to  1978. The Council, however, 
will  unfortunately not be able to deal with these proposals before the referendum has taken 
place in the United Kingdom, and it is our hope that it will be able to do so before the end of 
this year. 
The Draft Convention prepared by Mr Patijn is  eminently suitable for  a transitional period. 
But it is  unfortunate that because the Legal Affairs  Committee was  consulted at such a late 
hour its advice could no longer be incorporated in the Patijn report. It is true that in 1960 also 
a resolution was adopted which had emanated solely from the Political Affairs Committee, but 
that committee was also competent with respect to institutional questions at the time, which 
is  no longer the case. I am bringing this matter up because the Legal Affairs Committee has 
scarcely had time to formulate its advice because of the wish to discuss the Patijn report at an 
early  date  in  Parliament.  Consequently the  work  of  the  Legal  Affairs  Committee was  too 
heavily concentrated on the main points of  the  report and the amendments. Nevertheless, 
there are also other interesting questions. 
Why, for example, is a separate Convention necessary with regard to the Assembly? Why not 
a  convention  amending  Article  138,  for  example?  Must  the  Convention  relating  to  the 
Assembly be based partially on Article 236, as  it is in the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to 
the Draft Convention? I should not have thought so, because Article  138  surely represents a 
clear deviation from Article 236. Why was  an amendment to  the Treaty of Rome envisaged 
when our budgetary powers were modified? 
I  should like to  put another question. Will the European Parliament, acting in pursuance of 
the  Convention  on  the  Assembly,  'ld  therefore  elected  in  a  different way,  and  having  a 
different number of Members, be a 1  . w Parliament or a continuation of the present one? The 
answer to this question has consequences for the practical operation of Parliament as  regards, 
for example, its rules of procedure, the opening of session, etc. 
It is very tempting to dwell for a long time on this-up to now, as  far as  the first question is 
concerned, we have worked in the belief that the European Parliament chose the correct path 
in  1960.  I  would  not say  yes  as  regards  1960,  but the  Draft  Convention of  197 5  provides 
sufficient grounds for saying that, in view of its transitional nature, there are no objections to 
it. 
When drafting a proposal for a uniform electoral procedure in accordance with Article 7 the 
Legal Affairs  Commitee should take time to  examine this question. The same applies to  the 
second matter. There is no provision relating to the Assembly in the EEC Treaty which would 
prevent our regarding the Parliament as a transitional parliament and as  a direct continuation 
of the present one. When we deal with the Convention in its final form we  shall also have to 
examine whether during revision of the EEC Treaty the numbers of Members of Parliament 
per country have to be laid down, or whether criteria have to be established for the calculation 
of those numbers. According to  the  Explanatory Statement contained in  the Patijn  report, 
such criteria  already  exist.  In view  of  the possible  enlargement of the  Community in  the 
future, it would be better, in my view, to list the criteria in order not to have to adapt this part 
of the Treaty of Rome every time there is  an enlargement. 
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system. This is very much interlinked with the question of whether both the Commission and 
the  Council  will  remain  in  existence  or whether  the  Commission  becomes  a  European 
government and the Council is  transformed into a  kind of senate or disappears altogether. 
Only when that is  known will it be possible to answer the question about a bicameral system. 
Leaving  aside  the  fact  that  the  Legal  Affairs  Committee  wishes  to  change  Article  5  by 
introducing an amendment, this Article is a somewhat strange provision in its present form as 
surely a dual mandate during the transitional period must be made possible. Otherwise only 
the rich or those with pensions, in short those with other sources of income, could become 
Members of the European Parliament. 
The freedom  of action  of  a  Member of Parliament referred  to  under paragraph  11  in  the 
Lautenschlager opinion will  therefore  be illusory if  national  legislation  makes  no  material 
provision  for  membership of the European Parliament only. Article  5,  in its  present form, 
serves  little  purpose,  and  its  amendment  places  this  Parliament  before  an  unavoidable 
declaration of principle. We are speaking now about a dual mandate, but we should not forget 
that the  mandate  for  the  European  Parliament is  not a  mandate from  the  people, but an 
indirect mandate and more of a dual membership. 
For a Parliament such as we now have, with a task which is almost exclusively advisory, that is 
no drawback.  But each additional power which this Parliament acquires will  make it  more 
difficult to fulfil  a dual mandate and could cause more conflicts between the various duties. 
The mandate of the European Parliament will certainly entail more work. 
I do not believe in the superman who could carry out both tasks simultaneously, as  depicted 
by Mr Kirk. Apart from  that,  it  is  questionable whether Members  can  really  justify a dual 
mandate to their electors; I do not believe they can. Members are constantly complaining here 
about the difficulties  of dual  membership, but when the elections come up for  discussion, 
reference to the difficulties is avoided. 
It was  not my intention to  discuss  the Legal  Affairs  Committee's proposal  that Parliament 
should have a smaller number of members than is  provided for in the report, but I should like 
to point out that the suggestion by my fellow countryman, Mr Scholten, that the large States 
would  be  under-represented  if  the  Legal  Affairs  Committee's  proposal  were  adopted,  is 
completely unfounded. 
Further, I wonder whether the list of functions stated in Article 6 to be incompatible with the 
office  of  representative  should  not  in  due  time  also  include  that  of  paid  adviser  to  the 
institutions and bodies of the Community? 
We do  not anticipate  that the Council will  have  many objections  to  the adoption  of  this 
Convention. Should this view prove  to  be incorrect, however, Parliament will  really have  to 
apply Article 175 in a few years' time. It would in any case be interesting to ascertain what the 
Court understands by the gradual introduction of a provision. Is  it possible to  postpone the 
introduction of a provision for years and yet speak of a gradual introduction? I doubt it very 
much. We are discussing today the direct election of Members of this Parliament. But no-one 
will  have  forgotten  that  the  struggle  for  the  rights  of  Parliament  will  proceed  without 
interruption; we  must continue to demand more powers for  Parliament. Whatever the case 
today will be an important milestone on the long uphill road towards direct elections and the 
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otherwise Parliament will have to have recourse to its rights. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Johnston. 
Mr Johnston. - Mr President, I would like straight away not only to compliment Mr Patijn 
upon his excellent work, but at the same time to pay tribute to his country, the Netherlands, 
which, of all the States in our Community, perhaps more than any other has been consistently 
in the van of those who have worked to shape a democratic European union. The fact that I 
do not extend this tribute is not to be taken as  evidence either of a lack of enthusiasm on my 
part or of any inability on the part of the cold and nordic Scot to emulate the Latin rhetoric of 
my French and Italian colleagues. It is simply that I have not got any time. 
Firstly, it is  worth reminding the world outside which is  now watching and reporting us that 
the concept of  direct  elections  is  not an  idea  thought up by the  European  Parliament to 
improve its  strength, but it is  something built into the Treaties to  which every State in our 
Community is  committed. It is  equally worth  reminding both the British and the Danish 
governments of this fact.  In joining the Community they committed themselves to  playing 
their part in building a democratic Europe, and I do not think that their Paris reservations did 
either of them any credit. 
Secondly, I would like to refer briefly to two matters, both of which are deeply important if we 
are indeed to evolve a sensitive and representative European Parliament to which wide powers 
can  in  time  readily  be  given.  I  am  disappointed  that  Mr  Patijn  avoided  the  question  of 
uniform electoral procedure. He said in paragraph 29  that the rapporteur himself 'does not 
feel  that the time has come to propose standardization'; he felt that his discussions in various 
Member States  led  him to  the conclusion  that the time was  not appropriate. And then of 
course,  in  paragraph  53  of  his  report,  he  refers  to  the  fact  that  according  to  the  new 
Convention, the electoral system  should fall  within the competence of each Member State 
while the European Parliament should draw up by 1980  a  proposal for  a uniform electoral 
system. I would have liked Mr Patijn to have firmly asserted his commitment to proportional 
representation now. In February last year, Liberals in Britain polled nearly 20 °/o  of the vote, 
which even with the present representation in this Parliament, in which Great Britain has 36 
Members, should have given us 6 or 7 Members here. We have 2. 
Under the British system, it would certainly be possible for  Liberals or any other minority 
party  to  poll  over  20 °/o  and  obtain  no  representation  at  all.  I  know  that  the  British 
Conservative  Party has  played its  part in sustaining this  crude, divisive  and fundamentally 
unjust  system,  but  I  thought  that  they  were  turning  away  from  it;  I  was  therefore  very 
disappointed to hear the remarks made by Sir Derek Walker-Smith. France, too, has a system 
which distorts the democratic will. In my view, we  should now, as  a Parliament, make clear 
our commitment to proportional representation. 
In paragraph 48, Mr Patijn says  that it was  argued by those whom he consulted 'that there 
should  be  adequate  representation  of  national  political  interests  and  of  regions  in  the 
European  Parliament', and  he goes  on  at  the  end  of  paragraph  49  to  say  that 'while  the 
concept of a second Chamber is interesting, it does not in his view fall within the scope of his 
report'.  I  believe  that this  Parliament must turn its  attention very soon to  the question of 
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previous speaker about the various repercussions this has, but I think it is urgent that we turn 
our attention to thinking seriously about it. Personally I am a federalist. If you like, I am a 
believer in !'Europe des regions. But apart from my beliefs, there is no doubt at all in my mind 
that  as  time  passes  the  privileged  position  of  Ireland  or  Denmark,  by  comparison  with 
Scotland or Wales or Bavaria, cannot be easily sustained and will come under criticism. If a 
second Chamber is  evolved, similar perhaps to the Bundesrat, clearly this would remove the 
justification for a small nation weighting which is built into the Patijn proposals, and I accept 
the  remarks  in  this  regard  made  by  my  colleague  Lord  Gladwyn.  Direct  elections,  Mr 
President, will change this Parliament fundamentally. It will  probably become a much more 
divided,  a  much more argumentative and  perhaps a  much less  pleasant place.  But without 
them the necessity of a democratic Europe can never be achieved. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Brewis. 
Mr Brewis.  - Mr President,  I  want to  restrict my remarks  to  two  issues,  the  number of 
Members and the joint mandate. Personally I  prefer the smaller number of  355  because  I 
believe  the  number should be  related  to  functions  to  be  carried  out. At Westminster the 
House of Commons has 635 members, but one has to bear in mind that only some hundred 
members have to form the Government and the remainder have to man the innummerable 
committees which exist in our parliament. Now in this Parliament we do not have to form a 
government and there is  definitely an  optimum number of members who  should be on a 
committee. If we were to have no dual mandate, I believe that if membership was  limited to 
only one committee we might very well be rather underemployed in this Parliament, even at 
355. 
I want to turn, like my friend Mr Johnston, to the representation of smaller countries. I think 
it is  rather amusing to see that under the larger proposals of the Political Affairs Committee 
some of the smaller countries get an Irishman's rise: for example, Denmark goes down from 
17  to  14  and Ireland from  13  to  10. Now I appreciate the need for sovereign States to have a 
possibility of being represented on each of our committees, and the number of 6 accorded to 
Luxembourg is  perhaps the minimum which is  possible.  But Mr President, we  should also 
take into account the representation of smaller countries on the other institutions of the EEC. 
I  refer  to  the  Commission  and  also  to  the  Council  of  Ministers,  where,  of  course,  the 
representatives  of  Luxembourg have  always  carried out a very  distinguished role.  However, 
Luxembourg is  not the only small country in  Europe. We are  all  conscious of the historic 
fragmentation  of Europe. What about a  country like Andorra for  example? If this  country 
decided to be independent and to join the EEC I do not suppose anyone would object. But 
should a country like Andorra with a few  thousand inhabitants have not only 6 members of 
Parliament  but  corresponding  representation  on  the  Commission  and  the  Council  of 
Ministers, and the accompanying power of veto which would go with it? This is  perhaps a 
hypothetical question, but the over-representation of smaller States seems grossly unfair to 
countries like Scotland, which has its own traditions, its own legal system, its own church and 
other institutions, and has contributed a great deal to  Europe in the past. Although it has a 
bigger population than Denmark, we  in Scotland can expect at the most 8 Members, which 
may be compared with  17  for  Denmark under the present proposals. I  think, Sir,  once we 
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independence and therefore going in exactly the wrong direction for a united Europe. 
Turning now to  the dual  mandate, I  am sure that what we  need here  is  interchangeability 
between the European Parliament and the national parliaments. There should, of course, be 
facilities  in the  national  parliaments for  European  Members  to  attend party meetings and 
reunions, but I think in addition service in the European Parliament should be given credit 
and counted as  qualification for ministerial office at home. I want to quote here the words of 
Michael Stewart,  a  former  British  Socialist foreign  secretary.  He said our aim should be  to 
ensure that an able and zealous politician with legitimate hopes for his future can believe that 
work in Strasbourg will neither damage these hopes nor separate him from the main current 
of British politics. Now the possibility of promotion in the European Parliament is  virtually 
nil  - not even  to  a  Commissioner's bench. I think interchangeability should therefore be 
encouraged and no one should look on service in the European Parliament as  being a career 
in itself. For this reason, Mr President, I shall support the compatibility of the dual mandate 
when the amendment is  proposed. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mrs  Carettoni Romagnoli. 
Mrs Carettoni Romagnoli. - (I) Mr President, my comments on this problem stem from 
the position adopted by the group to which I belong in the Italian Senate, i.e. the intependent 
left, a group greatly interested in Europe, very much in favour of direct elections and whose 
leader  is  Mr  Parri,  who  presented  a  draft  law  in  Italy-but  only  in  Italy-for  the 
implementation of direct elections. Some of you will certainly remember the presence here 
some years  ago  of Senator Parri, a senior member of the European Parliament. If my group 
thought it useful at the time to  cause a shock, to  take this step for a single country, all  the 
more reason why we  now believe that election to the European Parliament by direct universal 
suffrage-even  if  this  is  far  removed  from  that  laid  down  in  the  Treaties-should  be 
considered in a favourable light. 
However,  Mr  President,  we  have  been  called  here  today  to  vote  on  a  document,  our 
rapporteur's report. I find his a somewhat minimalist approach and, in actual fact, although he 
is  well  aware  of the size  and seriousness of the problems he does what is  known in skiing 
circles as a slalom. In other words, when faced with major issues he either fails  to tackle them 
or shelves them or plays them down. I am not blaming him for this. He is  only too aware of 
the importance of this issue, but he knows how to proceed in an area strewn with pitfalls. On 
the other hand one only needs to have followed today's debate to become aware of the infinite 
number of gradations between opponents, don't knows and adherents. 
So we are on very thorny ground and my criticism is  not directed at the rapporteur. But these 
flaws  do exist and to my mind create doubt as  to what positions to adopt when we  come to 
vote on election  to  the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, which I consider, 
and I repeat, to be an important and fundamental issue. We ought to have gone much further 
and shown greater courage especially in  this  European  Parliament, since  this,  I  feel  would 
have pushed the governments towards a point of no return-and, on this point, might I say, 
Mr President,  that obligations  undertaken  at  summits  have  not always  been  automatically 
respected-and would have allowed us to reach a truly positive conclusion. 
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stage, for we are in favour of every step forward that can be made. Mr President, we consider it 
a  positive  step  forward  that  we  are  now  discussing  institutions.  Unfortunately,  however, 
progress is  not being made in other fields and this is  why we  have so  to speak been 'guided' 
towards this sector though even here the light is  interspersed with gloom. 
We think that, even given these limitations to achieve European elections still provides a very 
benefical shock, if  I may use the term by which I defined the draft law on direct elections 
proposed in Italy. But we  are convinced, Mr President, and as  Mr D'Angelosante said before 
me, that this will not be the end of the discussion. After this evening's voting I believe that 
still  more time and discussions  will  be  needed before  any definite  conclusion  is  possible. 
Thus, Mr President, my abstention will not be an expression of any doubt of the aims but of 
my dissatisfaction with the limited nature of the proposal made by the European Parliament, a 
Parliament  which  is  to  be  elected  by  universal  suffrage,  the  party  most  affected  and 
protagonist of this process which is  now beginning. If anything, I hope my abstention will be 
an incentive to greater and bolder things at the greatest possible speed. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr McDonald. 
Mr McDonald. - Mr President, I would like first of all to compliment Mr Patijn on his work 
on this report on the adoption of a draft Convention introducing elections to the European 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage. I appreciate the amount of dedicated work he has put 
into this, and I think that it is very appropriate that the report itself should be the subject of 
such  a  very  full  and  interesting  debate  here  today.  I  believe  that  direct  elections  to  the 
European Parliament will be a significant step forward towards greater democratization of the 
Community and, indeed, a significant contribution towards European union. 
I  should like,  Mr  President,  to  confine  myself  briefly  to  one  or two  points  that  I  do  not 
particularly agree  with in  the document. I  would like  to  say  at  the outset that I  think the 
document as  a whole is  a remarkable one and it is  one that I can subscribe to and support 
practically in toto. But I should like to avail  myself of this opportunity to point out that my 
people in a referendum just two and a half years ago expressed themselves overwhelmingly in 
favour  of entering Europe,  in  favour  of  joining this  Community, and we  were  influenced 
greatly in that decision by the Treaty of Accession. Under Article 138  of the EEC Treaty, as 
you all know, our country had 10 of the 198 seats in this Parliament. That is just two years ago, 
and in the past two years our people have maintained their devotion to  Europe. I think that 
the vast majority of people, despite the adverse economic conditions, are  more than happy 
and pleased, and indeed extremely lucky, that they voted in that way back in May 1972. 
However, how will our population feel now, Mr President, when they learn that it is  proposed 
under this document to reduce their representation from 10 seats in a Parliament of 198  to 10 
seats in a Parliament of 550, particularly when they note the great increases in the numbers to 
be elected by other Member States? I  know that arguments have been put forward  from  all 
sides of the House on this very topic. To my mind this will be seen as  an attempt to  push a 
proud and democratically-minded people into insignificant obscurity at parliamentary level. I 
was  surprised,  and  perhaps  a  little  pained,  to  hear  my  colleague  from  the  European 
Conservative benches, Sir Derek Walker-Smith, just a short while ago bemoan the fact  that 
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disadvantage when compared with people in the southern part of Ireland. I should also like to 
point out very  forcibly  to  the  honourable Member that his  particular system  is  apparently 
rolling along quite happily at present, when those people are  not represented here at all.  I 
think that is something to be regretted and I would share the views expressed by Mr Johnston 
when he touched, perhaps in a different context, on that same question. 
We must, therefore, act not only in the interests of Ireland but also in the interests of other 
small countries, bearing in mind the desirability of further enlargement of the Community, at 
no  remote  date,  Mr  President,  by  the  adhesion  of  countries  whose  democratic  conditions 
make them desirable partners. 
The  importance  of  public  opinion  cannot  be  overstressed.  If  the  powers  of  national 
parliaments are  on the decline, they can only be counterbalanced by a  minimum effective 
representation in this Parliament; since we are talking about a single Chamber this is  all the 
more reason why Member States must be adequately represented and must have a minimum 
number to  represent  the  various  parties,  groups  and,  indeed,  important  political  views  in 
them. 
In  this  regard,  I  perhaps share  the views  expressed earlier this  morning by Mr Kirk.  It  is 
desirable  to  ensure  that  in  a  full-time  and  enlarged  directly-elected  Parliament,  a  small 
country such as ours has the minimum representation necessary so that we can be represented 
on each parliamentary committee. The proposal that is least satisfactory in this document, as  I 
see it, is  the one that would give us  10  seats out of 550. We must not, I think-and I should 
like to impress this on the rapporteur-make the mistake of placing mathematical formulas 
and  mathematical  scales  above  considerations  of  history  and  geography.  This,  I  think,  is 
particularly significant to  those countries that form  the peripheral areas  of our Community. 
I know that Mr Patijn, while working on his report, has travelled right across the Community 
and  has  experienced  at  first  hand  the  difficulties  and  problems  which  affect  the  various 
Members in the Community. After his detailed study, he proposed in his original document a 
solution and a formula which we would go along with; but we very much regret the reduction 
to  10. In the absence of a second Chamber which could preserve the national presence more 
clearly-most democracies  have  a weighting in  the Upper House designed to  preserve  the 
special interests of the component parts of their democracies marked by different traditions 
and different beginnings, different regions  and,  indeed, in some countries, different ethnic 
groups-there is  a great danger of insufficient representation. Mr President, as  I see  it,  this 
could produce a very negative result in that under-represented peoples would be so frustrated 
and their powers so  reduced that their only hope of making themselves heard would be by 
obstructionist tactics. This, I think, would be most regrettable and it certainly would not be in 
the interests of a more dynamic, or indeed, a more European Parliament bravely shouldering 
the responsibilities that the European Parliament of the future  must have, with the courage 
and the capacity to undertake them. 
I  am  firmly  convinced  that  through  direct  elections  to  a  greater,  developed  European 
Parliament, we  shall  be  able  to  give  the institutions of  this  Community the support-the 
impetus-necessary to  ensure  that the  people who directly  elect  the  Members  of  a  larger 
European Parliament will  feel  justly proud and indeed get a positive return for their interest 
and their efforts. 
(Applause) 
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Mr Nsrgaard. - (DK) Mr President, I should like to thank the Socialist Group for allowing 
a  representative  of  the  small  group  of  Danish  Social-Democrats  to  take  up  some  of  its 
speaking time. We are  all  the  more  grateful  as  our opinion  of  our colleague  Mr  Patijn's 
proposal is completely different from that of the rest of the Group and apparently from that of 
the great majority of those here. 
We  also  appreciate  Mr  Patijn's  achievement  in  drawing  up  the  report  and  the  Draft 
Convention. 
Although we  have  acceded to  the Treaty of Rome, thereby accepting the principle of direct 
elections to Parliament, we cannot recommend the adoption of this proposal. 
In the final vote, we shall vote against the Draft Convention for two main reasons. 
First of all, we do not think a proposal of this kind should be adopted in this House before it 
has  been  decided  whether  or  not  the  United  Kingdom  will  be  remaining  within  the 
Community. It is obvious that if the United Kingdom withdraws the proposal will have to be 
modified. It is  also our view,  however, that if the United Kingdom remains a member of the 
Community-which we very much hope will be the case-it would be unreasonable towards 
such  a  relatively  large  group  as  the  British  Labour  Party  if,  just  before  it  entered  this 
Parliament, we were to lay down the rules according to which it would be elected without its 
having had the least say in drafting them. 
We shall also vote against Mr Patijn's proposal because it does not give any guarantee of a dual 
mandate. 
It is  perfectly true that the report states that the dual mandate may be retained, but in practice 
there will be very great difficulties involved in retaining it if Mr  Patijn's proposal is  adopted. 
We have just had elections in Denmark. One Member of this Parliament only was re-elected 
by a bare margin. He was the leader of a party which was  represented here in Parliament and 
which very nearly had to  leave the Danish Folketing at the double-quick, as  the margin was 
only 0.02 °/o. If 0.02 °/o  of the voters had decided not to vote for his party, it would no longer 
have been in the Folketing-it would no longer have existed. If, therefore, we  have a ruling 
that a Member can remain in this Parliament for up to 5 years, we run the risk that there will 
be representatives in the House for 4 years and 11  months who are  not represented at all  in 
the national parliament and may have completely different views on the decisions to be taken 
here and at home on matters affecting the future of Europe. 
We feel there should be the greatest possible agreement between the political views expressed 
by Members here in this Parliament and those expressed in the national parliaments. For the 
time being, we  regarded the dual mandate simply as  a guarantee of this, and as  long as  no 
practicable  proposal  is  presented,  we  cannot  accept  a  ruling  which,  in  practice,  makes 
impossible the exercise of the dual mandate and, hence, the agreement between the political 
standpoints at home and in the European Parliament. 
We think that Mr Patijn's proposal is  considerably better than the amendment tabled by the 
Legal Affairs Committee, which states quite clearly that the dual mandate is  inadmissible 
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we  do feel  there is  a danger of 'super-Europeans' being elected to  this Parliament by a tiny 
minority of the national electorate. If universal elections to  this consultative organ are  held 
without any relationship to the national elections, only a very small group of people might 
take part in the elections and the results could be extremely arbitrary. For instance, there may 
be people who are very enthusiastic about Europe, and this is all right-but it is  not all right if 
it does  not reflect  the  power structure in  the  national  parliament, which also  chooses  the 
government. 
The proposal we  are  dealing with today has  to  be approved unanimously by the Council of 
Ministers.  But the Council cannot start to  consider the proposal  until  it has  been decided 
whether the United Kingdom is  to continue as  a Member of the Community. Why then do 
we have to pass a proposal of this kind in Parliament now? 
Why not give us  extra time to see whether we  cannot modify this proposal so  that there is 
some  hope of its  being supported  in  the  Council  of  Ministers  by the  Danish and  British 
Governments? We know it cannot be approved as  it now stands. Both the Danish and the 
British Governments will oppose it. There is  every possibility that we can draw up a proposal 
which could be adopted unanimously here and which the British and Danish Governments 
could also  accept.  But if  we  adopt a  proposal  we  know to  be unacceptable,  I  feel  we  are 
damaging the concept of Europe as  it will seem that Mr Patijn's thorough and valuable work 
will not be dealt with as  seriously as  it deserves. 
I therefore submit that this proposal be dealt with in the same way as bills are dealt with in all 
democratic national parliaments. It should be given its first reading here and then sent back to 
the committees, so  that we  can  discuss  it further there and work out a better guarantee of 
agreement between political standpoints at home and here. We can them submit a proposal 
when  we  know  whether  or  not  the  United  Kingdom  is  to  remain  a  Member  of  the 
Community. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Lord Reay. 
Lord Reay.  - Mr President, I hope the rapporteur will appreciate that, confined as  I am in 
my speaking-time, I must compress my compliments to him as  much as  the substance of my 
speech.  I  will  only  say  that  I  think  his  document  is  realistic,  that  it  is  sensitive  to  the 
traditional needs and to the strength of the traditional factor in Member States and that it is 
wise as  much for what it leaves out as  for what it includes. 
I think he was right to treat the question of powers as if it were an unrelated subject, although 
of course it is not, and right to leave discretion to Member States on suc:h matters as voting-age 
and laws with respect to  political parties, giving an opportunity, as  he puts, it, for a  de facto 
standardization to grow up spontaneously without being imposed. 
Mr  President,  I  should  like  to  raise  two  matters.  The  first  concerns  something which  is 
contained  in  the  note  to  Article  1  on  page  13  of  the  report.  Article  1  provides  that  the 
representatives of the peoples in the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal 
suffrage.  In  the  note  to  Article  1 it is  stated, and  I  quote,  that 'the terms "universal" and 
"direct" mean that the elections shall take place throughout the territory of the Community 
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have  always  understood that the 'universal suffrage'  had a much broader meaning and that 
typically  it  meant the suffrage  which was  not based  on  property qualifications  and other 
qualifications such as  sex and was  limited only by disqualifications on grounds of minority 
and some other grounds such as  convictions for criminal offences. It therefore seems to  me 
that it might may be a  source  of legal  confusion  in the future  if  this  Parliament gives  to 
understand that when it employs the term 'universal suffrage' it means something different 
and far narrower than what the term has traditionally meant. I should therefore like to ask the 
rapporteur, if he has sufficient time, whether he could clarify in his concluding remarks his 
position and his intentions on that matter. 
For  my second  point,  Mr  President,  I  should  like  to  take  up  something which  Mr  Kirk 
touched on earlier today and to say that as things are now arranged we seem to be in danger of 
getting  behindhand  with  the  plans  to  introduce  a  uniform  electoral  system  for  the 
Community. On the one hand, each Member State as  a result of this Convention is going to 
have to draft a law to enable elections to be held in 1978, or as  soon as  possible thereafter and 
is to be free  to do so, as Mr Patijn points out on page 21  and I quote him, in a manner 'which 
corresponds to its political traditions and structures'. On the other hand, under Article 7 of the 
Convention, the European  Parliament would draw  up by  1980 -and the date  is  still  to  be 
198 0, as  I understand, not 1978-a uniform electoral system for elections to be held after that 
date. In other words, it  is  foreseen  that the national solutions which will be devised for  the 
first direct elections will apply for only one legislative period. In that case, surely, it would be 
desirable, before Member States set about framing their laws for that first election, that at least 
a passive agreement if not a formal agreement, a rough outline of a agreement if not one with 
all its details completed, should have been reached between Member States for the common 
system that was  to be introduced for later elections. There must therefore be discussion of the 
traditions of Member States in this matter. Speaking for myself, and taking up the point that 
Mr Johnston referred to,  I should like to say that out of consideration for what has been the 
practice  in  the great  majority  of  Member States,  and  out of  considerations  of  justice,  the 
uniform  system  will  have  to  include  at  least  a  very  substantial  element  of  proportional 
representation. 
Mr President, in conclusion may I say  that, in view both of the inherent importance of this 
question and of our authority in this matter, today's debate on Mr Patijn's report is extremely 
important. 
I only hope that this Parliament will shortly demonstrate as  much activity as  it has today and 
express as  strong a demand for  an early decision as  it has  today on that other outstanding 
question, the question of a single seat for  the institutions of the Community, on which our 
opinion is  of equal importance and where the delivery of an opinion by us  in view of the 
waste  and  the  inconvenience  of  present  arrangements  is  long  overdue.  Thank  you,  Mr 
President. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Hill. 
Mr Hill. - Mr President, I shall speak very briefly. 
First of all I thank Mr Patijn for the excellence of his report, and secondly may I say that this 
is  a  historic occasion, when for  the first  time it does seem that real  progress is  going to  be 
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elections has  been kept quite separate from  the evolution  of the powers  of this Assembly, 
because, as  was  rightly said in an editorial in yesterday's  Times,  it has come at an extremely 
awkward  time  for  the  United  Kingdom.  It  will  perhaps  give  further  ammunition  to  the 
anti-Marketeers in my country, and it may in some minor degree sway the views of the public 
which in the future we hope to represent. 
I fully agree with my colleague, Sir Derek Walker-Smith, when he refers  to two  points: the 
reason of law which no renegotiations can change, and the necessity for close of links between 
this Parliament and the people. I think we all know the state of this Parliament, inasmuch as I 
think it is  impossible for a Member to serve in his national parliament and in the European 
Parliament for the simple reason that he really is  not the superman that certain people try to 
pretend we  are.  He has  not only a double mandate: he has his constituency work as  well. A 
double  mandate would  be  a  double  mandate  only of Members who  have  strong seats-in 
other words, Members with a good majority. In fact, many of us know that if we were fighting 
critical seats during this period of change in Europe, many of us  would not be here for very 
long.  Indeed,  without  direct  elections  we  should,  perhaps,  always  be  the  victims  of 
unscrupulous political opponents who made the most out of our European Parliament work. 
Certainly I think Lord Gladwyn, when he said there should be an organic link between the 
House  of  Commons and  Europe,  was  quite  right,  but I  do  not think the organic  link  is 
membership of both Houses. I think the organic link should be some honorary status which 
gave us  the facilities and the opportunity to mingle with our parliamentary colleagues in the 
United Kingdom and at the same time get their views. Mr Lenihan, I regret to say,  has said 
that 550 Members would not be acceptable to the Council of Ministers. This I doubt, because 
if  you  look at  the  figures  for  the  larger States-and, gentlemen, you will  be  real  working 
Members  of  Parliament  if  you  are  elected  to  Europe  directly  will  have  a  constituency of 
something like half a million constituents if the figure of 550 is accepted. Consequently, you 
will  not be  able  to  say  that you  will  not be  busy. The volume of work  in committee will 
increase. There will  be more committees, and indeed there will  be more lobbying from  the 
outside world, and I think by and large we shall be working four weeks of each month rather 
than,  as  now,  one  full  week  in  the  plenary  part-session  and  perhaps  four  other days  in 
committee. 
Mr  Lenihan  said  we  must  be  represented  in  an  appropriate  manner.  To  my  mind,  this 
appropriate manner is direct election only to  the European Parliament. We should then take 
our work extremely seriously,  and this would exclude all  those who wish  to  shine in both 
national and European chambers. 
Mr President, I hope I have kept within my time. Mr Patijn himself has agreed with me. He 
says on page  11  that the continuously increasing workload borne by representatives has long 
since made it impossible for them properly to carry out both national and European duties. 
This is  a half-way house. We want to be as efficient and as good as  we  can at our jobs. 
Let us concentrate on Europe. Let us be directly elected, but let us still retain some honorary 
links with our parliaments in our Member States. Thank you. 
(Applause) 
President. - I call Mr Andreotti. 
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his report. 
Although the present discussion has many legal aspects the main issue is obviously a political 
one. It means implementing without delay the possibilities  resulting from  the recent Paris 
Summit and pressing for a decision for which we  have been waiting for many years. 
It is  well worth recalling that the present European Parliament has indisputable democratic 
legitimacy,  this  being derived  from  the  personal  appointment each  of  us  has  in our own 
countries.  However,  direct  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  itself  will  mark  a 
considerable step forward in Europe's own history. 
But, we  must not forget that there will be little use in having a European Parliament in 1978 
elected directly by the European peoples if by then we  have  not taken many more sensible 
steps forward in order to widen the effective powers of Parliament and the Commission. We 
must rededicate ourselves to this task with all our hearts and minds. 
I  should  just  like  to  make  two  recommendations on the problem under discussion  today. 
Firstly, there should not be too great an increase in the number of Members. It is  not at all 
true to say that efficiency is linked to numbers; in fact, the opposite is  often the case. 
A  little while ago  Mr McDonald bemoaned the fact  that the representatives  of the smaller 
countries might be frustrated  by massive disproportion; in the event of any enlargement of 
the  Community it would  certainly be  easier to  increase  the  total  number of seats  than  to 
reduce the present number of representatives. 
Secondly, on the point of the link with national parliaments, perhaps a compromise between 
the  political  advantages  of  the  present  system  and  the  practical  difficulties  of  the  dual 
mandates could be found by creating a special status in the separate national parliaments for 
members who  are  also  European  parliamentarians. They could,  for  example, be  exempted 
from certain duties, such as  attendance at committees, acting as  rapporteur, etc., and not be 
included in the requisite quorum for voting on certain issues. The calendars of the various 
parliaments could also be brought into line with that of the European Parliament. 
There are cogent arguments both for and against compatibility of the dual mandate. Certain 
countries  stressing  the  incompatibility of  the  dual  mandate at home have  not in  practice 
strengthened  the  real  representativeness  of  the  assemblies.  By  way  of  contrast,  in  France, 
where there is  no incompatibility between being a local administrator and a parliamentarian, 
the combination has a two-way advantage. 
The  amendments  allow  for  a  transitional  period,  and  it  may  well  be  that  a  prolonged 
transitional period will solve the problem de facto. When an incompatibility arises it would 
surely be possible to find a practical way of avoiding a complete break between European and 
national parliamentarians. In Italy, for example, European parliamentarians would have to be 
called upon at least to take part in the extraordinary assembly which elects the President of 
the Republic, but these are matters which must be studied in greater detail. 
I would like to end by agreeing with Mr Patijn's statement that there is  a need to prepare the 
peoples for the creation of the new Community Parliament. I would even go so far as  to say 
that a  method  must be  found  which  will  enable  the  various  European  peoples  to  follow 
satisfactorily, via  the press or other medium, the work done by Parliament. This has  rarely 
been the case up to now, either for the European Parliament or even the Council of Ministers. 
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had specific consequences in certain national sectors. 
We  must make  the  Parliament elected  by  universal  suffrage  felt  to  be  a  living  reality  for 
European citizens, not only in economic but in political, social and cultural spheres. 
For young persons in particular this will be an education in itself and a guarantee of freedom 
and effective democratic development. 
(Applause from the centre) 
President. - I call the rapporteur. 
Mr Patijn,  rapporteur.  - (NL) Mr President, I do  not think that any of the 25  preceding 
speakers today will expect me, as  rapporteur, to be able to answer everyone and to be able to 
take up all the comments made. 
I did not keep my speech this morning down to 10 or 15  minutes in order to come back now 
and elaborate blithely for a  further three quarters of an  hour.  I  intend to  make only a few 
general comments, and to  deal with matters of detail when, as  rapporteur, I come to speak 
about the amendments to  the various  articles. We can  then close  the debate  at  6  p.m.,  as 
arranged, and proceed to the vote. 
I should like to express my extremely warm thanks to all speakers for the way in which they 
received  the  report  presented  by  me  on  behalf of  the  Political  Affairs  Committee. Their 
attitude has been similar to my own attitude to the problem: no castles in the air, no attempt 
to attain paradise all  at once, but a sober assessment of what is  possible and necessary in the 
political situation of 1975. That was  my starting point, which has been adopted both by the 
Political Affairs Committee and the Legal Affairs Committee and by the vast majority of the 
speakers in this debate. For this I am grateful. In making this general comment I do not wish 
to do anyone an injustice, including those speakers who find for whatever reasons that they 
are unable to vote for this Convention. I shall revert to that point later. 
I  should also  like  by way  of an  introductory remark to  say  something about the  political 
context in which this Convention is  being drawn  up. Of course, the current interest in the 
subject has been increased by the fact  that a positive decision was  reached by a majority of 
votes at the Summit Conference a month ago. Nevertheless, current interest would have been 
very great even without the decision at the Summit Conference, because we are wrestling with 
problems, which have been described by many Members here in colourful terms, such as  the 
lack of legitimate authority on the  part of representatives  in  the European  Parliament, the 
dual  mandate  and  the  struggle  to  increase  the  powers  of this  Parliament.  I  expressed  my 
conviction this morning that the powers will only come when there is a full-time Parliament. 
I regard elections as the only way, the only means of exerting greater pressure in this direction 
from  within  this  Parliament.  Mr  Ortoli  rightly  said  this  morning  that  there  is  a  logical 
connection between powers and elections. The connection is not such that we cannot develop 
one without the other. I am glad that the majority of Members have  taken  the same view. 
Election by a people is  not solely dependent on whether or not the powers are adequate. It is 
of course gratifying and commendable if these powers exist in large measure, but it is  not an 
absolute precondition. 
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Schmidt has  rightly  said  that what concerns us  in  this  matter is  not our powers  but the 
European citizen. 
Reference was  also made to the European citizen by Mr Bordu, but in a somewhat different 
context.  Mr  Bordu  said  that  the  Parliament  had  obtained  a  gadget  from  the  Summit 
Conference; that is a nice American word, Mr Bordu, which it does my heart good to hear you 
use.  It could perhaps indeed be called a gadget, something with which we  could pleasantly 
keep ourselves occupied, if it were not that at the same time, and this you know from recent 
years,  we  have  been  occupying ourselves  on  all  kinds  of  fronts  with  the  question  of  our 
powers. Parliamentary elections are  not a game in your country, nor in mine, and European 
elections will  not be one either. I agree with you that inflation and employment are  much 
greater problems from the social point of view. The one does not exclude the other, however; 
we  must advance on both fronts and try to take measures on both of them. If we  had to  tie 
parliamentary powers and the control of inflation to the European elections, then indeed we 
could give up trying to make further progress. 
In this connection I should also like to make a comment to Mr Johnston. Mr Johnston spoke 
in general about the regions of Europe. I: am interested in that problem; it is one for which we 
shall have to find a solution. But the problem of your rapporteur was that he had to concern 
himself with nine Member States find  not with regions or countries within a Member State. 
We all have our own problems in that sector, and are all seeking solutions of our own. 
For example,  I  know that in  the United Kingdom original  solutions  are  being sought for 
regional  representation,  possibly  via  regional  parliaments.  But  you  must  not  blame  your 
rapporteur for being constrained by the fact that the Treaty establishing the EEC was  signed 
by States, and that it was with these States that he had to concern himself. When the system is 
elaborated in detail at a later stage, firstly  within the United Kingdom and secondly when 
deciding on uniform procedure, we  shall of course have  to  take  into account the problems 
which  play an important role within the regions.  But you could not expect, and I  do  not 
believe that you did expect, your rapporteur to find direct solutions to this problem. 
I should also like to say a word in this connection to Mrs Carettoni Romagnoli, who finds my 
approach minimalistic and intends for that reason to abstain from voting. I find her attitude 
more positive than that of her colleague, Mr D'Angelosante, who is  not going to vote for this 
Convention for quite different reasons. I shall revert to that point in due course. 
The approach is  perhaps minimalistic, but in my view and in the view of the majority of the 
Members of this Parliament it is  the correct approach at this point in the development of the 
European Community. Of course I could have worked out a uniform procedure; of course I 
could have  put forward  suggestions on that point. The proposals would not have  appeared 
until three years later, however, and we should only have reached agreement here after debates 
lasting many long weeks, if we  had managed to reach agreement at all. But, as  I said in my 
introduction  already,  the important thing for  me was  that the  European  elections  should 
come soon. The introduction  of elections  in  the  short term, as  envisaged  by the Summit 
Conference, entails a limited framework for  the first  elections. That was  the choice I made, 
and I admit that it is minimalistic. Many Members have spoken of a transitional period in this 
connection. We shall look into that question in more detail when laying down the uniform 
procedure. At least, that was what I had in mind. 
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referendum and the obligatory retention of the dual mandate. 
With regard to the dual mandate, I prefer to comment in the context of the amendments to 
Article 5. With regard to the British referendum, I should just like to say a few words. 
I  sympathize  with  Mr  N0rgaard's  problems;  I  also  see  why,  in  view  of  the  reservations 
expressed during the Summit Conference, he holds the views that he does at the present time. 
I  just hope that, whatever the result of the British referendum, Mr N0rgaard will  not allow 
Danish  membership,  and  thus  the  further  development  of  the  Community,  to  depend 
exclusively upon it. I am in fact optimistic about this referendum, and I look forward to it, I 
would say straight away as  an outsider, with confidence. This is intended as  a general remark. 
Now I should like to proceed to a few  general remarks on the contents of this Convention, 
about which I  did not speak this morning and to which I should now like  to  refer briefly. 
Much has naturally been said about Article 2,  relating to the number of Members. May I just 
summarize  briefly  how  the  Political  Affairs  Committee  arrived  at  its  decision?  Our  first 
consideration was  that each  Member State  should  have  a  minimum number of  Members. 
Secondly, we took the view that the traditional compromise incorporated in the Treaty would 
have to be set aside in order to arrive at a more proportional system. I would stress 'a more 
proportional system', because I  freely admit that the 'one man, one vote'  principle has  not 
been followed.  I  calculated,  however,  that on the basis  of Luxembourg- and six  seats  for 
Luxembourg  is  the  minimum-Parliament  should  have  5 000  members.  And,  of  course, 
nobody wants that. In such a situation every solution is a compromise. Even if Luxembourg is 
left out of consideration, any solution that would result in a manageable Parliament will be a 
compromise. You are  already aware  of my views  on this subject; the point has been raised 
often enough. I adopted as  a starting point the Parliament of 355 Members on the basis of a 
system of calculation designed to  arrive  at a  reasonably well  functioning Parliament in the 
present situation with respect to powers. By that I mean that there would be the possibility of 
increasing  the  number  of  Members  on  the  basis  of  increasing  powers  and  the  possible 
increase in the number of Member States of the Community. Let us  not begin by being too 
big, because we shall never revert to a smaller number. That is  the first point. 
The amendment proposed by Mr Klepsch and adopted by the Political Affairs Committee has 
substantial advantages.  It puts a better basic emphasis on the 'one man, one vote'  principle 
than  my original  proposal.  In  addition, the legitimate  rights  of the  large  States  with  large 
populations are taken into account to a greater extent by having a large representation in the 
European Parliament. In that respect the amendment put forward by Mr Lautenschlager is  a 
return to my original proposal, and you will appreciate that your rapporteur now stands before 
you  with  very  mixed  feelings.  My  heart  is  with  the  Lautenschlager  amendment,  but  as 
rapporteur of the Political Affairs  Committee I am defending the text of my report. I  have 
already  mentioned  the  arguments  in  favour  of  it.  The  principle  of  proportionality is  best 
upheld  in  the  text  of  my report. The  Lautenschlager amendment very  clearly  favours  the 
smaller States. 
I now come to a comment which is  intended for  those who maintain: 'It is  not up to  us  to 
determine what the  number of Members shall  be;  leave  that to  the  Council.'  In  my view 
Parliament is  not worth very much if it does not put a proposal before the Council. We must 
do the same in 1975 as Mr Dehousse did in 1960. In the present situation we must not leave it 
to the Council. Of course, the Council decides, but we  must let it know what our conception 
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the Council of Ministers. 
Another  point  that  has,  of  course,  caused  a  considerable  stir  is  the  question  of  the  dual 
mandate. I shall speak about the details when dealing with the amendments. But there is  one 
thing which I should like to say in the present general context, and that is that we really ought 
to hold a survey among the 198  Members of this Parliament to establish who at the present 
time  and  with  the  present  powers  of  the  European  Parliament  would  be  prepared  to 
relinquish his national mandate. Should the survey show that the vast majority is  prepared to 
do so at the present time and would like  to  restrict itself to  a  European mandate, then my 
proposal is incorrect. During my tour of the European capitals the unanimous advice was: do 
not forbid it, make it possible. In my report I have quite clearly subjected the possibility of a 
dual  mandate  to  limitations, two  of which  I  referred  to  in  my introduction  to  the article 
concerned. First of all, the European mandate is  not terminated if the national mandate ends 
because  the Member concerned has  not been re-elected  to  the  national  parliament. If, for 
example,  someone  is  elected  on  1  March  1978  to  the  European  Parliament  and  on  1 
November  1978  he  loses  his  national  mandate,  he  remains  a  Member  of  the  European 
Parliament.  I  would also  draw Mr  N0rgaard's  attention  to  this,  as  he apparently has  other 
ideas. That is  the basis, as otherwise European elections would have no value because it would 
not be the European election which would be the deciding factor, but the national election. 
The European election is  primary. Secondly, MP's will  have to be freed completely for their 
work in the European Parliament. At the present time the opposite is  the case; the national 
parliament takes  precedence, and if there is  any time over, we  can work for Europe. Today, 
too, some of our colleagues are not present because they have to take part in a division in their 
national parliament. 
An end must be made to  this situation, but you cannot expect your rapporteur to  provide a 
European solution. The solution must be found by national parliaments. A large number of 
possibilities will  be  apparent to  you.  For example, a  Member of  the  European  Parliament 
could take part in national activities without having a vote, so that he would not be forced to 
leave  the  European  Parliament  in  order  to  go  and  vote  in  his  own  country.  A  further 
possibility would be for  the national parliament to  have extra members engaged exclusively 
on  European  work  and  therefore  in  a  supernumerary  position.  Or one  might consider  a 
pairing system, which is  a procedure whereby a supporter and an opponent of a government 
travel together to the European Parliament, or if one remains behind the other does not vote. 
These are all possibilities, but you must not expect your rapporteur to make the choice. I am 
only making suggestions to the national parliaments. 
My  next comment relates  to  the uniform procedure. Mr de  Ia  Malene  has  said  that if  this 
project is blocked by the Council, the reason will be, for example, that there is  no agreement 
on the election procedure, and so it will merely postpone everything. I do not believe that the 
Council intimated at the Summit Conference that it wished to take a decision on the whole 
matter.  The  Council  wishes  to  decide  on  the  elections.  It has  not stated  that a  uniform 
procedure is  a necessary part of the elections. I believe that the solution which I have chosen 
and which the great majority of you support is in accordance with the Treaty. The Treaty does 
not lay down anywhere that the provisions of an article must be implemented at one stroke. If 
that were  the  case,  agricultural  policy would  have  had  to  stand still  for  ten  years,  and  no 
further alterations could be made to it. No, the Treaty is constantly evolving. Time limits have 
been laid down, but these have been exceeded by a large margin. Moreover, in its decision of 
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stated that a decision provided for in the Treaty could be taken in stages. Well, a decision of 
this kind in stages is  what I am putting before you. Mr D'  Angelosante has made some very 
interesting legal comments on this subject. He said that by cancelling Article  138  I had lost 
the possibility of introducing a uniform election procedure. 
No, Mr  D'Angelosante, by introducing Article  7  and by endeavouring to  modify the  EEC 
Treaty we are creating a new obligation. From the point of view of consistency it is  better to 
delete from  the EEC Treaty any provision which has  ceased  to  apply. That is  the situation 
exactly. The obligation on the part of the Council to  lay  down the uniform procedure then 
arises from Article 7 of the Draft Convention now before us, and no longer from Article 138 
of the EEC Treaty. 
Mr D'Angelosante has also spoken in this connection about Article 14. Article  14  is  not the 
provision  laying  down  that the  uniform  procedure  should  be  introduced by  means  of  an 
amendment to the Treaty. Article 14  is what Article 235 is in the EEC Treaty, not Article 236, 
but Article  235,  in which  an  additional  opportunity is  provided  for  the  Council  and  the 
Commission to introduce more detailed provisions if there are gaps. 
I should like, if I may, to mention a few examples. There is  the question of the remuneration 
of Members. I have made no proposals in that respect. Will it require the conclusion of a new 
convention? That may be a matter which is  regulated by Article 14. Then there is  the matter 
of the expenses to be allowed to national parties or governments for elections. I had thought 
of taking up that point, but it is better that Parliament should discuss it later with the Council 
in accordance with the procedure of Article 14. 
There are  many things which still  have  to  be settled, and for  which I  have  provided for  a 
flexible  procedure along the lines on which we  worked when considering budgetary powers, 
i.e. the consultation procedure to which reference is  made in the Vedel report on the powers 
of Parliament and in our own proposals and also Article 203  of the EEC Treaty; we  have  to 
consider the interaction between the Council and Parliament, which enjoy equal rights in the 
drawing up of the required provisions. This is  nothing new, as  in Article 203  (8)  of the EEC 
Treaty reference  is  made  to  agreement between  the  Council and Parliament on budgetary 
procedure. 
Mr D'  Angelosante also asked why I refer to national provisions when speaking of the banning 
of parties. That is  an old provision from  the Dehousse convention. Mr Scelba asked why no 
reference was  made to constitutional provisions. The banning of parties is  not regulated in all 
countries  by  the  constitution.  If I  have  understood  correctly-and  if  not,  my  German 
colleagues will  correct me-the ban on the Communist Party in its old form  in the Federal 
Republic was  introduced by a court in Karlsruhe, and is  not part of the constitution. In Italy 
the ban on the Fascist Party is  laid down in the constitution. Under those circumstances Mr 
Dehousse'  s old text seemed to  me to  be very valid,  and  I  have  adopted this  point without 
making any changes. 
In conclusion, I should like  to  make a  couple of remarks  about the date  of  the elections. 
Various comments have been made on this subject, and I should now like to refer briefly to 
them. Mr Jozeau-Marigne  and others have  spoken in  this  connection about the link with 
national  elections.  He  asked  whether such  links  should  be  forbidden  I  do  not know,  Mr 
Jozeau-Marigne. Perhaps we shall do so in the uniform procedure, but I can very well imagine 
that for reasons of cost or in order to increase the poll the elections may be made to coincide 
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Convention is also open with respect to this point. 
Mr Kirk asked in the modest way for which he is known whether 1978 is a feasible target date. 
Mr Kirk, it is  a tremendous challenge for the European Parliament within the space of three 
years to take up the preparations for the elections with the national parliaments, the national 
political parties, the Council and the Commission and everyone else who has a part to play. 
We have learnt from the Treaty of Rome that deadlines can provide a stimulus to push ahead. 
The great advantage  of  the  transitional  period  in  the  EEC  Treaty is  that we  are  working 
towards something, and that at a given time we  shall again have to take a decision. I am not 
saying that I am one hundred percent certain that we will succeed by 1978, but it is up to us, 
the Parliament and the Council, the political parties and the national parliaments to aim at 
holding the elections in 1978  and to do everything possible to meet the deadline. Should we 
find that it is  not possible, we shall have to reappraise the situation, but at the present time it 
is  our aim, in accordance with the wishes expressed at the Summit Conference, to hold the 
elections in 1978. 
Mr President, I know that many members will be disappointed by my reply because there are 
many  important comments which  I  have  not answered  and  because  I  have  only given  a 
general introduction. You must forgive me; I cannot give replies to 25  speakers. We agreed to 
begin the voting at a reasonable time. I still hope to go into a number of details when we deal 
with the amendments. 
(Loud applause) 
IN THE CHAIR: MR BERKHOUWER 
President 
President. - The general debate is closed. 
We shall now consider the motion for a resolution. 
On the first six paragraphs of Part I of the resolution I have no amendments or speakers listed. 
I put these to the vote. 
The first six paragraphs of Part I of the resolution are adopted. 
On the preamble to the Draft Convention I have no amendments or speakers listed. 
I put it to the vote. 
The preamble is adopted. 
On Article 1 I have Amendment No 6 tabled by Mr Bourges and Mr Yeats on behalf of the 
Group of European Progressive Democrats and worded as  follows: 
Article 1 
This article to read as  follows: 
'The Assembly of the representatives of the peoples of the States in the Community shall be elected 
by direct universal suffrage. It shall constitute the European Parliament.' 
I call Mr Yeats to move this amendment. 
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rapporteur in order that it shall approximate more closely to the text of the Treaty itself. It is 
not intended to  alter the precise intentions of the article that we have before us, but it does 
seem that it would be better to have it as close as  possible to the relevant articles in the Treaty. 
Perhaps  I  might quote Article  137  of the EEC Treaty, which is  as  follows:  'The Assembly, 
which shall  consist of  representatives  of the peoples  of  the States  brought together in the 
Community, shall exercise the advisory and supervisory powers which are  conferred upon it 
by this Treaty.' Our amendment, therefore, intends merely to incorporate the wording of this 
article of the Treaty, so far as it is relevant, into the Convention, and I would suggest that it is a 
relatively  technical  matter which we  ought to  accept because  clearly we  ought to  try  and 
adhere as  far as  possible to the Treaty. 
President. - What is  the rapporteur's position? 
Mr  Patjin,  rapporteur.  - (NL)  Mr  President,  I  would  point  out  to  the  movers  of  this 
amendment that if we accept it, we shall have Article 137 of the EEC Treaty on the one hand 
and  Article  1  of  our  Draft  Convention  on  the  other,  both  of  which  will  then  state 
approximately the same thing. I think that this would be wrong and not very desirable if we 
want to preserve an orderly system of Community legislation. 
Furthermore it is  concerned with the election of the representatives and not of Parliament. I 
find  the  text  'The  Assembly  of  the  representatives  (  ...  ).  It  shall  constitute  the  European 
Parliament' considerably less clear and concise than my text. I would also point out that my 
text is  the same as  that contained in Mr Dehousse's draft, and I felt it was exactly what was 
wanted. It reflects very clearly what we  mean. I should like to  ask the House to  reject this 
amendment. 
President. - I put Amendment No 6 to the vote. 
Amendment No 6 is  rejected. 
I put Article 1 to the vote. 
Article 1 is adopted. 
On Article 2 I have six amendments: 
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Amendment No 7 tabled by Mr de la Malene and worded as  follows: 
'Article 2 
This article to read as  follows: 
"The number of representatives elected in each Member State shall be fixed by the Council and shall 
be proportional to the population of each of these States." ' 
Amendment No 5 tabled by Mr McDonald and worded as  follows: 
'Article 2 
This article should read as  follows: 
"In proposing the number of representatives which each Member State shall be entitled to elect to 
the  European  Parliament,  the  Parliament  shall  maintain  the  same  ratio  of  representatives  per 
Member State as  currently provided for under Articles  138  of the EEC Treaty,  108  of the Euratom 
Treaty and 21  of the ECSC Treaty, as  amended by Article 10  of the Act of Accession, modified by 
Article 4 of the adaptation decision." ' Amendment No 15  tabled by Mr Nyborg and worded as  follows: 
'Article 2(1) 
This paragraph to read as  follows: 
"1.  The number of representatives elected in each Member State shall be as  follows: 
Belgium  14 
Denmuk  10 
France  36 
Germany (FR)  36 
Ireland  10 
Italy  36 
Luxembourg  6 
Netherlands  14 
United Kingdom  36 
198"' 
Amendment No 13  tabled by Mr Outers and worded as  follows: 
'Article 2(1) 
This paragraph to read as  follows: 
"1.  The number of representatives elected in each Member State shall be as  follows: 
Belgium  15 
Denmark  11 
France 
Germany (FR) 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
57 
67 
10 
60 
6 
19 
61 
306"' 
Amendment No 3 tabled by Mr Lautenschlager on behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee 
and worded as  follows: 
'Article 2(1) 
This paragraph to read as  follows: 
"1.  The number of representatives elected in each Member State shall be as  follows: 
Belgium  23 
Denmark  17 
France  65 
Germany (FR)  71 
Ireland  13 
Italy  66 
Luxembourg  6 
Netherlands  27 
United Kingdom  67 
355"' 
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'Article 2(1) 
This paragraph to read as follows: 
"1. The number of representatives elected in each Member State shall be as  follows: 
Belgium  18 
Denmark  12 
France 
Germany (FR) 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
74 
87 
10 
77 
6 
23 
80 
387", 
These six amendments can be considered jointly. 
I call Mr de la Malene to move Amendment No 7. 
Mr de Ia  Malene. - (F) Mr President, the scope of my amendment is apparent from its text. 
Since I commented on it in my introduction during the general debate, there is  no need for 
me to do so again now. 
President. - I call Mr McDonald to move Amendment No 5. 
Mr  McDonald. - Mr President, I should merely like to say that the proposals in Article 2 
should at least not depart significantly from the Treaties of Accession. I have dealt with this 
amendment in the general debate. However, as  there is  another amendment which I think 
suits our situation a little better, I withdraw my Amendment No 5. 
President. - Amendment No 5 is accordingly withdrawn. 
I call Mr Nyborg to move Amendment No 15. 
Mr Nyborg. - (DK) Mr President, I should like to start by thanking Mr Patijn for his report. 
I do so  now because I did not have the opportunity to thank him before. 
May  I  point out that not all  Danes agree  with  the  Danish Socialists'  standpoint on direct 
elections. While I agree with the concept of direct elections, I am against an excessive increase 
in the number of Members for the following reasons. 
At present Parliament has 198 Members, and all past experience shows that an increase in this 
number will  not improve efficiency  - the reverse if anything. The debates would certainly 
become longer and the work slower and more ineffective. We welcome any increase in the 
number  of  Member  States  in  the  Community,  and  when  this  happens  the  number  of 
Members will  rise automatically. Both here and in Strasbourg we  have room enough for  198 
Members.  The  administrative  staff  and  other facilities  are  also  intended  to  cater  for  this 
number. If we  decide to  increase the number of Members  this will  obviously cost a  lot of 
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peoples do not want any extension of the bureaucracy and that they expect us to lead the way 
in exercising moderation. 
I  find  the present distribution  of  seats  in  Parliament reasonable  and recommend that we 
retain the status quo of 198  Members. 
President. - I call Mr Outers to move Amendment No 13. 
Mr Outers.  - (F)  Mr President, my amendment aims to  reconcile several  principles. The 
first  of these  is  that the  nations  must be  represented  in  accordance with  the size  of  their 
population.  Universal  suffrage  is  based  on and  justified  by  the  equality of  all  citizens,  no 
matter to what country they belong. 
The  second  principle  is  that,  as  long  as  the  elections  are  held  in  national  electoral 
constituencies,  it is  perfectly right to  lay  down  a  minimum number of  Members  for  each 
country. My  proposal allocates  a basic  quota of 6 Members  to  each Member State  and one 
further seat each for every million inhabitants. 
The  third  principle  is  that we  must  avoid  a  situation  in  which  an  excessive  number  of 
Members - and this is the main objection to the proposal to have 550 Members-makes the 
future accession of new Member States more difficult. The total number of Members is  thus 
reduced from  550 in the original proposal and 355  in Mr Lautenschlagers's proposal to 306. 
One last  principle is  that the new seat distribution should not reduce  the number of seats 
currently allocated to any Member State. 
President. - I call Mr Lautenschlager to move Amendment No 3. 
Mr  Lautenschlager.  - (D)  Mr  President,  in  our  view  the  compromise  proposed  in 
Amendment No 3 is the one which comes closest to meeting the wishes of the large countries 
and the expectations of the small countries. If you take a system of coordinates and plot on it 
a line for  the representation, you will find that, with the figure  of 355  Members, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Belgium gain slightly, the Netherlands is  on the mean line, and the large 
countries make a slight concession on representation. It is my belief that this sacrifice is worth 
while, in order to form a Parliament which can implement European politics in solidarity and 
which does not give the impression that a large number of seats have been created in order to 
benefit some countries. Everything has been worked out in detail. 
We also  experimented with  a  lower  number and  found  each  time  that,  if  the  number of 
Members is  less  than 355, it is  too much to the detriment of the larger countries, whereas if 
Parliament  has  more  than  355  Members,  it  is  too  much  to  the  detriment of  the  smaller 
countries. We thus found, without recourse to  party-political or national considerations, that 
the  figure  of  355  Members  was  a  suitable  compromise.  No-one  maintains  it  is  the  ideal 
solution, but it is  the one which comes closest to satisfying all standpoints. 
We also found that if we  take only the national parliaments and their relationships with the 
constituencies, i.e.  the relationships between the individual Members and the constituencies, 
and apply them  to  a  future  European  Parliament, we  will  not achieve  the result we  were 
aiming at, namely that in this directly elected European Parliament something new should be 
created. 
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which can look back on a history of only some two hundred years; and quite apart from that, 
even the House of Representatives manages with only about 400  members for a population 
much larger than that of Europe. 
One amusing point, Mr President: there is  no assembly hall in the whole of Europe which 
could hold more than 400 Members. Just a point. 
(Laughter) 
Anyhow, if we  do create a large Parliament on the basis that the European Parliament should 
be  about as  big as  one of  the  larger  national  parliaments,  the only aim  being to  achieve 
maximum  representation,  we  shall  certainly  have  a  Parliament" with  loads  of  pomp  and 
circumstance,  but the  self-imposed  difficulties  would  result  in  this  Parliament's becoming 
nothing more than a mutual admiration society, and all of us here would consider this to be a 
sad fate for it. 
I  therefore  recommend that the  House adopt the Amendment tabled by the  Legal  Affairs 
Committee, thereby limiting the number of seats to 355. 
President. - I call Lord Reay to move amendment No 17. 
Lord Reay. - Mr President, I think I shall have to say something, otherwise my amendment 
will not be understood by Members, since I had no opportunity to speak on this matter earlier 
in  the  debate.  My  amendment  shares  the  intention  of  the  Political  Affairs  Committee's 
amendment  - that is  to  say, what is  now the text of the report-of applying more closely 
than  the  rapporteur  originally  did  himself  the  principle  of  parity  in  the  ratio  between 
electorate  and elected  throughout the  Community, but with  the intention of arriving at  a 
lower total. 
To do this, instead of allowing one Member for each additional 500 000 of the population or 
part thereof  beyond  the  first  million, which  is  now  the  present text,  I  have  allowed  one 
Member for each additional 750 000 of the population or part thereof beyond the first million. 
Otherwise I have kept the same criteria. The first million will quality for 6 seats: no State will 
have  less  than  6  seats;  no State  will  have  less  than  it  has  at  present.  In  practice  this  last 
provision will only affect Ireland, which would otherwise under my amendment have 9 seats 
rather than 10. The main effect is  to give a fairer representation to the electorate in the larger 
States  than was  done by the rapporteur originally or is  done in the amendment now being 
moved by Mr Lautenschlager on behalf of the Legal  Affairs  Committee, while preserving a 
smaller total number. The higher number in my opinion is  far too high, for the reason which 
I heard Mr Jozeau-Marigne give this afternoon-namely, that it ignores the possibility of the 
Community being enlarged in the future. I think by some this point has not been sufficiently 
appreciated.  If for  example  you  take  only  the  possibility  of  Spain,  Greece,  Norway  and 
Portugal joining the Community, using the current population figures and the same criteria as 
now laid down in Mr Patijn's report for determining individual membership, that would mean 
an  additional  membership of  128. That is  to  say  a  total  membership for  the Parliament of 
678 -a figure which perhaps in the opinion of most people would be hitting if not breaking 
the limit of what was considered a reasonable and practical number for a working parliament. 
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me in a difficult position. Naturally enough, I prefer my own amendment to that of the Legal 
Affairs Committee, although, for the reasons which I have given, I prefer the amendment of 
the Legal Affairs Committee to the numbers as they now stand in the report. Now I think that 
the Legal Affairs Committee's amendment will be taken before mine. If that is to be the case I 
have decided that I shall support the amendment of the Legal Affairs Committee, that is  to 
say Mr Lautenschlager's amendment, although this will  reduce the possibility of mine being 
reached, in order to try to prevent the greater danger of the report's being adopted without any 
amendment at all. In return, and out of considerations of both gallantry and logic, I hope that 
those  who  vote  for  the  Legal  Affairs  Committee's  amendment,  in  the  event  of  their 
experiencing the misfortune of defeat, will support my amendment when the time comes. 
(Applause and laughter) 
President. - What is  the rapporteur's opinion? 
Mr Patijn, rapporteur.  - (NL) Mr President, in my reply to the debate I commented briefly 
on Mr de la Malene's remarks regarding Article 2.  I think that what he is  proposing here is 
wrong as Parliament would be giving up its right of initiative to the Council. This was the first 
point. 
And then there  is  a  second  point. If no guarantee  is  given  for  a  number which we  fix  or 
criteria  which we  lay  down,  there  can  be  no certainty for  such  countries  as  Luxembourg, 
Ireland and Denmark that today'  s figure  will  at least constitute the starting point. Mr de la 
Malene's  amendment also  contains  the criterion 'proportional  to  the  population'. And my 
compromise  for  Luxembourg,  i.e.  six  seats  for  350 000  inhabitants,  could  theoretically, 
according to Mr de la Malene's scheme, be reduced to one or none, if one takes a minimum of 
500 000  inhabitants  as  a  starting  point.  For  these  two  highly  fundamental  and  highly 
important reasons I recommend that you reject this amendment. 
Furthermore Mr de la  Malene's amendment implies the deletion of Article 2,  paragraph 2, 
which provides for the possibility of making subsequent changes to the number of seats. No 
provision is  made for this in Mr de la Malene's amendment, so the Treaty would have to be 
modified before a change could be made in the number of seats. This is  another argument for 
asking Parliament to reject Mr de la Malene's amendment. 
I thank Mr McDonald for withdrawing Amendment No 5, which has a similar purpose to that 
of Amendment No 15 by Mr Nyborg. 
For reasons of economy Mr Nyborg wants to keep the existing number of seats. I think that is 
a  good principle, Mr  Nyborg. Of course we  must be  economical and not a  single unit of 
account must be wasted, but your amendment would mean that in large  States such as  the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain it would be necessary to organize elections to 
elect 36 people, 36 representatives for a population, in the Federal Republic of Germany, of 
62  million and an electorate of 2  million per seat! It is  moreover in conflict with the basic 
principle that we adopted in the Political Affairs Committee, and with which everyone was in 
agreement, namely that we are on the way to introducing the 'one man, one vote' principle, in 
other words proportionality. You prefer to keep the old system, the compromise based on the 
Treaty. But I think it was one of our fundamental preoccupations, that of the rapporteur, that 
of Mr Lautenschlager, that of Mr Outers and Lord Reay, to guarantee proportionality. For this 
reason I would recommend that Parliament reject Mr Nyborg's amendment. 
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juggling the figures somewhat here, because according to his system the Irish would have nine 
seats and not ten. I feel  that in Mr Outers' proposal the small States are kept too close to the 
present figure,  and get too little compensation. In all  the proposals, in the proposal of the 
Political Affairs Committee and that of Mr Lautenschlager, it has been one of the basic points 
that the large States must obtain the greatest number of seats, but not at the expense of proper 
representation for the small States. In my opinion the total number of 306 and the distibution 
which Mr Outers proposes do not satisfy these criteria. Furthermore, with 306 seats we  are 
entering the danger zone as  regards proportionality, if we want to be able to organize elections 
properly.  Ten  seats  for  Ireland  eleven  seats  for  Denmark?  I  know  that  these  are  small 
differences, but they are important differences for small States  .. 
I now come to Mr Lautenschlager's amendment, which I spoke about a few  moments ago in 
my second speech. The proposal of the Political Affairs Committee, as formulated in the Draft 
Convention, offers the best guarantee of proportionality. 
You know that I  have  reservations about this, but if we  assume that proportionality will  be 
introduced, I think it fair to say what Mr Klepsch proposed in the Political Affairs Committee 
best satisfies the criterion that I have put forward. I, therefore, believe that Mr Lautenschlager's 
recommendation implies the same compromise, in that it gives  the small States  more than 
they are entitled to. In Mr Klepsch's proposal they get a considerably greater number of seats 
but the difference vis-a-vis the larger States is  rather greater. 
Mr President I  think I can apply the same arguments to Lord Reay's amendment which is 
along  the  same  lines  as  Mr  Lautenschlager's  amendment.  There  is  not  much  difference 
between  a  total  of  355  or  387  But  here  too  the  compromise  is  to  the  detriment  of 
proportionality. I do not think I need go into this matter any further. All the Groups defined 
their positions this  morning. Every Member knows what is  involved and I  shall now leave 
matters to the judgment of Parliameq.t. 
President.  - Pursuant to the Rules of Procedure we  shall first,  consider the amendments 
which depart furthest from the Political Affairs Committee's text. 
I put Amendment No 7 to the vote. 
Amendment No 7 is rejected. 
I put Amendment No 15  to the vote. 
Amendment No 15  is rejected. 
I put Amendment No 13  to the vote. 
Amendment No 13  is  rejected. 
I put Amendment No 3 to the vote. 
Amendment No 3 is adopted. 
(Applause) 
Following the adoption of Amendment No 3, Amendment No 17 is  no longer necessary. 
I put Article 2(1) so amended to the vote. 
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I put Article 2(2) to the vote. 
Article 2(2) is  adopted. 
On Articles 3 and 4 I have no amendments or speakers listed. 
I put them to the vote. 
Articles 3 and 4 are adopted. 
On article 5 I have three amendments: 
Amendment No 9 tabled by Mr Liogier and worded as  follows: 
'Article 5 
Replace the word "compatible" by the word "incompatible".' 
Amendment No 4 tabled by Mr Lautenschlager on behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee 
and worded as  follows: 
'Article 5 
This article to read as follows: 
"After  entry  into  force  of  the  procedure  to  be  adopted  under Article  7(1)  membership  of  the 
European Parliament shall not be compatible with membership of a Parliament of a Member State".' 
Amendment No 16/rev. tabled by Mr Lautenschlager and worded as  follows: 
'Article 5 
This article to read as  follows: 
"1.  After entry into force  of the procedure  to  be  adopted under Article  7(1)  membership of the 
European  Parliament shall  be incompatible with  membership of  a  Parliament of  a  Member 
State. 
2.  However, mandates held in a national Parlament at the time of the election of the first European 
Parliament elected by a uniform procedure may be retained until the expiry of the term of office 
of the national Parliament".' 
I call Mr Liogier to move Amendment No 9. 
Mr Liogier.  - (F)  Mr  President, ladies  and gentlemen, if  my amendment were  accepted, 
Article  5 would read: 'Membership of the European Parliament shall be incompatible with 
membe~ship of a Parliament of a Member State.' This total incompatibility seems absolutely 
essential to me and I am most surprised to find that in Article 5 of the new Draft Convention 
Mr  Patijn  recommends  the  contrary,  after  declaring  in  paragraph  3  of  the  explanatory 
statement:  'The  increasing  problems  created  by  the  exercise  of  a  dual  mandate  merely 
emphasize the urgency of direct elections. The continuously increasing work load borne by 
representatives has long since made it impossible for them properly to carry out both national 
and  European  duties.  This  situation  adversely  affects  the  national  parliaments  and  the 
European Parliament-not to  mention the dependants of the representatives  themselves.'  I 
subscribe fully  to  this  penetrating analysis  of the situation and I would ask  you  to vote  in 
favour of the incompatibility of the two mandates. 
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the disadvantages of this dual mandate, I believe that they are no more than feeble paliatives. 
If they  were  to  be  implemented  in  the  present  situation,  they  might  yield  some  slight 
improvements in our working conditions, but they are  quite  unacceptable in the event of 
elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage. 
There is  no question  of making do  with cut-rate  representatives  on the grounds that they 
represent both the  European  Community and their own  country, which has  elected them 
specifically to  assume  the  responsibilities  resulting from  their mandate and  not to  entrust 
them to third parties, whoever they may be. 
The  tasks  incumbent  upon  representatives  of  the  European  Parliament  are  growing 
unceasingly, as  you yourselves  realize every day. They will grow still further in the years to 
come. They are such that they require undivided attention which cannot be distracted without 
the risk of serious dilution of effort, leading inevitably to inefficiency, and sometimes even to 
errors of judgment due to lack of time for reflection. 
Do we  not all  suffer, as  a result of our dual mandate, from being confronted time and again 
with trying situations owing to shortage of time and despite our willingness to do our job well, 
as  regards  attendance at committee  meetings,  regular  participation  in various  projects  and 
detailed study of the reports we  receive as well as  the making of all the necessary contacts. 
Do we really think that the dual mandate, national on the one hand, European on the other, is 
liable to create and foster that Community spirit without which we  cannot achieve the great 
objective which we have fixed for ourselves, that of integration? 
For these various reasons I would ask the honourable Members to vote for the amendment I 
have proposed. 
President. - I call Mr Lautenschlager to move Amendments Nos 4 and 16/rev. 
Mr Lautenschlager.  - (D) Mr President, may I ask you to hold the vote on Amendment 
No  16/rev.  first.  If it is  adopted, Amendment No 4  will  become unnecessary,  as  the first 
paragraph of Amendment No 16/rev. contains the same wording as Amendment No 4. 
Paragraph 2 of Amendment No 16/rev. to Article 5 merely guarantees that national mandates 
held at the time of the direct election of the European Parliament may be retained until the 
expiry of the term of office of the national parliament. From conversations I have had in this 
House it seemed necessary to me to add this, and I do not believe Parliament will oppose it. 
This must be the only exception allowing a dual mandate to be retained after the election of 
the new European Parliament. 
President. - I call Lord Gladwyn. 
Lord Gladwyn.  - I  should  like  the  rapporteur to  answer  my question, which was  this. 
Would it in his view be compatible with the Convention during the interim period which will 
follow  the first  election, taken, as  we  know, in accordance with national procedures, for  the 
British  Parliament, if it so desired, to elect all  its 67  members and make them at the same 
time, in its opinion, members of the national parliament? The point is  that, if I may say so, 
even though during this period, in accordance with the Lautenschlager second amendment, it 
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himself, because in the new Parliament it would be quite impossible in practice for a Member 
to have any dual function at all. Therefore, if it is  indeed desired that there should be some 
kind of organic link with the European Parliament, would it, in his view, be possible for  the 
British  Parliament  to  act  as  I  suggest-during  the  interim  period,  of  course,  and  as  a 
provisional measure? 
President. - What is  the rapporteur's opinion? 
Mr  Patijn,  rapporteur.  - (NL) Now we  have reached the second very important point on 
which amendments have been tabled. 
As  regards  Mr  Liogier's  amendment I  can  be  relatively  brief.  He would  like  to  oblige  all 
directly  elected  representatives,  immediately  after  European  elections,  to  renounce  their 
national  parliamentary mandates,  regardless  of  the powers  which  the  European  Parliament 
will enjoy at that time. I strongly recommend you to reject this amendment. 
I gave some of my reasons for this a few moments ago. I believe that in the provisional period, 
during which, according to my proposal the first elections shall take place and we shall try to 
create a uniform procedure, a Parliament with full  powers and an executive with full  powers, 
we  shall  find  the  link with  national  parliaments very  useful.  In  any  case  we  must in  my 
opinion  not prohibit it.  Such  a  link must be  possible: whether anyone  makes  use  of  this 
facility is  another question. In the light of the present political situation and the opinions of 
all  the representatives with whom I have spoken I must strongly recommend that you reject 
Mr Liogier's amendment. 
I  come  now  to  the  two  amendments tabled  by Mr  Lautenschlager.  I  can  deal  with  them 
together since they relate to the same question. 
Mr Lautenschlager is  right when he says that Amendment No 16/rev. must be voted on first. 
If it is adopted, Amendment No 4 will become unnecessary. If it is  rejected, Amendment No 
4, which contains the first paragraph of Amendment No 16/rev., will be voted on. 
Throughout my report I have avoided as  far as  possible anticipating what the directly elected 
parliament, subsequently to be elected by a uniform procedure, may wish to decide on matters 
of principle. I may be criticized for not going far enough. Mr Liogier and Mr Lautenschlager 
may criticize me for not saying that it is  in principle forbidden to hold a dual mandate. I wish 
to leave this matter open. The text of Article 5 of my report does not exclude all  this being 
settled at a later date. The rule forbidding the dual mandate may, for example, be incorporated 
into the uniform election regulations. This is one of the things about which I do not intend to 
make  a  pronouncement at  the  moment,  and  this  applies  equally  to  the  proportional  or 
non-proportional systems  we  shall  be  discussing shortly when we  come to  Article  7.  The 
numerous people with whom I discussed this matter were all in agreement with my proposal. 
There  are  already  difficulties  in  sight.  Mr  Lautenschlager  at  first  tabled  an  amendment 
containing a  new  paragraph  1  of Article  5,  and  immediately had to  table  a  changed  text, 
because  difficulties  had  arisen  with  regard  to  the  national  mandate.  I  am  in  principle  in 
agreem..:nt with him: he, too, prefers a transitional period until the application of the uniform 
procedure. Perhaps by that time the dual mandate will be considered quite unacceptable. In 
my proposal I have tended not to anticipate such fundamental decisions, which we  shall be 
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Amendment  No  16/rev.  and  4  by  Mr  Lautenschlager  and  request  Parliament  to  approve 
Article 5 in the original version. 
I can only partially answer Lord Gladwyn's question.  For the constitution of the European 
Parliament only one election  is  valid  and that is  the  European  election. If 67  Britons  are 
elected  in  the  European  election,  they  will  be  Members  of  the  European  Parliament.  If 
Westminster, the House of Commons and the  House of  Lords  want to  make sure  that, by 
means of a special procedure, these 67  members hold a mandate in the national parliament, 
there is  nothing prohibiting this in the Draft Convention nor in the EEC Treaty. 
President. - I call Mr Liogier. 
Mr Liogier.  - (F) Mr President, since Amendment No 16/rev. by Mr  Lautenschlager does, 
after all,  confirm the principle of  the incompatibility of the two  mandates, I support it and 
withdraw my own amendment. 
President. - Amendment No 9 is accordingly withdrawn. 
I put Amendment No 16/rev. to the vote. 
As  the result of  the  show of  hands  is  not clear,  a  fresh  vote  will  be  taken  by sitting and 
standing. 
Amendment No 16/rev. is  rejected. 
(Applause from the European Conservative Group) 
(Protests) 
I put Amendment No 4 to the vote. 
Amendment No 4 is  rejected. 
I put the original text of Article 5 to the vote. 
Article 5 is  adopted. 
On Article 6 I have Amendment No 10  tabled by Mr Bourges and Mr Yeats on behalf of the 
Group of European Progressive Democrats and worded as  follows: 
'Article 6(2) 
This paragraph to read as  follows: 
"2.  Subject  to  the  entry  into  force  of  the  provlSlons  laid  down  under  Article  7,  the  national 
Parliaments shall establish the rules governing the question of incompatibility." ' 
I call Mr Yeats to move this amendment. 
Mr Yeats.  - Mr  President, the  purpose of  this amendment is  to  make a change which I 
think is necessary in the wording of paragraph 2 of Article 6 as set before us. This paragraph 2 
of Article 6 covers the interim situation which will arise on and after the first election to the 
directly-elected Parliament and before the Council has in fact agreed on a uniform scheme of 
election for  the Nine members of the EEC. Now, as  Mr Lenihan has already pointed out in 
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elections will be held under these so-called interim procedures, because the prospects of the 
Council's agreeing unanimously on a uniform system of election are  not good. So  this is  a 
matter of some importance because it relates to a position which may last some time. Now 
under  the  rapporteur's  text  the  incompatibilities  existing  in  each  national  State  will 
automatically be extended also  to  the  European Parliament. This means in  the case  of  my 
country, for  example, that an electricity worker who is  employed climbing up electric-light 
poles in the west of Ireland and is therefore forbidden to be a Member at the same time of the 
Irish  Parliament because  he  is  employed by  a  State  corporation  - this  person  and many 
others like him would not be able to be a Member of the European Parliament. Now whatever 
the reasons  may be  (and  one sometimes wonders  what  they are)  at  the  national  level  for 
incompatibilities  of  this  kind,  they  certainly  would  seem  not  to  apply  to  the  European 
Parliament, but under the rapporteur's  text there  is  no discretion given  automatically:  the 
incompatibilities at the national  level  must be  carried over to  the  European  level,  and the 
national  parliaments have  no discretion  to  make rules  for  one and rules  for  the  other. My 
amendment therefore suggests that the national parliaments should have the discretion to say, 
'Well, all  right, so-and-so  is  forbidden  to  be  a  member of  the  national  parliament but we 
cannot see any reason why he should not be a Member of the European Parliament.' It makes 
the situation more flexible,  and I suggest that we  ought to  adopt it.  I am quite certain the 
result would be not that the national parliaments would add incompatibilities but that they 
would delete a number of incomparibilities from the ones that exist at the national level. 
President. - What is  the rapporteur's position? 
Mr  Patijn, rapporteur.  - (NL) The difference between the text proposed by Mr Yeats and 
my text is  that I  have  simply stated that the national provisions  relating to  incompatibility 
with other functions are to be applied. The pro-proposal made by Mr Bourges and Mr Yeats 
on behalf of the Group of European Progressive Democrats implies that they think there is a 
gap which must be dealt with by the national parliaments. If it is  said that existing national 
provisions must be applied and the national parliaments lay down no such provisions, then 
you really can talk of a gap. If the special situation referred to by Mr Yeats does arise, namely 
that someone should be eligible for the European Parliament who may not be elected to  the 
national  parliament, then there  is  of  course  no objection  to  legislating nationally for  this. 
There  must,  however,  be  a  point  of  departure,  and  this  must  be  the  existing  national 
legislation.  I  admit that  the  French  text  is  badly  worded  on  this  point.  I  quote: '...  les 
dispositions nationales relatives aux incompatibilites s'appliquent mutatis mutandis'. I do not 
think this is  a very good translation. The versions in the other five  languages are  in order. I 
think  the  French  text  should  read  as  follows:  ' ... les  dispositions  nationales  relatives  aux 
incompatibilites  sont applicables'.  This  means  that it  continues  to  be  up  to  the  national 
legislators to  make special provisions, on the basis  of existing regulations, for  the European 
Parliament. But you must start with something which already exists, to which additions can 
then be made. The amendment by Mr Bourges and Mr Yeats gives the impression that there 
are  no regulations at all and that they must be laid down by the national parliaments in the 
nine Member States. This is why, to ensure order and certainty as  to the legal position, and in 
view of the arguments I have just put forward, I should prefer to reject this amendment by Mr 
Bourges and Mr Yeats. 
President. - I call Mr Scelba. 
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as  has been pointed out by my colleague who has tabled the amendment. 
As I have already mentioned, in my country, for example, the mayors of towns with more than 
40 000  inhabitants  cannot  become  members  of  the  national  parliament.  In  France  the 
opposite is true and yet the provision contained in the Draft Convention would sanction these 
contradictions. This is unacceptable. 
The amendment goes back to the text of the 1960 draft which, on this point, was  as  follows: 
'Each Member State shall determine whether, and to what extent, the incompatibilities laid 
down by its law with regard to the exercise of a national parliamentary mandate shall apply to 
the exercise of a mandate in the European Parliament.' This was a plain, comprehensible and 
rational  formula.  I would thus recommend the adoption of this amendment which corrects 
the irrational text that we  have  been given and restores, even  if  not in the same form,  the 
much clearer and much more explicit text of 1960. 
President. - I put amendment No 10  to the vote. 
Amendment No 10  is  rejected. 
I put Article 6 to the vote. 
Article 6 is adopted. 
On Article  7  I  have  Amendment No  14  tabled  by  Mr  Bordu  and Mr  D'Angelosante and 
worded as  follows: 
'Article 7 
This article to read as  follows: 
"The elections shall be held in accordance with a uniform electoral procedure based on the system of 
proportional representation." ' 
I call Mr D'Angelosante to move this amendment. 
Mr D'  Angelosante.  - (I) Mr President, the reasons for this amendment have already been 
put forward.  To a  certain  extent this  amendment represents  our entire  position  as  already 
outlined during the general debate. 
By this amendment we propose that Parliament should introduce the proportional system and 
eliminate the two phases, i.e. the immediate introduction of a uniform electoral system. 
The rapporteur has countered this opinion of ours merely with arguments of caution without 
however explaining who and what we are to be wary of. Since this is a question of principle we 
insist on this amendment and ask the House to approve it. 
President. - What is  the rapporteur's position? 
Mr  Patijn, rapporteur.  - (NL) Mr President, I wish that Parliament were able to decide on 
one electoral system or the other. My findings are that Parliament is  not in a position to do so 
at the moment. For these reasons I consider it wrong and unrealistic to anticipate the nature 
and  content of  this  electoral  procedure, which  we  ourselves  have  yet  to  work  out.  I  will 
confine myself to this comment and ask Parliament not to adopt this amendment. 
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Mr Memmel. - (D) Mr President, one question to the rapporteur: the rapporteur has tabled 
Amendment No 1, in which he wants to change 1980 to 1978; in that case, should he not also 
change 1980 to 1978  in paragraph 1 of Article 7, on which we are now to vote? 
President. - I call the rapporteur. 
Mr Patijn, rapporteur.  - (NL) Mr President, Mr Memmel is stating the obvious. 1978  refers 
to the date of the first elections. 1980, which appears in Article 7, refers to the drawing up of a 
proposal  for  a uniform electoral system. I and everyone else  with me believe, Mr Memmel, 
that the first election in 1978, will not, as  I have just told Mr D'Angelosante, be held according 
to the uniform electoral system. In this situation it is  realistic to state that a uniform electoral 
system, on which study may begin  tomorrow but has  not yet begun, will  not be drawn  up 
before  1978.  By  taking  1978  in  the  text  of  the  Convention  as  the date  for  drawing up a 
proposal, I might leave Parliament too little time. That is why I chose 1980. 
The European Parliament must draw up the procedure by 1980. So  much the better if we  can 
draw up the uniform electoral system by  1978, but I want to  extend the time limit a little, 
because we may well need that amount of time. In any case the system must be drawn up by 
1980. 
President. - I put Amendment No 14 to the vote. 
Amendment No 14 is  rejected. 
I put Article 7 to the vote. 
Article 7 is adopted. 
On Articles 8 to  12  I have no amendments or speakers listed. 
I put these to the vote. 
Articles 8 to  12 are adopted. 
On Article 13(1) I have two amendments: 
Amendment No 11  tabled by Mr de Ia Malene and worded as  follows: 
'Article 13(1) 
This paragraph to read as follows: 
"1. The  date  of  the  first  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  by  direct  universal  suffrage  in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention shall be fixed by the European Council." ' 
Amendment No 1 tabled by Mr Patijn on behalf of the Political Affairs  Committee and 
worded as  follows: 
'Article 13(1) 
Replace the words "May 1980" by "May 1978".' 
I call Mr de la Malene to move Amendment No 11. 
147 Mr de Ia  Malene.  - (F) Mr President, I shall be brief as  I have no illusions as  to  the fate 
which awaits  my amendment. Over the last  15  years  I  have  all  too often seen this type  of 
debate, in which the dates have to be fixed in advance and are then not retained. This House 
proposes  Europe, and the peoples and governments dispose. This is  why I have  tabled this 
amendment, I repeat, without any illusions as  to the fate which awaits it. 
At the same time, Mr President, I should like to defend my second amendment, modest in 
scope as it is: it requests the deletion of the adjective 'exact' in the second paragraph of Article 
13, which, at least in the French text, seems to me superfluous. 
President. - What is  the rapporteur's position? 
Mr  Patijn,  rapporteur.  - (NL) I  cannot say  that Mr  de  Ia  MaU~ne made a  very  spirited 
defence of his amendment. I could well make a spirited counter-remark, but I do not think it 
necessary. It is clear that we have to fix  the date for the elections ourselves. I suggest 1978, as 
can be seen from  my Amendment No 1 on behalf of the Political Affairs  Committee. I am 
prepared to accept Amendment No 12 by Mr de Ia Malene on the deletion of the word 'exact'. 
It is  a  marked  improvement in  the  text  if  the word  'exact'  in Article  13,  paragraph  2,  is 
deleted, as  it adds nothing to the text. 
President. - I put Amendment No 11  to the vote. 
Amendment No 11  is  rejected. 
I put Amendment No 1 to the vote. 
Amendment No 1 is adopted. 
I put Article 13(1) so amended to the vote. 
Article 13(1) is adopted. 
On Article 13(2) I have Amendment No 12 tabled by Mr de Ia Malene and worded as follows: 
'Article 13(2) 
Delete the word "exact".' 
The rapporteur has already indicated that he agrees to this change. 
I put Amendment No 12 to the vote. 
Amendment No 12  is adopted. 
I put Article 13(2) so amended to the vote. 
Article 13(2) is adopted. 
I put the whole of Article 13  so amended to the vote. 
Article 13  is adopted. 
On Article 14  I have Amendment No 8 tabled by Mr Bourges and Mr Yeats on behalf of the 
Group of European Progressive Democrats and worded as  follows: 
'Article 14 
Delete the last sentence.' 
I call Mr Yeats to move this amendment. 
148 Mr Yeats.  - Mr  President,  this  amendment seeks  to  eliminate  from  Article  14  the  last 
sentence. This is  the article which was  referred  to  a short time ago  by the rapporteur.  He 
pointed  out,  and  I  think  that  one  can  certainly  agree  completely with  him,  that  it  was 
necessary to have a general article of this kind to provide for details which for whatever reason 
were  not included or foreseen  in this Convention, relating to the implementation of direct 
elections. It is  necesary, quite clearly, to have an article like this. But what I and my group fail 
to  see  is  why,  when  considering  how  the  direct  elections  to  this  Parliament  are  to  be 
implemented, it is  necessary to consult the Commission. Now I wish to stress that this is  not 
in any sense intended as  criticism of the Commission. We have  the highest respect for  the 
Commission and the work it does. But I think one must have regard to the functions which 
are given  to  the Commission in the EEC.  In the Community, Parliament and the Council 
share the legislative power. 
The Commission  is  in part the  executive,  and indeed the various  articles  of  the Treaty of 
Rome which  refer to  the legislative  process  naturally exclude the  Commission from  this.  I 
think the rapporteur included this reference to the Commission through a misunderstanding, 
if I may be so bold as to say so in view of the extraordinarily able job he has done throughout. 
I hesitate to suggest such a thing, but in the last line of his explanation to Article 14, he says 
this role is already assigned to the Commission elsewhere in the Treaties, for example Article 
126 EEC. Now if one looks up Article 126 of the EEC Treaty, one finds it relates to the Social 
Fund, which is  clearly a matter directly related to  the activities of the Commission and it is 
only right that they should be consulted with regard  to  it.  But I do not think that we  as  a 
Parliament ought to  concede that on matters strictly relating to  the  parliamentary process, 
which are strictly a matter between us and the Council, it ought to be necessary to consult the 
Commission. So  I would ask the rapporteur to agree to delete this sentence. 
President. - I call Mr Scelba. 
Mr Scelba. - (I) Mr President, I call for a split vote on Article 14, i.e. for a separate vote on 
the phrase 'acting unanimously'. 
My reason is this: the European Parliament has always protested against the application of the 
Luxembourg Agreement which imposed the rule of unanimity. Equally contradictory is  the 
fact that Padiament, which must be heard in advance, decides on a majority basis whereas the 
Council would have to decide unanimously. 
I therefore hope that Parliament will reject this rule of unanimity and leave the Council to act 
as  it thinks best. I repeat that unanimity is contrary to the attitude of this House. 
President. - What is the rapporteur's position? 
Mr Patijn, rapporteur.  - (NL) Mr President, the Commission is  mentioned in two places in 
this  Draft  Convention,  namely  here  and  in  Article  2,  paragraph  2,  which  states  that  the 
Commission  as  well  as  the  Member  States  and  Parliament  may  propose  to  the  Council 
changes in the number of members of the Parliament. Thus the Parliament and the Council 
do not regard the elections as  something which concerns them exclusively. A short while ago 
we adopted Article 2, paragraph 2. 
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the European Social Fund clearly assigns a role to  the Commission. But I cannot at present 
foresee  what  administrative  measures  will  have  to  be  adopted  jointly by  the  Council  and 
Parliament,  for  example  in  the  budgetary  field  or  in  the  field  of  institutional  or  legal 
provisions,  in  the  adoption  of  which  the  Commission,  as  guardian  of  the  Treaty  and 
sometimes also  as  administrative and executive body in the Community, should participate 
under  the  terms  of  Article  155.  The  Commission  cannot  influence  agreement  between 
Parliament and Council  in  the sense  that its  vote  is  mandatory.  It advises.  In view  of  the 
uncertainty with regard to the measures to be adopted during the coming years, I find this a 
very useful provision. Therefore I should like to ask the House to reject this amendment. 
President.  - As  for  Mr Scelba's request to  have separate votes on the two parts of the first 
sentence of Article 14, so that the words 'acting unanimously' are voted on in isolation, I do 
not know if  it is  possible to  have  two  votes on two  parts of the same sentence. I would not 
have  thought  so,  and  besides  no  amendment  has  been  tabled.  If Mr  Scelba  had  been 
consistent, he would have tabled an amendment to withdraw the unanimity requirement. But 
now that there is  no amendment, I think a vote must be taken on the article as  a whole. 
I put Amendment No 8 to the vote. 
Amendment No 8 is  rejected. 
I now put the proposal by Mr Scelba to the vote. 
The proposal is  rejected. 
I now put Article 14  as  a· whole to the vote. 
Article 14  is  adopted. 
On Article 15  I have no amendments or speakers listed. 
I put it to the vote. 
Article 15  is adopted. 
On Article 16  I have Amendment No 2 tabled by Mr Patijn on behalf of the Political Affairs 
Committee and worded as  follows: 
'Article 16 
This article to be worded as  follows: 
"This Convention is  drawn  up in the Danish, Dutch, English,  French, German, Irish and Italian 
languages, all seven texts being equally authentic." ' 
I call Mr Patijn to move this amendment. 
Mr Patijn.  - (NL) Mr President, Mr Yeats was kind enough to point out to me that, since an 
official  amendment is  being made  to  the Treaty,  Irish  will  also  have  to  be  adopted  as  an 
official  language  for  this  Convention.  Therefore  'Irish'  is  inserted  between  'French'  and 
'Italian and Dutch' - at least that is  the order in the Dutch text. This must be so because it 
involves an official amendment to the Treaties of Rome and Irish must therefore be included. 
That is the purpose of my amendment. 
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Amendment No 2 is adopted. 
I put Article 16 so amended to the vote. 
Article 16 is  adopted. 
On Article 17  I have no amendments or speakers listed. 
I put it to the vote. 
Article 17  is  adopted. 
I note that we have thus adopted a Draft Convention to replace the Draft Convention adopted 
on 17 May 1960. 
Therefore we can now vote on the sixth paragraph of Part I of the motion for a resolution. 
I put it to the vote. 
The sixth paragraph is  adopted. 
We shall now consider Part II of the motion for a resolution. 
I have no amendments or speakers listed. 
I put it to the vote. 
Part II of the motion for a resolution is adopted. 
We  shall  now  vote  on  the  motion  for  a  resolution  as  a  whole  incorporating the vanous 
amendments that have been adopted. 
I would point out that Mr  Spenale and a certain number of representatives of the Socialist 
Group have requested that this vote be taken by roll call. 
I call Mr Spenale. 
Mr Spenale.  - (F)  Indeed, Mr President, I did submit a request, signed by ten members of 
the Socialist Group and myself, that this vote be taken by roll  call. The importance of this 
question is  such that it is  desirable  to  find  out the number of Members who were  present 
today to vote on this matter. 
President. - I call Mr Memmel. 
Mr Memmel. - (D) I support Mr Spenale's request for a roll call, particularly because an old 
wish of mine was yet not fulfilled today. I mean that, as  during voting on previous occasions 
when the results were close and there was a risk that a quorum did not exist, it was again only 
the officials and not we, the Members of Parliament, who knew the voting results! 
President. - I call Mr Klepsch to explain his voting intentions. 
Mr Klepsch.  - (D) I shall support the motion, although it is based on a principle regarding 
the number of Members which I find unsatisfactory. I would have preferred to see Lord Reay's 
151 request  regarding  the  number  of  Members  adopted  as  a  compromise.  In  spite  of  this 
reservation, I shall vote positively in the final vote. 
President. - I call Mr Romualdi for an explanation of vote. 
Mr Romualdi. - (I) On behalf of the party I represent in the Italian Parliament and thus in 
the European Parliament I shall vote  in  favour  of this motion for  a resolution in the same 
spirit as  my party did in favour of the Treaties of Rome fifteen  years ago.  I  think that this 
important decision, with which I am delighted, may revive many hopes of European political 
union which seemed lost for ever. As  Mr Ortoli said, this might not dissolve our doubts and 
difficulties, but it certainly augurs well for the future. I am honoured to be called upon, at the 
request of Mr Spenale, to explain our vote of approval of this Draft Convention. 
President. - We shall now take a vote by roll call. 
This will begin with Mrs Goutmann, whose name has been drawn by lot. 
The vote may commence. 
I ask the Secretary-General to call the roll. 
Does anyone else wish to vote? 
The ballot is closed. 
Here is the result of the vote. 
Number of Members voting: 125 
The following 106 Members voted in favour; 
Mr  Adams,  Mr  Albers,  Mr  Andreotti,  Mr  Ariosto,  Mr  Artzinger,  Mr  Bass,  Mr  Bayed,  Mr 
Behrendt, Mr Berkhouwer, Mr Alfred Bertrand, Lord Bessborough, Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Boano, 
Mr Brewis, Mr Broeksz, Mr Brugger, Mr Carpentier, Mr Cifarelli, Mr Corterier, Mr Creed, Mr 
De  Clercq,  Mr  De  Keersmaeker,  Mr  Delmotte, Mr  Didier,  Sir  Douglas  Dodds-Parker,  Mr 
Dondelinger, Mr  Dunne, Mr  Durieux, Lady  Elles,  Mr  Fellermaier, Mrs  Fenner, Mr  FHimig, 
Miss  Flesch, Mr Frehsee, Mr  Friih, Mr Gerlach, Mr Geurtsen, Mr Giraud, Lord Gladwyn, Mr 
van der Gun, Mr Hansen, Mr Harzschel, Mr van der Hek, Mr Herbert, Mr Hill, Mr Howell, Mr 
Hunault,  Mr  Johnston,  Mr  Jozeau-Marigne,  Mr  Kavanagh,  Mr  Kirk,  Mr  Klepsch,  Mr  De 
Koning, Mr Laban, Mr Lagorce, Mr Lange, Mr Lautenschlager, Mr Lenihan, Lord Lothian, Mr 
Liicker, Mr McDonald, Lord Mansfield, Mr Martens, Mr Meintz, Mr Memmel, Mr Mitterdorfer, 
Mr Willi Miiller, Mr Emile Muller, Mr Mursch, Mr Ney, Mr Noe, Mr  Nolan, Mr Normanton, 
Mr Notenboom, Mr Nyborg, Mrs Orth, Mr Outers, Mr Patijn, Mr Petre, Mr Pianta, Mr Radoux, 
Lord Reay, Sir Brandon Rhys Williams, Mr Romualdi, Mr Rosati, Lord St. Oswald, Mr Santer, 
Mr  Scelba,  Mr  Schmidt,  Mr  Scholten,  Mr  Schuijt,  Mr  Schwabe,  Mr  Schworer,  Mr 
Scott-Hopkins,  Mr  Seefeld,  Mr  Shaw,  Mr  Spenale,  Mr  Springorum,  Mr  Thornley,  Mr 
Vandewiele, Mr Vernaschi, Sir Derek Walker-Smith, Mr Walkhoff, Mrs Walz, Mr Yeats and Mr 
Zeller. 
The following 2 Members voted against: 
Mr Espersen and Mr N0rgaard. 
152 The following 17 Members abstained: 
Mr  Ansart,  Mr  Bordu, Mr  Bourges,  Mrs  Carettoni  Romagnoli, Mr  Cointat, Mr  Couste,  Mr 
D'  Angelosante, Mrs  Goutmann, Mr Hartog, Mr  Leonardi, Mr  Liogier, Mr de  la  Malene, Mr 
Marras, Mr  Bn~mdlund Nielsen, Mr Petersen, Mr Rivierez and Mr Sandri. 
As  more than an third of the current Members of Parliament have taken part in the vote, it is 
valid. 
The resolution as  a whole is adopted. 1 
(Loud applause) 
1  OJ C 32 of 11. 2.  1975. 
153 RESOLUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN 1976 
relating to elections by direct universal suffrage 
1.  Resolution of 11  March 1976 (OJ C 79 of 5. 4.  1976, p. 27) 
2.  Resolution of 7 April 1976 (OJ C 100 of 3. 5.  1976, p. 24) 
3.  Resolution of 16 June 1976 (OJ C 159 of 12. 7.  1976, p. 23) 
4.  Resolution of 15  September 1976 (OJ C 238  of 11. 10.1976, p. 25) 
RESOLUTION 
on direct elections to the European Parliament in 1978 
The European Parliament, 
in anticipation of the meeting of the European Council on 1 and 2 April 1976, 
1.  Calls on the Council to take, at this meeting, the final decision allowing elections to the 
European  Parliament by direct  universal  suffrage  in  1978  on  the  basis  of  the Convention 
adopted by Parliament in January 1975; 
2.  Instructs its President to forward  this resolution to the Council and Commission of the 
European Communities 
RESOLUTION 
on elections by direct universal suffrage to the European Parliament 
The European Parliament, 
recalling the draft Convention on elections by direct universal suffrage  to  the European 
Parliament which it adopted on 14 January 1975,1 
t  OJ No C 32, 11. 2.  1975, p. 15. 
155 recalling the resolution on direct elections to the European Parliament which it adopted 
on 11  March 1976,1 
recalling that at its meeting of 10  December 1974, the European Council itself decided 
that elections by direct universal suffrage should be held in 1978, 
1.  Regrets  the failure  of the European Council to  respond to  its  resolution of  11  March 
1976, which called upon it to  take on 1 and 2 April  1976 the final  decision to  hold direct 
elections on the basis of the draft convention; 
2.  Nevertheless welcomes the decision ·of  the European Council to confirm that elections 
by direct universal suffrage should be held in May or June 1978; 
3.  Emphasizes strongly its opinion that the final  decision on the draft convention should 
now be taken  in  the shortest possible time in order to  enable suitable arrangements to  be 
made in Member States for elections to be held in May or June 1978; 
4.  Affirms its opinion that the principles adopted in the draft convention as  the basis for 
determining the number and distribution of seats remain valid and strongly urges the Council 
of Ministers to base their decision upon them; 
5.  Urges  that, in view of the delay in arriving at a decision on the draft convention, the 
European  Parliament  should  now  be  consulted  under  the  concertation  procedure  as 
discussions in the Council of Ministers proceed. 
RESOLUTION 
on the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the fact that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs have not been able to fulfil 
the mandate given them by the European Council in respect of elections to the European 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage, 
1.  Shares the sincere hopes of all those who saw the election of the European Parliament by 
universal  suffrage  as  a  major  contribution  to  the  progress  and  democratization  of  the 
institutions of Europe; 
2.  Considers it essential that steps should be taken to ensure that the elections can be held 
on the dates set and earnestly asks the European Council and the Council of Ministers to keep 
to the formal undertakings given at the 197  4 Paris Summit Conference; 
I  OJ No C 79, S.  4.  1976, p. 27. 
156 3.  Asks  them  to  establish  the  number of  Parliamentarians  at  between  350  and  400,  a 
necessary pre-requisite for a balanced representation of the people and their minorities in the 
various countries and regions; 
4.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission of the 
European Communities and to the Governments of the Member States. 
RESOLUTION 
on direct elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to its resolutions of  14 January 1975 (Doc. 368/74), 1  11  March 1976 (Doc. 
11/76), 2 7 April1976 (Doc. 45/76) 3 and 16 June 1976 (Doc. 174/76), 4 
having regard to the undertaking given by the European Council on 12 and 13 July 1976 
that the act concerning the election of the European Parliament would be signed by the 
end of July, 
deploring the decision by the Council of the Communities on 27  July to  postpone the 
signing until its meeting of 20 September 1976, 
I 
considering  that  any  further  delay  in  the  approval  of  the  act  by  the  Council  would 
jeopardize  the  implementation  of  the  European  Council's  decision  that  the  elections 
should take place on the date fixed by it, 
convinced  of  the  need  to  broaden  as  soon  as  possible  the  democratic  basis  of  the 
Community by election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, 
1.  Calls  upon the  Council  of  the  Communities to  finally  sign  the  act  at  its  meeting of 
20 September 1976; 
2.  Insists  that the European  Council's decision  of  2  December  1975  m  Rome that the 
election will take place in May/  June 1978 should be respected; 
3.  Notes  the  total  number  of  seats  and  their  distribution  between  the  Member  States 
decided by the European Council on 12 July 1976 and declares its agreement thereto; 
1  OJ No C 32, 11. 2.  1975, p. 15. 
2  OJ No C 79, 5. 4.  1976, p. 27. 
3  OJ No C 100, 3. 5.  1976, p. 24. 
4  OJ No C 159,  12.  7.  1976, p. 23. 
157 4.  Calls  upon  the  Governments  and  Parliaments  of  the  Member  States  to  put  the 
ratification  procedures in hand as  soon as  possible after the signing of the legal  act and to 
adopt the necessary implementing measures so that the election can take place on the agreed 
date; 
5.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission and to 
the Parliaments and Governments of the Member States. 
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